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MANDATORY BUSING AND DESEGREGATION: WICHITA, 1954 – 1999

An Abstract of the Thesis by
Pilar K. Pedraza-Bailey

Wichita opened its first officially integrated school in 1954, yet by 1965,
approximately 85% of schools in Wichita were predominantly European American.
After a 1966 complaint to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) and
a protracted legal battle, a federal administrative judge ordered the district to devise a
plan for integration or lose federal funding in 1971. The resulting mandatory busing plan
remained in effect in Wichita for more than 40 years. In 2016, nine years after the
official end of mandatory busing in Wichita, 25% of the city’s schools had already
returned to what the federal government considers single-race status.
This thesis argues that although mandatory busing policies were the only
practicable solution within the power of school districts like Wichita, they were little
more than temporary stop-gaps that were constitutionally incapable of fixing the true,
underlying source of school segregation in cities like Wichita that no longer practiced de
jure segregation but still suffered from de facto segregation. Changing political attitudes
not only hindered efforts by school districts to develop racially balanced attendance
centers, but they actively blocked other local actions at the city, county, and state level
that might have provided the needed permanent solution. Given these circumstances, the
return to de facto segregation in some school buildings, once cleared of the mandatory
busing order, was a pre-determined outcome in Wichita.
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CHAPTER I

ROOTS AND TYPES OF SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
“I knew that many of my white friends that I would continue to see. But I did not
know how many of my black friends, whose homes I’d never been to, whose
neighborhoods weren’t mine, that I would see. So, I ended up going to the after-prom
party at the Zanzibar Club. My date and I were the only white folks there,” laughed Roz
Hutchinson.
Although she remembers some busing began as early as her freshman year,
Hutchinson’s high school senior year, 1971-72, was the first year of official mandatory
busing in the Wichita school district, USD 259. She recounts tales of racial tensions in
the school and of efforts on the part of the district to defuse those tensions and help the
students get along with each other. She also recounts how the racial mixing generally
ended at the schoolhouse door.1 Hers was the first generation in Wichita to live the
impact of mandatory busing for the purposes of integration, nearly two decades after the
U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark ruling Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas,
which ordered the end of de jure segregation in schools.

1

Roz Hutchinson, interview by Pilar Pedraza-Bailey, Wichita, KS, January 31, 2019.
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Wichita was one of dozens of cities across the country affected by the order to
find a way to better balance racial makeup at its various attendance centers at the risk of
losing all federal funding. Unlike southern cities that had been previously ordered to
desegregate, Wichita and other similar northern cities faced problems far beyond the need
to legally open all buildings to all races. Race relations there had developed over many
years into social hierarchies, cultural attitudes, and legal restrictions very dissimilar to the
outright segregation of “Jim Crow” laws in the South. Much like other cities dealing
with mandatory busing orders, which opponents labeled forced busing, Wichita saw some
immediate progress. Not only did racial balances even out in the busing era, academic
performance of all students saw improvements, and the achievement gap between the two
largest racial groups tightened within those first few years.2
However, school reassignment was never meant to be a permanent fix. Even
activists who had fought for school desegregation saw it as just one brick in the path to
ending social and cultural discrimination, especially as pertains to employment and
housing.3 As the civil rights movement lost internal momentum in the 1970s, it also
faced clear setbacks in national politics and the federal court system. The landscape
surrounding school desegregation was changing, and a series of presidential actions and
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U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, School Desegregation in Wichita, Kansas, August
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court orders began to set limits on the Civil Rights Commission’s and the Wichita school
district’s ability to remedy racial imbalances.4
In the late 1960s and into the 1970s, the base causes of school segregation in
Wichita were connected to the human tendency to seek out lodging where one feels safe
and secure. They were also the outgrowth of the desire to protect the monetary value of
one’s personal property, individual prejudices, the historical influences of legal
segregation on socioeconomic status and contemporaneous living patterns, and federal
housing laws and regulations of the era, such as redlining. True desegregation would
have taken much more than just the school district’s efforts to completely eradicate
building-level segregation when the district relied on the concept of the neighborhood
school. As the years passed, changing demographics in the city exacerbated the existing
problems; a growing Latino population represented a third large racial category to
contend with, one that was not a major player in the original desegregation plan. Since
those who could change the underlying causes -- the city, the business community, and
the voting public -- never acted, segregation returned to many of Wichita’s schools once
mandatory busing ended.
It is within this setting in the early 1970s that teens like Roz Hutchinson - and
their younger siblings - found themselves suddenly navigating a whole new world, one
that would be at times both unrecognizable and completely familiar to students in the
district today. “I mean, you know, in retrospect, and looking at it through eyes different,
you know, it’s like you think that you’re so woke for the times,” Hutchinson said. “And

“The State of Black America,” newspaper clipping, Eugene Anderson papers, KU
Spencer Research Library, folder RH MS 654:1.3, Legislative Papers, Clippings, Minority
Concerns, 1983, 1985-1986.
4
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you’re going, ‘Boy…there were so many things that I didn’t know or wasn’t sensitive to
or…’ You know, everybody’s doing the best they can, given the times that you live in.”5
SCHOOL SEGREGATION: NORTH VS. SOUTH
According to School: The Story of American Public Education, edited by Sarah
Mondale and Sarah Patton, most historians trace the roots of the American public school
system to the common schools that originated in the New England states in the mid-19th
century.6 In the colonial era, education was “neither free nor public.”7 Many colonists
brought with them the European idea that education was the responsibility of the family,
not the government. As small towns grew and developed the concomitant moral and
criminal problems of larger cities, politicians in Massachusetts enacted the first law
requiring a town to form a school. The Old Deluder Satan Act of 1647 was designed to
protect future generations from Satan by enabling them to read the Bible.8
After the Revolutionary War, leaders such as Noah Webster, Thomas Jefferson,
and Benjamin Franklin pushed for government-supported and institutionalized schooling
as a means of nurturing a sense of national unity. Historians would later call this
“Americanization” when applied to new immigrants.9 Even in the late 1700s, one of the
main obstacles to establishing government-supported schools was the cost to the public
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purse, as James Madison told Jefferson after the Virginia legislature voted down
Jefferson’s plan for a second time.10 Supporters eventually sold the public school idea to
business leaders as a way of establishing a common set of values, respect for authority,
and basic skills in the workforce.11 They sold it to working families as providing an
equal chance to all at what would become the American Dream. In 1852, the first
compulsory attendance law was passed in Massachusetts.12 By the beginning of the Civil
War, these “common schools” dominated in the New England states; they eventually
became the model upon which states built the current American public school system.13
From the earliest common schools to the modern public school, the American
society understood basic education as something that should be available to all. In
reality, however, the concept of “all” was not all-inclusive. This ideal did not necessarily
extend to working class girls beyond the basic primary schools, or to religious or racial
minorities in any school.14 In the pre-Civil War South, many communities had laws that
prohibited educating African American slaves, although, as historian Vanessa Siddle
Walker points out, slaves found ways to educate themselves clandestinely, hiding
textbooks underneath sewing kits, listening around doors as European American children
learned from tutors, or ‘playing school’ with European American friends.15 Before and
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immediately after the Revolutionary War, religious groups such as the Anglicans and
Quakers set up schools for African American students, even in the South. Some northern
communities experimented with integrated schools in the post-Revolutionary period, but
by 1820 they, too, generally either blocked African American students from attending or
had segregated school systems.16
The white racial frame dominated attitudes among school leaders, teachers, and
parents in both the North and South. After the Civil War, reconstructed southern
communities fought to keep former slaves and their children out of public schools, in part
because uneducated laborers were cheap and controllable. Congress required these states
to include public schooling in their new constitutions as a condition of their re-entrance to
the Union. There were attempts to force the former Confederate states to create racially
mixed schools; these efforts failed, in general.17 To help former slaves transition to
freedom, the Freedmen’s Bureau established up to 4,329 schools with a combined
enrollment of more than 247,000 by 1870.18 Southern states fought these efforts through
the restoration of home rule as Reconstruction ended. Voters expelled Republicans from
office and reinstated segregationist Democrats, who began passing Jim Crow laws,
circumscribing the newly found freedoms of former slaves, and requiring school
segregation.19 From the moment the Plessy v Ferguson ruling enshrined the concept of
separate but equal as constitutional under American law, not only did school districts
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across the nation have separate schools for European and non-European Americans, but
they primarily appropriated tax collections on European American schools, sometimes at
rates of as much as three or four dollars spent on European American schools for every
dollar spent on minority schools.20
In his personal history of the attempt to desegregate America’s schools, Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr, explores the development of white supremacy in the Old South. He writes
that starting in 1867, African Americans saw the rise of groups like the Knights of the
White Camelia, the White Brotherhood, and the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), all
with one purpose – to push African Americans out of any positions of power they had
gained under Reconstruction and put them back in their place. These groups waged a war
of psychological terror on the African American population, and throughout the South,
communities began to pass Black Codes, such as “grandfather clauses” in voting
registration. The former slaves saw education as their way to freedom and economic
prosperity within these conditions of oppression. When the European American system
failed them, they turned to developing their own. That education took two basic forms:
compromise on one hand, fighting back on the other. Urban and Wagoner illustrate the
compromise efforts through the work of Booker T. Washington, the founder of the
Tuskegee Institute. Rather than fight the majority American racist attitudes, he chose to
provide vocational training, emphasizing the dignity of labor as a means of instilling
racial pride in African Americans. Another African American activist of the time,
W.E.B. DuBois, spent decades studying the “Negro problem” of former southern slaves.
He concluded that to gain true social, economic, and political equality, African American

20

Ibid., 224.
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leadership needed an equalized, broad based, liberal arts higher education. His work led
to the formation of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) in 1909.21
Focusing on legal challenges, the NAACP chose segregated schools as one of its
first targets in its efforts to end segregation everywhere. In initial court cases, the
NAACP fought for equal funding for African American schools. Urban and Wagoner
explain that African American schools were often the center of their communities and
had generally better educated instructors than European American schools, many with
master’s degrees as opposed to simple high school teacher’s certificates, because they
had a lack of job opportunities elsewhere. The problem with these schools was based in
the lack of equal funding and resulting inadequate facilities.22 By the time of Brown v.
Board, the organization had realized that its best chance at successfully overturning
Plessy v Ferguson lay in convincing the Supreme Court that separate but equal was
“inherently unequal.”23 Although argued with the best of intentions, the case’s outcome
would mean that more than 30,000 African American teachers in the South alone would
lose their jobs in the ensuing years, and that schools around which strong African
American communities had formed would close.24
Despite the African American community’s hope that the Brown v. Board ruling
had rung the death knell of segregation in the United States, it had mixed success. The
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Brown II (1955) ruling, ordering districts to proceed with “all deliberate speed,” left the
door wide open for delaying tactics, which many districts pursued. Some districts
proceeded with limited desegregation, allowing only small numbers of African American
students to attend the European American schools, but claiming full desegregation. To
qualify to attend the European American schools, the African American students had to
be above average both academically and behaviorally. Other districts relied on de facto
segregation and gerrymandered boundaries to keep African American students in one
school building and European American students in another, and some districts used
“freedom of choice” plans, which allowed European American students to flee a newly
integrated school building for a still-segregated one. Another option was to segregate
students within a school building into separate programs, generally college preparatory or
technical education programs. These efforts kept students from mingling with and
learning about each other and kept African American students from earning higher
incomes once out of school because they lacked an academically rigorous education.25
Border states like Kansas appeared to quickly comply with the desegregation
mandates of Brown v. Board, while school districts employed many of the abovementioned practices to avoid desegregating in fact.26 Some communities, like Little
Rock, vowed massive resistance and used police lines and riots to prevent African
American students from entering European American schools. Others employed some of
the various delaying tactics -- from “freedom of choice” plans to integrating only a
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handful of students -- or completely closed all schools in order to avoid desegregation, as
happened in Virginia. A decade after the Brown ruling, 98% of African American
students in the South remained in segregated classrooms. It was not until Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that things began to change. This act banned racial
discrimination in all federally funded projects, including schools. The Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 offered southern states, many among the country’s
poorest states, increased federal funding for all schools.27 This was an option that had
been under debate since at least the early 1950s as schools nationwide struggled to find
the money to accommodate the rapidly growing enrollments spurred by the post-war
baby boom.28
Providing additional federal funding initially had little impact on northern
schools, where racist housing codes segregated the schools just as much as school
segregation laws had in the South. That began to change in 1971, when the Swann v
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education ruling inaugurated the era of mandatory
busing to desegregate schools segregated by neighborhood living patterns.29 European
American families that could afford to leave big cities with large minority populations
did so in another wave of white flight. This increased city versus suburb segregation
problems that had grown with post-World War II suburbanization. School systems
around the country used tracked instruction, putting European American students on a

27
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university preparatory track and minority students on a vocational/technical track, to
segregate within buildings. They relied on standardized intelligence assessment exams to
place students, even though the racial biases of these tests had played a large role in the
Brown v. Board arguments.30 In 1974, the Millikin v Bradley ruling said states were not
responsible for desegregating schools if inner city schools were mostly African American
and nearby suburban schools were mostly European American unless the schools had
used legal means to make that happen. In other words, if more affluent European
American families could afford to move to all- European American towns or out into the
country and if minority families wanted to live near each other, that was all a personal
choice. Desegregation laws did not apply.31 This ruling failed to consider the
government’s role in promoting these segregated living patterns. In consequence by the
1980s, southern schools were more integrated than northern schools.
HOUSING SEGREGATION
Schools were not the only institution to suffer from both de jure and de facto
segregation through the second half of the 1900s. Businesses, job opportunities, and
housing options were also highly segregated, and thus they complicated efforts to
desegregate the nation’s schools, especially in larger urban areas in the North and West.
In the 1980s, historian Kenneth Jackson began an in-depth analysis of the
suburbanization of America. He traced the development of modern suburbs to the 1830s
and 1840s. Up until then, suburbs were the slums of American cities, while the central
cities were the province of those who had money. In 1799, the newspaper the Aurora

30
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described the Philadelphia suburbs by their stench, saying visitors “are saluted with a
great variety of fetid and disgusting smells, which are exhaled from the dead carcasses of
animals, from stagnant waters, and from every species of filth that can be collected.”32
Those who could afford it chose to live as closely as possible to their places of work,
marking the daily commute in how many minutes it took to walk to work. Jackson calls
the cities that grew up around this ancient tradition “walking cities.”33 It was not until the
advent of modern mass transportation just before the Civil War, in the form of ferries,
steam-powered locomotives and horse trolleys, that those with money began to move into
new suburban communities recognizable to modern eyes. The American elite began to
purchase country homes or estates outside of the city for respite in the summer or for
holidays. These purchases were fueled by a growing social movement that valued clean,
healthy air as well as by the development of mass transit.
Starting in the second half of the 1940s and continuing over the next two decades,
European American GIs and their families moved en masse to the suburbs, turning what
had been a steady trend since the 1840s into a massive upheaval in American living
patterns and city design. The migration to suburbia was supported not only by the
American dream of owning one’s own home in the clean, healthy country air. It was also
supported by the search for economic prosperity and stability in the wake of the Great
Depression as well as safety from the threat of atomic attack. Jackson argues that
Americans began flooding into the suburbs by the end of World War II for three reasons:
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Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985),
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an extreme housing shortage, the advent of the family car and, as historian Paul Boyer
points out, the nuclear bomb. From 1950 through 1979, 72% of the nation’s largest 25
cities lost population.34
In the process of fleeing urban areas, European Americans chose to avoid conflict
as much as possible, clinging to stability over risk in both personal and work lives, and
enforcing adherence to the ‘norm’ by all within the social circle, excluding anything that
threatened that stability. Historian Elaine Tyler May refers to this as “defense through
containment.” The result was a dramatically increased level of segregation, supported
and incited by government policies as well as personal predilections.
The move to the suburbs blurred class lines, mixing Caucasian blue-collar
families with the middle class, pulling recent European immigrants out of their traditional
ethnic enclaves, and allowing them to blend into mainstream American life. The
migration positioned people of differing religions, from Jewish to Catholic, as next-door
neighbors. It was a dramatic illustration of the American melting pot.35
At the same time, racial divisions grew larger and more entrenched. Some
communities legally banned the sale of land or homes to minorities, racial and religious,
in restrictive neighborhood covenants.36 The religious bans in neighborhoods fell away
after World War II, but the racial bans continued for another 20 to 30 years, upheld by
both real estate agents and residents, despite the 1948 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in
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Shelley v. Kramer that these restrictive covenants were “unenforceable as law and
contrary to public policy.”37
Anti-segregation activists proved unable to successfully combat these divisions as
a new slum culture developed in increasingly impoverished and primarily African
American-only inner-city neighborhoods from which African American middle-class
families struggled to escape. When those families did try to purchase homes in the
suburbs, even after legal blocks were lifted, they sometimes met violence from European
American homeowners fearing losses in property values.38
Post-World War II economic factors helped the suburbs grow and left the inner
cities to dwindle away. The United States had an excess of land, something not available
to older cities in European countries, making suburban growth cheaper than rebuilding
the inner cities. In addition, with development following the Interstate Highway Act of
1956, industry found itself increasingly freed from its historical transportation restraints.
This allowed industries to move to cheaper properties on the edges of the cities, spurring
the development of new working-class suburbs around those properties.39 There was also
a belief as the Cold War gained strength that multiple, smaller factories scattered
throughout the suburbs would be safer from communist agitation than single, large
factories in the central city because this would prevent the gathering of large groups of
common laborers who might too easily be seduced to the communist cause.40 These
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developments drained jobs from large cities and lowered the tax base available to
maintain public services. The resulting lowered standard of public services further
lessened the incentive to stay for those who could afford to move away. And, it increased
poverty levels in the remaining urban, minority communities. Minority communities
were stuck in the cities with fewer job opportunities and fewer city resources to provide
services, from street repair to police protection against the growing crime rate that itself
resulted from the lack of viable, legal financial options for survival.
Originally, cities could simply absorb economically stable suburbs through
annexation, bringing the taxpaying population lost to the suburbs back into the cities’
financial folds. The resulting mixture of classes and races within the overall city, if not
within the individual neighborhoods, allowed cities to spread resources, provide jobs, and
continue growing. By the 1950s, though, annexation ceased to be an option for growth
for most of the largest cities in the US. Of the 12 largest cities that lost population
between 1950 and 1980, all had continued to grow until then by adding land.41
Memories and fears played a big role, as well, in the sudden growth of the
suburbs after World War II. Americans quickly realized that the nuclear bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were a danger that could reach them, too. As early as August
7th 1945, Hanson W. Baldwin wrote in the New York Times, “We have sowed the
whirlwind.” This fear trickled through all levels of society, though those with more
education and money were the ones to articulate the fear and act on it.42 This fear only
intensified as people began to realize the likelihood that other countries would have the
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nuclear bomb within a few years. The fear came in waves, increasing with the 1949
announcement that the Soviets had successfully tested their own bomb, the outbreak and
expansion of the Korean Conflict in the early 1950s, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in
1962; between events like this, it subsided to a low-level, rarely acknowledged
background noise that affected all facets of daily life.43
The nuclear age and the fears it raised defined and confined American life for the
next couple of decades. Its presence could be felt in the topics of songs and movies, in
political decisions, changing ideas about city development, the desire for earlier marriage
and larger families, and an all-encompassing faith in the ability of science to solve life’s
problems, including finding an effective defense against ‘the bomb’ as well as positive
uses for nuclear technology. Among those effects were the twin beliefs that dispersing
American cities so ‘the bomb’ could not destroy as many people and that having larger
families would help re-populate the country after an attack. This made moving to the
suburbs, marrying, and having a large family almost a patriotic duty. It also gave the
illusion of being able to do something to protect one’s country, if not one’s own family,
in the event of a nuclearized world war.44
One of the strands of changed thought to come out of the post-war haze of fear
was the belief that to truly move forward, America must unite in a way it never had
before, across racial and social boundaries. Soviet claims that the United States did not
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treat all citizens equally contributed to the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s.
For Eleanor Roosevelt, and many policymakers, the lesson of the development of the
atomic bomb was clear: “social unity must replace divisiveness and conflict.”45 They
worried that racial strife and dissatisfied labor would draw the working poor and
minorities to radical, left-wing political ideologies like communism.46 For most
Americans, though, this remained mainly a conceptual ideal, one that did not truly carry
over into daily life and internal thought processes. They wanted to find peace by
surrounding themselves with others of the same class, race, and religious beliefs,
adapting to life’s circumstances and not making waves. Both beliefs were part of an
overwhelming desire for peace following the upheaval of the Depression years and the
dangers of the war years.47 Idealists like Roosevelt saw peace in cooperation. But most
Americans saw peace in separation, segregation, and normalization.
After decades of fewer marriages and fewer births, Americans wanted a return to
the ‘traditional’ family – a working husband supporting a stay-at-home mother and three
to four children, something most of their parents did not have.48 This held true for all
Americans, regardless of race or religious persuasion. The average age at marriage for
both men and women, which had been falling slowly but steadily since 1890, reached its
lowest point in about 1950. At the same time, the numbers of divorces fell in the postwar years. Even those couples that did eventually split up generally did so some 20 years
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later, after children had been raised and set loose on the world as full-fledged adults.49
Most couples married in their early twenties and had completed their families within the
decade.
With the increasing number of new marriages and families coming after the
Depression and war years that had nearly halted home construction, Americans
experienced a severe housing shortage after World War II.50 By 1945, there were not
enough houses in 98% of U.S. cities and a shortage of apartments in 90% of them. The
solution became the modern pre-planned subdivision, filled with a new balloon-style
frame home that could be built on the assembly line model as pioneered by Abraham
Levitt and his sons.51 Even the design of the homes reflected the new priorities of
Americans. Easily expandable with a growing family, the designers put the kitchens near
the front entrance and giant picture windows in living rooms facing backyards so mothers
could keep an eye on their children while keeping up with their household chores.52
Made quickly, with low-cost materials, the new suburban homes cost less than
traditionally built homes. Once federal financing policies were added to the cheaper
construction, they even cost less than renting.53 The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (GI
Bill) of 1944 expanded the Federal Housing Authority’s programs, providing mortgage
insurance at lower rates to millions of European Americans. This, combined with federal
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tax deductions for mortgage interest and real estate taxes, made purchasing and owning a
home cheaper than it ever had been before.54 Over the next two decades, 83% of the
nation’s growth took place in the suburbs, doubling the number of Americans living in
these planned communities.55 Access to these advantages, though, was difficult for
minorities, not only because of restrictive covenants banning sale of the new homes to
minority buyers but also to federal mortgage insurance practices and transportation
policies.
In the 1930s, President Franklin Roosevelt signed legislation creating the Home
Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC). Meant to protect homeowners from foreclosure by
helping banks to better determine what properties would maintain their value and be a
good investment for a mortgage, it ended up essentially barring African Americans from
purchasing homes in certain neighborhoods and at reasonable interest rates for decades.
The implementation of these loan standards came to be called redlining for the color
coding HOLC used to determine the quality of neighborhoods. Brand new, all- European
American neighborhoods were considered the best investments and thus guaranteed
mortgages. These neighborhoods were coded green. Second rate neighborhoods were
still all- European American, still at their peak but beginning to age. Following that came
declining neighborhoods beginning to see some incursions by minorities, and, finally, all
minority neighborhoods, regardless of age or quality of the homes. This last group was
coded red. To maintain their top ratings and thus their property values, all- European
American neighborhoods fought to keep Jews, African Americans, and other minorities
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and immigrants out.56 As May points out, this also meant that once a single home in the
neighborhood fell into the hands of an ‘undesirable’ family, European American families
in the area quickly sold out, fleeing a feared property-value drop that their own departure
precipitated. In some cases, as in Wichita, real estate agents initiated this evacuation by
deliberately fanning the flames of fear. This practice of redlining and white flight kept
African Americans in deteriorating inner cities and European Americans moving ever
farther from the core of the city, out into the deepest suburbs.
To help families living in the suburbs get to work every day, the federal
government began to build highways. With the sudden spread of the automobile culture
in the early 20th century, both motorists and motor companies began to lobby the
government for better roads.57 In the post-nuclear world of the 1950s, the concept of
defense through decentralization also took hold of the American public’s psyche,
encouraging urban sprawl.58 Thus, in 1956, Congress passed President Dwight
Eisenhower’s Interstate Highway Act. The Act authorized a 41,000-mile interstate
highway system for which the federal government would pay 90% of the cost.59 These
highways were often built at the expense of poor, mostly minority, neighborhoods in the
city that city leaders wanted gone, anyway. In Wichita, the construction of Interstate 135
split the traditionally African American McAdams neighborhood in two. Overall, this
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practice just forced more poor people who could not afford to purchase homes in the
suburbs to further crowd the remaining available inner-city housing.
Other government policies designed to help the poor and minorities living in the
inner cities made things worse. In 1937, Congress passed and President Roosevelt signed
into law the United States Housing Act. It created the United States Housing Authority
(USHA) to develop publicly funded housing available to the poor. The money was to be
given to local governments to build and maintain these projects. While it was meant to
be used everywhere, suburbs declined to form the necessary committees to develop these
projects. This meant that municipalities could not use cheaper land on the edges of the
suburbs, only the high-priced land in the center of the cities. Meanwhile, big cities were
more interested in clearing out slums and protecting real estate values than in developing
safe, sound new housing. This led to the new ‘projects’ going up in the same place as the
old slums, usually with cheap, shoddy work and little to no maintenance or security.
Though the ‘projects’ started out as a plan to help poor people, such low-cost housing
developments just packed them into tighter quarters, often ugly high rises in unwanted
parts of town, with fewer options for escape. Thus, even as more African Americans
were moving to the big cities because mechanization had replaced them on cotton and
sugar plantations in the South, there was less affordable housing available for them.60
With the federal government paying for more than 90% of the of the interstate
system’s construction costs, the tax deductions for homeowners and the federally
subsidized mortgage insurance programs of the FHA and the VA, more taxpayer money
provided social welfare to middle- and upper-class families living in the suburbs than to
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the poor living in the inner cities.61 This is just one of many ways in which
governmental policies combined with new attitudes toward racial mixing, the
development of the family and proper housing, to push European Americans into the
suburbs in unprecedented numbers in the post-World War II years while packing the poor
and minorities into underfunded inner-city neighborhoods. These attitudes and
governmental policies combined with fears of a possible nuclear war engendered by the
developing Cold War to convince all Americans regardless of income, race, or religion,
that the best places to live were the suburbs.
TARGETING SCHOOLS FOR DESEGREGATION
Desegregation was a short-lived movement in American education that produced
startlingly effective results, but quickly lost momentum as the attendant difficulties left
the American desire for a quick fix unsatisfied. Schools that saw successful
desegregation, even if only temporarily, also saw an increase in minority student
performance, a lessening of the performance gap between European American and
minority students, and lower operating costs. Simultaneously, the greater communities
often saw an increase in integrated neighborhoods and a decrease of criminal behaviors
and social welfare reliance as a greater percentage of the population had the necessary
education to successfully provide for themselves, and an increase in the local tax base.
However, discomfort in middle-class suburban communities over the up-front additional
tax burden of providing support services to students coming from impoverished systems
and educational traditions or of having their children endure long bus rides to school
combined with an growing belief that the American public school system was broken.
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This resulted in a push for a return to neighborhood schools, despite the fact that this
would lead to a resegregation of the American school system.
Much like the Reconstruction Era, the Desegregation Era lasted for only a couple
of decades and, as a top-down induced reform, fell to the quiet, persistent resistance of
the European American majority mostly in northern states, not to the loudly proclaimed
“massive resistance” of the South that won international headlines. Although most
consider Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, the beginning of
desegregation, the Supreme Court’s ruling a year later in Brown II that desegregation
must happen “with all deliberate speed” gave local communities plenty of leeway to
delay making any changes. Actual desegregation did not begin until after the passage of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act which allowed the federal government to withhold educational
support monies from schools that did not comply. 62 Some southern communities met
that desegregation order with riots, European American parents pulling their children
from public schools to send them to private schools or simply moving to European
American suburbs, and even the closing of school systems entirely in an overall
movement leaders called “massive resistance.” Headlines about these acts cemented
national outrage against the de jure segregation that had existed in the South and brought
state and federal forces into play to enforce the Supreme Court’s rulings.63 During the
years in which desegregation remained a court-controlled feature of public education,
conservatives worked to fill the bench with judges who agreed with the sentiment that de
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facto segregation, based on housing patterns and personal choice, were a natural fact of
life over which the government had no control. In the meantime, through zoning laws,
site location choices for new schools, white flight, and the push for federal funding of
private schools via a voucher system, private citizens and business communities who
opposed desegregation managed to begin slowly undoing what the courts had ordered.
Though it took more than four centuries to build the system of racism, segregation, and
discrimination across the nation that the Brown ruling was supposed to fix, within just
two decades districts had begun to drift back toward segregation. By the 1990s, the
political winds had shifted away from the progressive, liberal attitudes that had enforced
court-ordered integration. Conservative judges now controlled the U.S. Supreme Court
as well as many of the lower federal court benches. Their rulings completed what quiet,
persistent resistance to desegregation had begun.64
Up through the 1970s, Supreme Court rulings continued to push forward with
desegregation plans. Brown v. Board, of course, dismantled the separate but equal
mandate of the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson ruling. Further rulings outlawed the “freedom of
choice” plans many southern schools put in place, allowing European American students
to transfer out of African American schools, ordered desegregation to begin immediately,
and determined that cross-town mandatory re-assignment and busing of students to new
schools was a legal means of ending desegregation.65 The 1966 federal “Coleman
Report” influenced many of these decisions. David Aretha in With All Deliberate Speed:
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Court-ordered Busing and American Schools writes that a key part of that report showed
quality of education had more to do with the socioeconomic background of a child’s
family than with how much the government spent on schooling. Theoretically,
desegregation worked to improve schools because, according to the Coleman Report,
“the number-one indicator of a minority or lower-class student’s success was the
educational level of his or her classmates.”66 This theory proved its worth a couple of
decades down the road as will be evident later in this essay.
Much of the resegregation of American schools came about as the nation’s leaders
turned their eye from one clearly defined problem, apparently on its way to complete
resolution, to another, more amorphous concern. Throughout the nation’s history,
America has taken periodic issue with the quality of education afforded its youth. These
periods of concern have generally been in reaction to political trends. As the
technological revolution of the 20th century led to greater globalization, and the American
economy tanked in the 1970s, eyes turned to the educational system for answers. The
1983 federal report “A Nation at Risk” attacked the quality of education the system
offered. From that point on, presidents on both sides of the aisle pursued reforms
allegedly designed to improve the quality of the school system. In Dismantling
Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of Education, editor Gary Orfield
points out that these “debates on the excellence movement” rarely mentioned racial
inequality.67 In this atmosphere, school systems began to make decisions on student
placement, where to build new schools, and how to draw boundaries for buildings on
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merits other than population balance. Business communities had gotten what they
wanted out of desegregation and no longer threw their weight behind the movement,
instead pursuing other school reforms that ultimately reinforced school segregation. The
courts, now filled with conservative judges, began to hand down a series of rulings that
dismantled desegregation, blocking efforts to desegregate schools across city/suburban
lines, telling schools they could make up for segregation by spending extra money on
supplementary, compensatory educational programs in segregated schools, deciding that
once schools are considered unitary or fully desegregated, they can end their
desegregation programs, that schools only had to partially desegregate to win unitary
status, that schools do not have to fix the educational harms of segregation in their
desegregation plans, and that schools could no longer consider race when making student
assignments to specific buildings.68
In Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: School Desegregation and Resegregation in
Charlotte, editors Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Stephen Samuel Smith and Amy Hawn
Nelson describe the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, school district as a prime
example of not only how well desegregation could work, but also how quickly and
effectively resegregation can occur. The 1971 Swann decision that began desegregation
in Charlotte is also the one that initiated the era of mandatory busing. The 2002
Cappachione v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools decision, also known as Swann II,
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declared the Charlotte-Mecklenburg district unitary. That decision almost immediately
returned the county to a segregated system after years of slowly drifting in that
direction.69
In the 1980s and 1990s, many hailed the Charlotte schools as the poster child for
integration. When Ronald Reagan, during a campaign stop in 1984, railed against forced
busing as a failed social experiment, a Charlotte Observer editorial struck back, saying
that integrated schools were the city’s proudest achievement of the last 20 years. The city
had a series of unique factors that made integration work so well. The first is the
geographical make-up of the district – a combined county and city district.70 This
prevented serious impact from the suburbanization of America that doomed urban school
districts like Detroit, Chicago, and Los Angeles with the loss of European American
students and families of higher socioeconomic backgrounds.71 Second, once the legal
battle over desegregation ended, the school district got to work following the judge’s
order without the paroxysms seen in places like Little Rock and Boston. Third, the
business community in Charlotte fully and actively supported the busing plans as part of
its competition for a larger piece of the globalization pie.72 The ultimate plan revolved
around pairing majority European American and majority African Americans elementary
schools. The district bused African American students to the European American schools
for the K-3 grades, then bused the European American students to the African American
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schools for grades 4-6. The district re-drew boundaries to fully integrate its larger junior
high and high schools.73 West Charlotte High School (WCHS), a formerly all-African
American building, was the flagship of the district’s desegregation. In studies of its
students and interviews with alumni, one can see playing out the benefits of
desegregation predicted earlier by the Coleman Report. Despite cultural
misunderstandings and some self-segregation, students reported their time at WCHS as
the most racially integrated experience of their lives. They described the ways they
learned not only to make friends with students of the opposite race, but also how to
navigate the inevitable misunderstandings caused by their differing backgrounds.74 The
school also saw improved test scores among African American students and a lowering
of the achievement gap between African American and European American students.
Other benefits included lowered truancy and drop-out rates, as well as a reduced
probability of criminal behavior leading to incarceration.75
Changes in demographics throughout the county and in residential patterns due to
construction of Interstate 485, also known as the Outerbelt Highway, in southern
Mecklenburg County added to court rulings that had been chipping away at desegregation
plans like Charlotte’s, causing the district to begin a slow drift back toward segregated,
neighborhood schools in the 1990s.76 The loss of the business community’s support
compounded this drift. The business community no longer needed to tout its integrated
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status to compete globally and began to choose development projects such as the
interstate over desegregation. That increased status in the global business community
brought many new residents to town. They mostly came from de facto segregated
communities in the North and objected to their children’s having to ride buses across
town to go to school. In fact, six of the seven plaintiffs in Capacchione were European
American newcomers to the city. They charged that the school district denied their
children entrance to coveted magnet schools because the children were European
American. The district vigorously defended its desegregation policies, but the judge,
Robert Potter, had been a leader in the anti-busing movement in the 1960s. In 2002 he
ruled that Charlotte was unitary and could and should drop its desegregation practices,
returning to neighborhood schools.77 Since attempts to desegregate the city’s public
housing policies had failed, a return to neighborhood schools meant a return to segregated
schools. Within a school year, WCHS saw drastic changes. It moved from being an
integrated school, racially and socioeconomically, with high academic achievement to
being 91% African American, serving free and reduced-cost lunches to 61.9% of
students, and having the lowest test scores in the district. To date, the district’s efforts to
deal with increasing segregation and its impacts have failed. Opponents argue that this is
because those attempts failed to take into consideration racial balance. Instead, they have
relied on the Milliken II ruling to offer compensatory programs to students in lowperforming schools, which are mainly the minority majority schools in the district. 78
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As conditions changed, support for desegregation among the business community,
parents, and local politicians fragmented. By the early 2000s, Charlotte-Mecklenburg
schools were no longer able to offer integrated education, no matter what the school
board, teachers or students might want. This is a prime example of the resegregation
researchers are finding happening all over the country. Most schools today are
concentrating on educational reforms revolving around the Milliken II-type compensatory
programs and voluntary desegregation through magnet schools. They have left attempts
at racial balance behind. The history of racial politics in this country predicted this
change and predicts that another push for better racial relations and more equitable
conditions will come. With a nation moving toward a minority majority of the entire
population, it behooves educators, parents, and politicians to look closely at what has and
has not worked in the past to provide the coming generations with the best public
education possible.
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CHAPTER II

RACE RELATIONS AND DISCRIMINATION IN WICHITA
“My father was a businessman and so we would go to some restaurants that he
could kind of get familiar with because his white clients would take him there over lunch.
And so they knew him and they would accept him,” Bonita Gooch, editor of the Kansas
African American newspaper The Community Voice, told The Chung Report. She moved
to Wichita from Tennessee as a child in the early 1950s. She did not understand or even
recognize the segregation going on in the city until she had grown up, moved away and
then come back. But some things always raised questions in her mind. “I always
wondered why there were no other black people in the restaurant. Why don’t these black
people come and enjoy this good food? But, you know, it wasn’t a place that you could
go.”79
Wichita, like the rest of Kansas, has a mixed past when it comes to race relations
and discrimination. Even as it made strides to be at the forefront of the legal
desegregation of public schools, USD 259 remained highly segregated, pointing toward
the problems many northern schools would have with integration throughout the second
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half of the 20th century. While primary and secondary schools in Kansas often segregated
students by race, all state colleges and universities were already, in fact always had been,
legally integrated. Racial segregation also took a back seat to economics in many towns
and cities. The state that brought the country John Brown and George Washington
Carver also brought it Quantrill’s Raiders and Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,
Kansas. The City of Wichita officially came into being with the signatures of an African
American man and a woman on the incorporation petition. When the city’s school
district legally segregated, the African American schools were the newest and, in some
cases, best schools in the city. Although, by the time the Wichita Public Schools had
fought integrated schooling all the way to the point of losing federal funding, African
American schools in the district had fallen far behind their European American
counterparts in facilities and curriculum. Wichita was a prime example of the racial
contradictions that were and are Kansas.
In 1870, the U.S. Census recorded 689 persons living in the City of Wichita. Of
those, the Census labeled 680 as “white” and 9 as “Colored,” or 1.3% African
American.80 Those nine people were likely all members of the Buckner family, based on
James R. Mead’s personal memoir. Historians commonly consider Mead to be the
founder of Wichita because he opened a fur-trading post there, likely the first European
American business in Wichita, and later spearheaded the efforts to incorporate Wichita as
a city in Kansas. Yet, in his memoirs, it is clear he is not the first settler in the area. He
recounts his interactions with “a colored family named Buckner, from the Cherokee
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Nation,” who lived just up the river. He never gives Buckner’s first name, but tells how
Buckner lived with his wife and “six or seven” children. Buckner acted as a hunting
guide for Mead “as he knew the country well.” But Mead did not approve of Buckner’s
practice of shooting just enough buffalo for his needs and letting the rest get away, likely
part of the Cherokee culture Mead indicated that Buckner was from. Mead considered the
behavior “impractical and useless,” and the two soon parted ways.81 The Wichita Eagle
in 1872 identified Richard Robinson as the “first culled person” in the valley; he was also
a signatory on the city’s incorporation papers, along with Billy the Kid’s mother, marking
at least a public tolerance for equal political participation of minorities and women in the
city’s early years, at a time when Kansas proudly upheld its service to the Union during
the Civil War.82
Over the next few decades, the African American community slowly grew to be a
larger percentage of the city, with occasional rapid influxes of new immigrants from the
South. Yet, by the 1960s, African Americans had never exceeded 10% of the city’s
overall population. The Wichita Beacon reported in 1963, based on U.S. Census
numbers, that the African American population had grown from 268 persons in 1880 to
19,861 in 1960, or from 3.5% to 7.8% of the overall population; half of that growth had
come in the 1950s. The city’s African American community experienced two major
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growth spurts. The first came in 1879-1880, the second in the 1950s. At both points the
African American population in Wichita essentially doubled.
In 1879-1880, an exodus of former slaves from the Confederate South fled
economic conditions and the beginning of the Jim Crow Era; some 6,000 African
Americans relocated to Kansas. The migrant Exodusters mainly came from Texas,
Louisiana, and Mississippi, and they were generally poor, uneducated, and desperate.
With its history as a free state and its rule of allowing African Americans to participate in
the Homestead Act’s land giveaway, Kansas became the Exodusters’ Land of
Opportunity, much as the United States had become for European immigrants in the 19th
century. Already settled Kansans, both European and African American, feared the
influx of immigrants because of their poverty and expected impact on the labor market.
The majority of Exodusters, however, became farmers and settled in the state’s rural
communities. News about the Kansans’ resistance and the realities of homesteading
filtered back from this wave of African American settlers to those left behind in the
Confederate South, ending the Exodus.83
Incidents like one in Wichita led to this change of heart. In 1879, the City of
Wichita detained nine of 14 Exodusters who came to town in search of jobs and sent
them back to Topeka. The local Republican newspaper reported that Topeka had simply
forwarded the refugees on because the city could no longer afford to support them, thus
“dodging a responsibility of her own assuming.” Wichita then instituted a quarantine
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“against the introduction of any more exodus.” Only later did Wichita learn that these
Exodusters were not vagrants but were planning to stay with friends and family in town.84
Kansans generally left the former slaves alone once they settled in their own
communities, either in separate towns like Nicodemus, established in 1877, or within
segregated enclaves in already established towns like Wichita. By the 1880s, the Beacon
reported the beginnings of an African American settlement “in the vicinity of 13th and
Wabash.” 85 This was about a mile away from the main city at the time. When the city
separated into five wards for administrative purposes in the 1880s, Ward 2 was the
predominantly African American community, with the rest being predominantly
European American. This would have been due to personal preference and social and
economic pressures at that time, as there was no legal separation of the neighborhoods.
By the 1870s, Wichita was a main stop along the Chisholm trail, the route
ranchers took to get their cattle from pastures in Texas to the railroads in places like
Abilene, Kansas, that would allow them to ship the animals to markets back East. This
earned Wichita the title of being a cattle or cow town. For three to six months out of the
year, cowboys would invade the city intent on enjoying their break from the dry, dusty
job of herding belligerent cattle to market. The cowboys wanted luxuries like hot baths
and good food, and fun, like gambling, drinking, and fornicating with prostitutes. The
towns wanted the money that the cowboys were ready, willing, and able to spend. In
Wichita, fines and license fees from prostitution, gambling, and liquor sales brought the
town $3,000 a month. In a single year, one grocery store recorded sales profits of
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$100,000.86 The permanent residents of cow towns like Wichita did not want such
unsavory businesses, and the crime that often accompanied them, where locals lived and
found recreation. So they segregated the areas where saloons, dance halls, and bath
houses might operate. In Wichita, the Arkansas River was the dividing line between
permanent residents and this early, cowboy-targeted service sector. East of the river were
the main business district and residential areas for permanent Wichitans. West of the
river, in the Delano District, was for cowboys to have their fun and leave their money.87
It remains uncertain how much of this segregation was also due to the high
numbers of African American, Mexican, and, later, Native American cowboys as
opposed to concerns in Victorian society about crime and morality. The Hollywood myth
of the John Wayne-esque European American cowboy conquering the Wild West was
based on only a fraction of the truth. Historians estimate that between 15% and 25% of
the cowboys coming through on cattle drives would have been former slaves from Texas.
Another 15%, maybe more, were of Mexican heritage. As the 19th century waned, the
number of Native Americans taking up the cowboy trade increased. In Wichita, historian
Craig Miner has concluded that about a third of the cowboys on each drive were either
African American or Mexican and that, as the years passed, many chose to settle with
their families in Wichita after their experiences in the town. Since cowboys were on one
of the lowest rungs of Victorian society’s hierarchical ladder and were considered
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transients in cow towns like Wichita, there are few actual records of the ethnic
breakdown. Historians rely on census demographics and the history of the areas that
cowboys came from, such as Texas, New Mexico, and Utah, to make their estimates.88
What is certain is that the level of segregation in cow towns like Wichita was
much different from that in the developing apartheid of the South. In the early years,
African American Wichitans lived in integrated neighborhoods, likely due to their
statistically small number as much as to the efforts of European American Wichitans. In
these early years, European and African Americans shared the public streets and even ate
and drank in the same bars. However, they ate and drank in separate groups, on opposite
sides of the room, segregated together. As their numbers grew and the city became more
“civilized.” public attitudes and behaviors of their fellow European American residents
increasingly pushed minorities into their own neighborhoods, African Americans mainly
in the northeast section of the city, Latinos along the railroad and industrial areas. They
even began to develop their own business districts. The African American community’s
main street was along North Main and Water for many decades.89 Continuing the city’s
bi-polar attitude toward African Americans, however, local political leaders encouraged
the minority community to organize politically. Miner says that the Republican Party
was becoming more dominant in city government, and the party believed that African
Americans, in particular, would vote Republican in the wake of the Civil War and
Emancipation. The local newspapers even covered African American political
organization meetings. In another sign of racial progressivism in the city, as anti-
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miscegenation laws outlawing interracial marriages were becoming entrenched in the Jim
Crow South, the Wichita Beacon reported in 1878 that Judge Jewett could find no law
against an African American man marrying a European American woman and
determined that as long as her father had nothing against the marriage, it should go
ahead.90
Things got harder for African Americans as the calendar flipped over to the 20th
century. Schools, neighborhoods, and businesses that had been integrated began to
segregate during the economic depression and racial backlash of the end of the 19th
century in Wichita. The KKK and an infection of Jim Crow attitudes from the Old South
infiltrated into formerly liberal states such as Kansas. Shortly after the turn of the
century, about 6% of the population or 6,000 out of 100,000 Wichitans, were listed as
active members of the KKK.91 The KKK’s activities had grown to such an extent that
Governor Henry J. Allen became worried about their impact on law and order in Kansas
and issued a statewide warning that “such an organization operated in defiance of the
law.” The Emporia Gazette reported that the KKK was known to be recruiting in South
Central Kansas, in particular in the oil fields in El Dorado and Wichita, but did not know
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how successful it had been.92 It was just as the KKK was gaining strength in Wichita that
the school district finally formalized a segregated system for the first time.93
Kansas had been on a slow swing toward segregated education for several years.
One of the first to take a dedicated stand in the fight was the Kansas State Teachers
Association in 1866. At a July meeting in Lawrence, members voted to fight for
integrated educational opportunities. They resolved “to use our best endeavors to
overcome the unreasonable prejudice existing in certain localities against the admission
of colored children upon equal terms with white children.” Two years later, state
lawmakers passed a bill to “organize and maintain separate schools for the education of
white and colored children.”94 Then lawmakers approved the 1874 Kansas Civil Rights
Law, which included the right of African Americans to attend European American
schools if there was no equivalent school available in the district. The state moved closer
to segregated education yet again when legislators passed an 1879 law that allowed towns
bigger than 10,000 people to set up segregated school systems at the primary level.95
When the City of Wichita opened its first public schools in 1870, it considered a
segregated system but decided that given the low African American enrollment numbers,
segregation did not make financial sense. The issue came up again in 1879, spurred by
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fears of an Exoduster invasion. This was just one month after the city had expelled the
group of immigrating Exodusters mentioned earlier. Yet, with still just 22 African
American children in the district, it did not make financial sense.96 This is in a district
that did not even want to pay for building its own schools. Instead, it rented classroom
space where it could, including rooms that were saloons and brothels in the evening
hours. These makeshift locations were in bad shape, rundown, poorly heated, and
lacking basic amenities necessary for a proper school. One horrified visitor wrote:
When the walls are green with the accumulated dust and impurity of years,
the cracks and crevices are seething with poison within them when the
buildings perchance were used for other purposes none too pure in their
character, it is not expected that the emanations from these should be
conductive to the bodily health and mental vigor of children.
The classrooms were in such horrid shape that the city tried multiple times to pass bond
issues to construct its own buildings, but the population did not want to be taxed. It was
not until the end of the decade that a bond issue finally passed, allowing the Wichita
Public Schools to begin construction of its own buildings. This was the atmosphere of
fighting spending in which segregationists failed to find support for setting up a second
school system.97
In 1889, Orsemus Hills Bentley again asked the Wichita school board to segregate
schools, “in the interest of both races.” The African American community turned out in
protest and not only stopped the school board’s move toward segregation, but persuaded
Bentley, when he became a state senator, to sponsor legislation at the state level
specifically prohibiting Wichita from forming a segregated school system. This success,
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however, did not put an end to discussion of segregating the schools even that same year.
Supporters simply sought other methods of segregating students, even within the same
classroom. In 1889, the Wichita School Board recommended replacing dual desks with
single desks in racially mixed schools so European American students would not have to
share a desk with African American students, without ever explicitly mentioning race.98
While efforts to formally segregate Wichita’s schools repeatedly failed in the 19th
century, the city made decisions that moved it toward a basis for neighborhood
segregation that would lead to de facto school segregation. As discussed earlier, in the
1880s, the City of Wichita divided itself into five wards, with one school per ward. Most
African Americans lived in the 2nd Ward, while the 1st Ward was predominantly
European American. This trend intensified as the city became more populated. The city
had one school per ward, creating the basis of a de facto segregation of the primary
schools that would come to fruition as the African American community grew in Wichita
in the 20th century. Despite repeated efforts throughout the late 1800s, it was not until
1906, as the city grew and Jim Crow sentiments increased, egged on by the KKK, that the
district finally established a legally segregated system over the loudly voiced objections
of the African American community.99
Much as it was across the state, the move to segregate Wichita public schools was
a slow process as attitudes coalesced and hardened and as the African American
community grew, finally making a separate system economically feasible. That change
in attitude can be seen in the coverage and editorials of the Wichita Eagle. In 1902, in its

98

Peavler, “The Color Line,” 332-33.

99

Schiff, “The Process of Integrating,” 2.

41

coverage of the Topeka schools setting up a separate school system for African American
students, the Eagle’s editor wrote in an editorial that “prejudice is something which
neither laws nor courts can control….and the colored man makes a mistake whenever he
tries to enforce social recognition through legal channels.” Three years later, the Eagle
had moved toward a firm belief that segregation was best, writing, “The colored people
take more interest in their separate schools than they do in the mixed schools, because
they feel that they belong to them.”100
In 1905, the Kansas State Superintendent of Public Instruction published a
statement supporting segregation as being the best option for African American students
and families. He argued that his conclusion was “not based on prejudice, but on common
sense and pedagogical principles.” He wrote that all-African American schools would
help the race toward economic independence, help students overcome the shortcomings
of recent slavery while not holding back their European American classmates, and that
African American teachers could connect with, encourage, and support African American
students in ways no European American teacher ever could. On January 2, 1906, a man
identified in the papers at the time solely as Mr. Hallowell or Hollowell, presented a
resolution for segregation to the school board. He may have been Colonel James R.
Hallowell, a Civil War Union veteran from Wichita who had run for the U.S. Congress as
a Republican fifteen years previously. He may have been a member of the Wichita
School Board, as the Wichita Daily Eagle reports that a Mr. Hallowell asked for a roll
call vote on segregation when it came to a vote. Or, he may have been a separate man
named Mr. Hollowell, as Sondra Van Meter indicates in her history of the school, saying
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that someone outside of academia initiated and forced segregation. 101 Either way his
resolution is what is clearly recorded. It reads in part:
Whereas, We believe that the organization and maintenance of the public
schools of the city of Wichita so that provision for the separate education
of the white and colored children is more in keeping with the ideals and
wishes of a majority of patrons. Therefore, be it: Resolved by the Board
of Education of the City of Wichita that we favor the early organization of
our schools on that line.
The proposal came at the end of the board meeting, after the president asked if there was
anything else to discuss. The Wichita Weekly Eagle says Mr. Hollowell jumped up and
read the resolution, then added:
I believe it to be the best interest of the schools; I believe it to be for the
best interests of the colored pupils, as well as the entire colored population
of the city that this be done. A great many people have been asking that
the board take this matter up as soon as possible and do something on this
line.
The paper reports that two of the board members, Mr. Parrett and Mr. Kirker, spoke over
each other, trying to be the first to second the motion. In the discussion that followed,
Parrett said that he had been considering separate school systems for some time and felt it
would be better for the African American students. Kirker added that he had been
investigating which parts of the city had the highest African American population and
determined that 75% lived north of Douglas Avenue, with 60% in the Fourth Ward.
Most of the discussion centered around how to go about separating African American and
European American children into different buildings, or at least classrooms, not around
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whether it should be done. After Mr. Hollowell asked for a roll call vote, the board
unanimously approved the resolution that same night.102
District historian Van Meter writes that this was the point at which the school
board began listening to parents seriously for the first time for the direction they should
take in governing the schools. Until this point, the board had followed the advice of
Kansas University, the Board of Regents, and the State Board of Education in making
educational decisions about students. The board’s increasing reliance on parental input
for making decisions about the district’s direction meant that those with the most and the
loudest voices would have the most input, meaning European Americans with money and
organization. African Americans began to lose their ability to influence district decisions
at this point. At the same time, the move toward greater reliance on parental input would
eventually put its funding at risk under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as the board put off
doing what it knew was necessary in order to follow federal law because of the action’s
unpopularity with vocal parents.103
The African American community of Kansas, including Wichita, was mainly
populated with citizens who had had the fortitude and courage to escape slavery and
oppression for the Free State of Kansas during the era of the Kansas-Missouri
compromise, slipping over the border between the two states at every opportunity, or the
peonage and poverty of Jim Crow as the Reconstruction Era ended in the Confederate
South. They were unwilling to sit back and accept second class status from day one.
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That is how they got to Kansas in the first place. In 1865, representatives of African
American communities across the state met in a convention in Lawrence. There, though
discussing specifically suffrage rights for African American men, they sounded the
clarion call that would describe the fight for civil rights in Kansas for the next 100-plus
years in this warning:
Since we are going to remain among you, we believe it unwise or inhuman
to…take from us as a class, many of our dearest natural and justly
inalienable rights. Shall our presence conduce to the welfare, peace, and
prosperity of the state, or…be a cause of dissension, discard, and irritation.
We must be a constant trouble in the state until it extends to us equal and
exact justice.104
This spirit of fighting for equal opportunity and rights under the law was alive and
well in Wichita when the school board voted unanimously to segregate in 1906. At that
point, Wichita was the only city in the state with a population of over 10,000 to remain
legally unsegregated, even though many smaller cities had segregated their schools in
violation of state law.105 At the board’s February 5, 1906, meeting, a delegation saying it
represented two-thirds of the African American population in the city, stood up to protest
the decision. Their spokesman, a Mr. Will Bettis, gave three reasons for preferring
integrated or “mixed” schools as they called them. One, there was no large enough
African American population in any one location to make building an African Americanonly school financially sound. Two, the board could not afford to maintain two separate
systems. Three, African American children looked up to European American children
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and patterned their education after them, thus performing better. “If they are separated,”
he said, “they will stand no chance whatever to advance.”106
Neither this protest nor advice from the Kansas State Superintendent and the
Kansas Attorney General that Wichita could not legally separate students deterred the
board. That summer, members voted to set aside rooms and a part of the playground at
the Park School for African American students to attend that fall. The board planned to
pursue a change in state law allowing them to legally proceed with segregation after
setting up the split school system.
African Americans had been fighting such segregation mainly through lawsuits,
with mixed success. One failure was a 1903 lawsuit against the Topeka schools claiming
the European American and African American facilities were anything but the equal
required by Plessy v Ferguson’s separate but equal doctrine. The court ruled that the
appearance and quality of the facility did not speak to the quality of the education one
could get inside.107 However, the same court ordered Ottawa, Coffeyville, and Galena to
desegregate their schools because the cities housed fewer than 10,000 people and thus did
not qualify for the exception in state law that permitted segregated schools.108
When the Wichita school board voted to legally segregate, the African American
community turned once again to the courts, hoping to put a stop to the move. The
Wichita Searchlight, the African American paper, encouraged residents to go ahead and
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try to enroll their children in their neighborhood schools that fall. The schools turned
them away. It was one such instance that led to a lawsuit against the district. Sallie
Rowles wanted her 13-year-old daughter Fannie to attend the European American school,
Emerson Intermediate School, just 400 feet from the Rowleses’ front door. When the
district turned them away at enrollment, the Rowleses filed suit against the Wichita
School Board. The next summer, the Kansas Supreme Court sided with the Rowleses
due to the Bentley Law banning segregated schools in Wichita and ordered USD 259 to
enroll Fannie at Emerson. Instead, State Senator H. H. Stewart, backed by a petition
signed by 5,000 Wichitans, pushed through a new law in 1909 to permit segregated
educational facilities. In 1911, the board put the final decision in the hands of the
community in the form of a $60,000 bond issue to build two new buildings for African
American elementary schools. Van Meter says that School Board President Louis
Gerteis suggested that if Wichitans wanted separate schools, they would support the
bond. A vote against the bond issue would be a vote for mixed schools. Wichitans voted
overwhelmingly for the bond and in 1914 the district began paying to transport African
American students from European American majority neighborhoods to the African
American schools, sounding the death knell on attempts to prevent de jure segregation in
the Wichita schools for the next five decades.109
In continuation of Kansas’ tradition of bi-polar attitudes toward race relations,
when the Wichita Public Schools chose to segregate, the newest and the best school
buildings went to the African American students. While most segregated schools across
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the country relegated African American students to sub-standard facilities which
struggled to provide even a halfway adequate education, in Wichita voters approved
spending $41,000 on one new building, the new Toussaint L’Ouverture School, that
many considered one of the best in the city. L’Ouverture followed some of the latest
educational trends out of Germany, such as holding open-air classes on the rooftop for
students suffering from tuberculosis and anemia. In addition, twice a day, teachers
opened the windows to bring in fresh air and invigorate students and led them in “lungexpanding, muscle developing exercises.” The school also offered night classes to adults,
such as typing and English language classes. The district reported that more African
Americans moved into the Fourth Ward around L’Ouverture after it opened and
attendance among African American students increased. A higher percentage of African
American students showed up for classes on a regular basis than of European American
students. In the 1917-1918 school year, the African American average daily attendance
was 56% to the 49% of European American students. The next year, the respective daily
attendance averages were 59% to 47%.110
Segregation in the Wichita schools became even more entrenched in the 1920s.
The Democrat reported in 1922 that the district had decided to move ninth grade into the
new intermediate schools, which had formerly been called junior high schools. This cut
the high schools to just three grades. The purpose? This allowed the district to segregate
through the ninth grade, even though segregating high schools was illegal in Kansas. The
Democrat quoted superintendent L.W. Mayberry as saying, “At the opening of the school
year we gave the Negro children of the ninth grade the option of attending either their
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own classes at L’Ouverture or at one of the other intermediate schools…The law
provides for segregation of children up to the ninth grade, but not after that.” He added
that all 15 of the African American ninth graders had chosen to attend classes at
L’Ouverture. What is missing is the option to attend ninth grade at an integrated high
school. The Democrat ends its account by asking what will happen if African American
students decide they want their own segregated high school all the way through twelfth
grade, in violation of state law? Or, if a European child decides he or she wishes to
attend ninth grade at L’Ouverture.111 In 1926, Mayberry did indeed suggest, as the
African American population around Ingalls Elementary continued to grow, turning
Ingalls into a “colored school,” converting it to an African American segregated high
school. The board never acted on this suggestion.112
While the era of formal petitions, protests, and lawsuits subsided for the next few
decades in Wichita, these protests did not end entirely. The African American
community never conceded the fight against the status quo of segregation, either in the
school district or in the city as a whole. However, as the KKK continued to gain strength,
to the point that by the 1920s there were more active KKK members (6,000) in Wichita
than African Americans (5,600), the danger of these protests had increased, reaching its
height in the 1950s and 1960s.113
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This came after the second major growth spurt the African American community
experienced, during and after World War II. The impact of the Great Migration of
African Americans from the Jim Crow South to the industrialized North was nowhere
near as great on Wichita as on cities like Chicago and Detroit. Yet, it followed much the
same pattern.
The Great Migration was the result of numerous causes colliding at one point in
time. African Americans who had served in World War I or World War II and
experienced a more equal treatment while in Europe than at home sought better lives for
themselves and their families. At the same time, factories in the North, especially during
the war years, were in desperate need of manual labor. These jobs offered better pay and
less obvious segregation than was available to African Americans in the Jim Crow South,
where sharecroppers were routinely cheated out of their share of the profit for the harvest
each year; African American children counted themselves lucky if they got to go to
school just on the rainy days and learned to read; any African American man who even
looked at a European American man could expect a violent, public lynching in response,
and worse if he looked at a woman; where everything from parking spaces to Bibles at
the courthouse was split down the color line, with the African American side of that line
getting the short end of the stick every time.114 The mechanization of the cotton industry
from the 1920s to the 1960s also pushed many African Americans to make the move
either North or West in search of work. While sharecroppers in the Old South were
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reluctant to give up their mules and rarely could afford the more expensive equipment
that would lead to better yields and greater profits, the New Deal’s Agricultural
Adjustment Act (AAA) began to pay cotton farmers to take land out of production to
stabilize prices. This was just one part of the Act, but the one that attracted landowners
in the Old South the most, leaving their sharecroppers to seek out jobs elsewhere.115
African American-owned newspapers such as the Chicago Defender exhorted
friends and family in the South to move North, to the “Promised Land.” Between the
1920s and the 1970s some 37% of the African American population in the United States
relocated north of the Mason Dixon Line, mainly into urban centers.116 These migrants
were the strongest willed of the populace and had a much clearer idea of what could be
and what they were willing to put up with. It was in these years that the NAACP and
other activist organizations began to blossom and grow across the country, and in
Wichita. In reaction to this perceived invasion, European American resistance also grew
and violence broke out across the nation with 47 U.S. cities suffering from European
American mobs attacking, burning, and looting African American communities in 1943
alone. But the African American migrants had already braved beatings, imprisonment,
even death to make it to the North. They were much more willing to face off with those
who supported segregation in the North, as well. This was some of the impetus behind
the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s.
The Great Migration brought African Americans to Wichita by the thousands
seeking jobs in the aviation industry during and after World War II. Defense contracts
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meant that the industry moved from employing 1,478 Wichitans in 1940 to 40,563 in
1942, many of them working on the B-29 Superfortress bombers that would eventually
help end the war. The Cold War brought more such contracts. Many others came
through the Air Force to McConnell Air Force Base. Most of the migrants came from
Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Missouri in the 1950s.117 It was this influx that more
than doubled the African American population, from 8,082 or 4.8% of the overall city’s
population in 1950 to 19,861 or 7.8% of the population in 1960.118 It was also during this
period that segregation of neighborhoods and businesses in Wichita became much more
pronounced.
Segregation in Wichita was never as entrenched as in the Jim Crow South, but it
certainly was well-established by the birth of the Civil Rights Era. Newcomers to town
found themselves forced to find housing in the same three neighborhoods in the northeast
of the city where African Americans had historically been pushed. This led to the same
overcrowding seen in African American neighborhoods around the country. Those who
could afford to leave started filtering into the neighboring communities. But their
entrance into these previously European American zones was met either with violence or
with white flight. In some neighborhoods, real estate agents that had previously refused
to sell homes to African Americans, now sold the homes, then used their presence in the
neighborhood to spark a mass sell-out by their new European American neighbors,
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warning that their home prices would fall now that an African American family had
moved in. This practice was known as blockbusting and was prevalent in Wichita in the
1950s and 1960s.119 At the same time, the same real estate agents would refuse to even
show homes in certain neighborhoods to African Americans. Dr. Vashti Lewis, wife of
the NAACP President Chester I. Lewis, recalls having to pose as the maid of a friend in
1963 in order to simply walk through and see what homes were for sale in certain parts of
town.120 When she found a place, she had her friend purchase it and then sign it over to
her and her husband. Gretchen Eick recounts in her book, Dissent in Wichita, how the
Lewises dealt with repeated violence from a group of 60 to 80 of their neighbors almost
from the day they moved in. Upset neighbors set off a homemade bomb in their mailbox,
threw a brick through their window, even burned kerosene poured in the shape of a cross
on their front lawn and poisoned the family’s cat. The group met in an area church and
spoke openly to the Wichita Eagle of their intent to drive the Lewises out of the
neighborhood. The Lewises did not move. Instead, volunteers from Temple Emanu-El
and the Unitarian Church provided around-the-clock protection for the family and their
home.121
Segregation was a way of life for African Americans in Wichita that ruled from
birth to death. African American women could not have private rooms at Wesley
Hospital when giving birth, and their infants were placed in older bassinets at the back of
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the nursery, separated from the European American babies.122 Nurse Theola Cooper
remembers how sometimes African American women would be left in the hallways if
there were no rooms available, rather than force a European American woman to share a
room with her. She undermined that rule frequently by putting African American and
European American women together in the post-partum recovery rooms, but it took a
threatened lawsuit and federal Medicare legislation requiring integration to desegregate
Wichita’s hospitals. 123
Going out to eat was no easier. Bonita Gooch, editor of the Community Voice
newspaper in Wichita, remembers her family having to drive to a restaurant on the
turnpike. "I thought it was great - we'd go on a trip. But the reason you did that was
because it was one of the very few places that African-Americans could eat because of
the intercontinental laws."124
Again, African Americans refused to take this segregation in silence. They
demonstrated, wrote letters of complaint to lawmakers, participated in voter registration
drives and signed petitions. They also, at times, set up their own facilities rather than
accept sitting at the back of public majority-owned facilities. The Dunbar Theatre, which
opened in August of 1941, was one such example. Tired of being relegated to the
balcony of European American -owned theatres, the community built its own, state-ofthe-art facility. They also used it as a meeting and banquet hall, since they were often
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barred from European American -owned halls. The theatre only lasted for a bit more than
a decade, losing popularity as overt segregation ended in Wichita in the 1950s. European
American theaters, fighting for customers, realized that they needed to treat all movie
viewers equally to make more money.125
Recognition of this same economic imperative led Wichita youth members of the
NAACP to carry out the nation’s first successful sit-in at the Dockum Drug Store on the
corner of Broadway and Douglas. Acting without approval from the national NAACP
but with the support of the local organization, a group of high school and college students
began occupying the seats at the drug store on its busiest nights, demanding seated
service as opposed to the carry-out-only service provided to African Americans, and
carrying picket signs outside. It took more than three weeks of persistent sit-ins before
the owners of the chain broke. August 11, 1958, the manager came out and told his
employees, “Serve them. I’m losing too much money.” The Dockum Drug Store sit-in
served as an example that spurred further sit-ins across Kansas and, in the years to come,
across the country, though it never gained the public attention as some of those later sitins. Some NAACP youth groups even came to Wichita to train in how to handle sit-ins
successfully with those who had set the standard. In 1959, the NAACP recognized the
Wichita branch for its activism, including holding the Dockum sit-in, desegregating the
golf course, filing complaints against employment discrimination, running a letter-writing
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campaign against Bell Telephone, writing a civil rights bill for the state legislature, and
more.126
Though they lived in a segregated city, Wichita’s African Americans were not
doing so quietly. They fought with every tool at their disposal and invented a few new
ones. It was in this atmosphere that the fight over segregated schools finally came to a
head in the 1960s, leading to the federal court’s mandatory busing order in 1971.
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CHAPTER III

THE BATTLELINES OVER SCHOOL SEGREGATION IN WICHITA
Wichita’s African American community had been fighting the segregated school
system since before the school board voted unanimously to segregate in 1906. They had
won occasional battles along the way, but not yet the war. Even a formal end to de jure
segregation didn’t settle matters. Ironically enough, it would be the school board’s
handling of neighborhood school boundary decisions and a reliance on a “freedom of
choice” plan that would lead to a federal court case and a mandatory busing order ending
de facto segregation.
When the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its ruling in the case of Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, African American communities across the
country celebrated. Leola Brown Montgomery, mother of Linda Brown, the little girl
from Topeka at the middle of the case, recalls the day the ruling came down.
I was just ironing and had the TV on and listening to the news and at
12:30pm that day it came in, (a) news flash came through and the decision
had been handed down that it was unconstitutional to have separate
schools like that,” she told KMUW’s Carla Eckels in 2018. “And I said,
“Oh, my God!” and tears came to my eyes. I could not wait for my family
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to get home so when they got home and I delivered the message, oh, we
hugged and cried.127
Groups gathered in community centers across the country to celebrate together. In
Topeka, the local chapter of the NAACP planned a celebration at Monroe Elementary,
the all-African American school across town from Linda Brown and her family, complete
with speeches, musical numbers, and food. Many told the local paper that day that the
ruling made them feel like complete American citizens for the first time. “It will enable
me to sing ‘My Country ‘Tis of Thee, Sweet Land of Liberty’ without making myself a
hypocrite,” M.L Burnett, president of the Topeka NAACP chapter told the Topeka
Journal that day. He believed the ruling had “broken the back of segregation.”128
While legal change came comparatively quickly to most schools in Kansas, in all
the ways that mattered little changed for African American students in the classroom
across the state, not just in the Wichita Public Schools district. By 1954, most schools in
Kansas’ largest cities were de facto segregated not de jure segregated. That year the state
estimated that the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling would impact about 8,000 African
American students and expected that many cities would be able to eliminate official dual
school systems based on race when the next school year began that September. “Every
city now under a segregation program should be able to make the change-over in two
years,” Kansas Attorney General Harold R. Fatzer predicted the day of the Supreme
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Court’s ruling. The state considered Wichita to be unaffected by the Brown v. Board
ruling because it had eliminated de jure segregation two years previously.129
After decades of parent protests, petitions, and lawsuits, the district acceded to a
group of African American parents who packed a Board of Education meeting in 1945 to
demand that the district allow their children to attend their neighborhood kindergarten at
an all- European American school, Emerson or Park Elementary, instead of being bused
across town to one of the African American schools. They were asking only for the
rights that European American families had to send their children to the nearest to home.
The board spent the next year studying the proposal and agreed. In court filings in 1971,
the district said, “Negro pupils did begin to attend Emerson in 1946 and… by the year
1951 they were also attending Park.” This resolution also affected two formerly allEuropean American junior highs, referred to originally as intermediate schools and later
as middle schools, Horace Mann and Central. That same fall the attendance at those
schools became, respectively, 22% and 10% African American. Further petitions
challenging the district’s policy of busing African American students from all over town
to the African American schools came in 1947 and 1948. The board reported to courts
later that it had made informal efforts to begin desegregating other schools in the late
1940s but aborted the efforts when confronted with backlash from European American
parents. This concern with parent support would halt district attempts to desegregate
repeatedly, until the federal government finally intervened. The district tried again,
successfully this time, with one more school, Skinner, in the 1951-1952 school year.
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With that success, the district made an official decision to formally end its dual school
system in favor of neighborhood attendance centers.130 “For the school year 1952-1953,
all pupils of elementary school age in the Wichita Public Schools shall be admitted to and
attend the school district in which they reside.” However, in making that decision, the
board provided an escape for European American families who did not want their
children attending schools with African American children. Families in schools that
would have mixed-race enrollment for the first time in 1952 would be able to choose
between attending that school and a designated alternate, all- European American or allAfrican American, school. Despite this option, some European American families sold
their homes and moved out of the district entirely. The board, however, stuck with the
plan as, on the surface, it adhered to the board’s overall policy of neighborhood
attendance centers.131 It later defended this move to HEW, writing that offering optional
attendance areas was a standard practice in the district when changing boundaries and
that it also “made European American schools available to many Negro pupils who
would otherwise have been zoned into the areas of the former segregated schools.” With
this change in policy, in the fall of 1952, 23% of the Wichita Public Schools’ African
American students were attending integrated facilities. 132
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The superintendent at the time, Dr. Wade C. Fowler, was pleased with this
solution, writing, “Now it seems to be an accepted principle that the make-up of a
particular community decides the kind of school that will be maintained, and the question
of racial background is not the factor that decides who shall attend a given school.”133
This was the official point of view the Wichita School Board would take toward school
attendance assignments for the next two decades. Given the segregated nature of
Wichita’s residential structure, most school buildings remained highly segregated, de
facto. The district defended this policy saying it was what parents wanted. The district
superintendent, in a report to the board on October 3, 1960, explained that neighborhood
attendance centers, close enough to students’ homes for them to be able to walk to and
from school and to return home for lunch, was a long-standing policy and a big reason
why parents bought homes where they did. He added that this proximity increased the
ability of students to participate in after-school activities “and still get home without
having to ride a bus or be too late in the afternoon.” The district also believed that this
neighborhood school policy fostered greater parental involvement in the schools. This
would be a part of the district’s defense of its de facto segregated status when the issue
would later come to an administrative court hearing.134
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the school district didn’t worry overmuch about
whether its neighborhood school format would be a problem. In Brown II, the 1955
follow-up ruling on how to implement the desegregation ordered in 1954’s Brown v.
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Board, the U.S. Supreme Court justices determined that schools should dismantle
segregation “with all deliberate speed,” but left it up to individual school districts, under
the oversight of the U.S. district courts, to figure out how to go about desegregating and
just how fast “all deliberate speed” should be. In Kansas, similar plans to Wichita’s new
neighborhood attendance centers with options for students to transfer out of newly
integrated schools and into buildings that remained single race had found quick
opposition among African Americans. Parents in Topeka and Kansas City immediately
headed to court. The courts disagreed. By December of 1955, a panel of three district
court judges, Walter A. Huxman, Arthur J. Mellott, and Delmas C. Hill, had already ruled
on the Topeka case. They did not like the option feature of the Topeka plan, especially
for kindergartners, because it showed a lack of “good faith,” but determined that de facto
segregation in schools because of residential segregation was not the district’s
responsibility. “Desegregation does not mean there must be intermingling of the races in
ALL [sic] school districts. It means only that they may not be prevented from
intermingling because of race or color,” they wrote.135
At the same time, school districts across the country were facing classroom
shortages as children of the Baby Boom era reached school age while the nation was still
dealing with post-war materials shortages. In Wichita, the school had resorted to using
individual homes, churches, and portable classrooms to find room for all of its students
after the national production authority denied pleas for an allotment of more steel for
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construction, halting the work on the district’s new West High School and plans for
several other buildings.136
This was the time when schools across the country were beginning to look to both
their state governments and the federal government for financial aid. In 1954, the Kansas
GOP added a plank to their political platform favoring the establishment of “an
‘equitable’ system of state aid to high school districts.”137 In the ongoing political battle
over state versus federal control, the question of whether the federal government should
provide aid to schools became a political hot potato. Since Reconstruction, states had
eschewed federal financial aid for schools because the federal government could then
make demands on what was taught, when, where and how, endangering the segregated
system the South was developing. But the need for money to build new schools and hire
new teachers for the incoming Baby Boom children was so fierce that many districts and
states began to demand it. The question took over a White House conference on
education in Washington D.C. in 1955, even before President Eisenhower told the
attendees in his opening address that the “federal government will have to step in, if
necessary, to prevent ‘a lack of schools in certain important areas.’” He added, though,
that “if we depend too much…on the federal government, we will lose independence and
initiative.”138 In the 1950s, the Wichita Public Schools began to consider looking for
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financial aid from the federal government.139 By 1971, that federal aid accounted for
some $5.5 million of the district’s annual budget.140
This all began happening in the same decade that saw the second round of
explosive growth in the African American community in Wichita. As the African
American population grew, they began to push out of the traditional northeastern zone in
the city, into nearby neighborhoods. As African Americans moved in, European
Americans fled the neighborhoods, even selling their homes at a loss to get away faster.
Local real estate agents eager to make more money fanned the flames of latent racism to
an open fire in the city. The U.S. Civil Rights Commission called out the Wichita Real
Estate Board in a 1977 report on desegregation in schools for not controlling its more
avaricious and less scrupulous members.141 Restrictive covenants began appearing in
Wichita’s records as early as the 1920s. One example reads: “No persons of any race
other than the Caucasian race shall use or occupy any building or lot, except that this
covenant shall not prevent occupancy by domestic servants of a different race domiciled
with an owner or tenant.”142 The National Association of Real Estate Board’s code of
ethics, as established in 1924 and in use well into the 1950s, kept realtors from
“introducing members of any race to a neighborhood that would threaten property
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values.” In Wichita realtors continued into the 1970s to push segregation of
neighborhoods, by refusing to show homes in European American neighborhoods to
minorities -- remember Vashti Lewis’ story earlier -- warning European American
homebuyers away from mixed neighborhoods by telling them “that the school was going
Negro,” and even inciting white flight in neighborhoods where African Americans finally
managed to buy a home. In her history of Wichita’s civil rights movement, Gretchen
Eick records that real estate agents in Wichita would reach out to European American
homeowners in neighborhoods with new African American residents and ask if they
wanted to sell out because their property values were about to drop precipitously as a
result of their new neighbors. This not only encouraged white flight from some
neighborhoods, but it also contributed to the degree of segregation in the city.
Sociologist Donald Cowgill reported in 1960 that while the growth in the African
American population had enlarged the area of the city where African Americans could
find homes, the degree of segregation from European American areas had, at the same
time, increased, from 91.5% segregated to 95.3% segregated.143
It was in this atmosphere that more of Wichita’s elementary and intermediate
schools were becoming de facto segregated African American schools. Take for example
the cases of two schools opened in 1954, Isely Elementary and Little Elementary. The
district experimented with the concept of an integrated school at Little, drawing the
attendance boundaries to include both African American and European American
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students. With a European American principal, William T Ward, and a balance of seven
each of European American and African American teachers, the district expected the
school to enroll about 425 students that fall, with a 65% to 35% ratio of African
Americans to European Americans. Even the staff was evenly split racially. This time
the district did not give parents the option of transferring to a non-integrated school.144
The result? Between the natural expansion of the African American neighborhood and
white flight, within three years Little had become 90% African American. At the same
time, Isely Elementary moved from 5% African American to 35% African American
within one year due to shifting residence patterns. By the spring of 1958, Isely, too, was
almost completely African American. Yet, as will be seen shortly, the district was not an
innocent bystander in all of this. It fully participated in the transition of mixed schools to
de facto segregated by complying with parental wishes on where to draw boundary lines.
Remember, European American families comprised 91.7% of the community, according
to the 1960 U.S. Census, giving them the most power to sway the board in their
direction.145
Many of the Wichita parents who had spent so much time fighting for equal
access to school facilities and other civil rights in town, were no happier with de facto
segregation than they had been with de jure. They continued to fight the district with
petitions, protests, lawsuits, even school boycotts, well after the state supreme court’s
ruling that the district wasn’t responsible for attendance patterns caused by residence
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choices.146 Others simply found a way around the district’s new neighborhood
attendance center policy. Jo Gardenhire, a civil rights activist in Wichita in the 1950s
and 1960s, describes the mostly de facto segregated schools of the time as dated and in
need of repair and replacement. To find something better for their children, after Wichita
left behind de jure segregation in the 1951-1952 school year in favor of neighborhood
schools and de facto segregation, Gardenhire and her husband “decided to drive them
several miles” across town to a majority European American school. She considered it a
“marvelous experience” and that they had done “every white family in that school a
favor.”147 Many African American activists argued that mixed or integrated schools
provided a better education for European American children as well by preparing them to
live and work in a multi-racial society.148
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s more and more African American parents began
requesting transfers to other, integrated, schools from the de facto segregated elementary
schools in Wichita. A 1960 report to the school board on integrated schools says that the
district had ended the optional territory practice the previous year and limited transfers to
three reasons: child care needs, health reasons, and special education requirements. The
report indicated that the limit on transfers was meant to help prevent overcrowding in any
one school building.149 Yet, African American families were finding ways around these
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rules to get their children into racially mixed schools. In a 1962 school board agenda, the
superintendent reported to the board that a number of parents in the African American
community around Matthewson Junior High were requesting transfers out of the de facto
segregated building to racially integrated or European American attendance centers.
Since the rules didn’t allow transfers for racial integration purposes, the district was
denying the requests. Instead, parents were getting transfers through what the
superintendent termed “subterfuge” by signing over guardianship of the child to a family
who did live in the neighborhood of the desired school.
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The uptick in transfer requests came as part of an ongoing fight over boundary
lines between two junior high schools. In 1951, Wichita USD 259 built a new junior high
school called Mathewson Intermediate School, at 1847 N. Chautauqua.151 When it
opened, it was predominantly a European American school. By 1958, it was 50/50
African American/ European American in enrollment. Its attendance district straddled
Hillside Street, which was a general demarcation line between the two communities.
When the district opened a new junior high school, W.C. Coleman at 1544 N.
Governeour, in 1966, a group of European American parents took advantage of the
drawing of new boundary lines to demand the school board draw the new boundary
between Wm. Mathewson, 1847 N Chatauqua, and L.W. Brooks, 3802 E 27th N, along
Hillside, keeping their children, about 150, out of Mathewson and in Brooks. The board
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acquiesced to these demands, and Mathewson, which would have been racially mixed,
became 98.6% African American by 1966.152
Yet, Wichita Public Schools continued its hypocritical attitude toward
desegregation. While giving in to the demands of European American parents by
drawing boundary lines that increased the segregation of elementary and middle schools,
the district was also fostering the Fairmount School Project and removing race from its
official record keeping.
By 1959, Fairmount Elementary School was the only remaining attendance center
in the northeastern portions of Wichita to still have a sizeable European American
enrollment, 47%. Many of the European American students’ parents were faculty and
staff at Wichita University, later to become Wichita State University. Families from both
sides of Hillside got together and asked the school board to keep Fairmount Elementary
as an integrated school by creating the forerunner of the magnet schools the district relies
on to offer integrated classrooms in the 21st century. With strong parental and
community involvement, the school was able to offer both remedial and advanced
learning classes, a racially inclusive curriculum, and advanced courses taught by Wichita
University faculty. To keep the racial mix balanced, the district opened up enrollment to
any European American families in the city interested in the accelerated learning
program. Volunteers from both sides of the color line also ran a pre-school similar to
later Head Start programs, designed to give disadvantaged children a running start on
education. In the five years the program operated, it had great success. However, by
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1964, the founding parents had begun to age out of the school along with their children,
and new parents weren’t as active in the school’s programs. Due to overcrowding
concerns, the school board moved the accelerated learning program, and much of the
incentive for the active parent/community collaboration with the school, to Murdock
Elementary School, in another neighborhood. This move effectively ended the effort at
maintaining a model integrated school, but it did succeed in slowing white flight from the
community, which remained a highly diverse, integrated neighborhood into the 21st
century.153
During the years of the Fairmount Project, school board president Edwana Collins
got the board to agree to remove racial identification from school records. She also
proposed a committee she later served on to study how de facto segregation was
impacting Wichita Schools. In 1962, that committee brought a policy statement to the
board on racial integration, which the board passed. It read, in part, “In respect to
desegregation the Board of Education sees the public school system as an agency to give
leadership in developing attitudes and understanding which are compatible to race
integration for a democratic form of society.” This policy statement included a
commitment to equality of building maintenance, curriculum and instruction, discipline,
and administration. It did not include a commitment to preventing residential segregation
from segregating public school buildings. 154 That lack of commitment would lead to a
formal complaint to the federal government four years later of school-administered
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segregation, followed by an investigation, an administrative court hearing and a judge’s
order mandating student busing to counteract the impact of residential segregation.
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CHAPTER IV

CHESTER LEWIS, EDWANA COLLINS, AND ENOUGH IS ENOUGH

The slow slide toward the federal order to bus students for desegregation in
Wichita began to quicken in the early 1960s, in part because of the actions of two people
who would play key roles in filing the complaint and helping HEW to prove its case
against the district. One was a highly educated African American activist with
generational roots in South Central Kansas, the other a European American high school
dropout and transplant to the city from Louisiana, a man and a woman in an era of high
gender-role stereotyping, these two community leaders were unlikely allies who came to
the issue from different worlds but attacked with the same goal, providing a good
education for all of Wichita’s children.
CHESTER LEWIS
Chester I. Lewis, Jr, spent his life fighting for equal rights for African Americans
in Wichita and across the state of Kansas. A native son of Hutchinson and a graduate of
the University of Kansas law school, Lewis was a lawyer who settled with his first wife
in Wichita in 1953. He almost immediately jumped into civil rights work, beginning with
suing Wesley Hospital for segregating his infant son into an inferior bassinet at the back
of the nursery after the nurse told him, “All the colored babies are kept in the back of the
nursery.” The hospital desegregated its nursery. He followed that with a lawsuit the next
72

month against the City of Wichita to desegregate its public pools. A year later, the city
desegregated its pools. Lewis served as president of the NAACP for several years, from
1957 until the late 1960s, leading the organization toward a more active approach to the
civil rights fight, helping an NAACP youth group to design, organize, and execute the
first successful sit-in in the nation at the Dockum Drugstore in downtown Wichita,
leading demonstrations at and boycotts of businesses that discriminated against African
Americans, either in hiring or in service practices, fighting for fair housing rules, and
pushing for desegregation of both faculty and student bodies in the Wichita Public
Schools.155
In December of 1957, Lewis began pushing the Wichita Public Schools to
desegregate their hiring practices for teachers and administrators. He began with a letter
to the Board of Education requesting a conference with members. At this time, no high
school in Wichita employed an African American teacher. When it learned of Lewis’
request, the Wichita Beacon published an editorial with racist undertones, implying that
African American teachers were inferior.156
When Lewis brought the issue before the board on January 6, 1958, he said he
understood that the district had a policy of assigning “Negro teachers only to all-Negro
schools or where Negro pupils were in great attendance.” Superintendent Fowler
disagreed, saying that while the staffs at Dunbar and L’Ouverture Elementaries were “allNegro,” the staffs at nine other elementary schools were mixed, with anywhere from one
to twelve African American teachers in each building. There were also six African
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American teachers at what the superintendent termed the secondary level, all in the
intermediate schools. The superintendent and the Board president, Harry Little, Jr, told
Lewis that the community was not ready for a higher level of integration. “We…will
continue to proceed on it, but the speed at which we proceed on this program will be
determined by what the community is ready to accept,” Little said. Board member Edra
Weathers told Lewis, “We have made a considerable amount of progress. Perhaps that
progress has been slow, but when you are dealing with social questions as important as
these are, you need to go slowly.”157
Though the board members promised Lewis that they would continue to work
toward desegregation, four years later the segregation of teachers remained an issue in the
district. At the April 16, 1962, board meeting, in response to Lewis’ continued demands,
Superintendent Lawrence H. Shepoiser presented the board with a survey of 2,202 district
teachers on integration. Of those teachers, about 79% would agree to teach in a school
building where a minority of the students were of a different race. However, only 39%
would accept an assignment in a school building where most of the students were of a
race different from the teacher.158 At Mathewson, the district’s only 50/50 integrated
junior high or intermediate school in the early 1960s, about 75% of the teachers asked for
transfers to different buildings in the spring of 1962 for the following school year. The
district attributed this to race relations causing difficulties in student/teacher
relationships. The district was slowly hiring more African American teachers and nurses,
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however. By 1968, Van Meter reports, African Americans taught in 50 of the district’s
113 buildings.159
Lewis and others continued to bring up the issue of segregation, of teachers more
than students, in the Wichita Public Schools through the late ‘50s into the early ‘60s.
However, desegregation of schools was not a priority for civil rights activists in the state
at the time. Lewis was busy spreading the methods of direct action protest through sitins, demonstrations and boycotts, that had worked so successfully in Wichita, to other
cities and states, as well as holding voter registration drives and working toward fair
housing and employment legislation.160 In September of 1963, the Associated Press (AP)
reported Lewis as saying that the breaking of racial barriers in fraternities and sororities
at universities “is the furthest thing from the Negro thinking right now, what with other
problems they face.” Other regional NAACP officials reported that “the Negro feels
being admitted to previously all-European American schools was a big enough step for
the present.” While this dealt with universities, not K-12 schools, it does point to
activists’ thought processes at the time, indicating that they were more concentrated on
the fight to get access to their child’s neighborhood school, something they already had in
Wichita. However, another line in the article points to dissension about that priority
among younger activists, whose militancy Lewis would soon side with over the
established NAACP. The AP quotes Laplois Ashford, the national director of the
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NAACP’s youth and college division as saying his group “was planning some type of
activities through which we eventually hope to integrate these fraternities and
sororities.”161
Two months later, the Wichita Beacon published a series of three articles dealing
with racial integration that papers throughout the state re-published. In it, Lewis told
reporters he had never seen such an attitude of “keen militancy” among the African
American community, with more people coming out for change. While housing and
employment issues dominate the series of articles, they did also touch on school
segregation. Lewis accused the school district of practicing “token integration” by
putting just a handful of African American teachers in predominantly European
American schools, rather than simply placing teachers based on skill and experience.
School board member Robert Arnold defended the district, saying its hiring practices
gave equal opportunity to all. Board president Kent Frizzell told the Beacon that Wichita
schools were not as bad as schools in other cities. But added, “As long as one person is
not afforded equal opportunities we should strive to do away with inequalities – to do
away with our own problem rather than pointing to other cities and saying we aren’t as
bad.”162
It was this same school board that the next summer agreed to re-open discussions
of its transfer policy after a European American mother, Mrs. D. H. Merriman, Jr,
complained. In 1962, in response to demands for desegregation from the African
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American community, the district allowed pupils to transfer from Matthewson to another
school because of restricted housing. They had to go to a school that had enough room
for them, no more teachers would need to be hired nor overcrowding of classrooms
caused. It was a very limited transfer policy used as a visible means of mediating the
impact of residential segregation on neighborhood schools, though African Americans
grumbled it allowed only a small percentage of students to leave what many referred to as
the “ghetto school.” Another limitation of the policy was that students could only
transfer out if they were of the majority race in the school they were leaving and would
be in the minority race of the school they were going to. Mrs. Merriman argued that that
limitation discriminated against her children who wanted to transfer from a school where
they were the minority race to one where they were the majority.163
On both sides of the race line, dissatisfaction was increasing with the way things
were moving. For many European American families, the change was too drastic, too
fast. For African American families it was too little, too late. Schools at all levels found
themselves trying to balance these two sides, often running afoul of both. By 1965, the
attitude among activists of leaving schools mostly alone was falling away across Kansas.
In March, at least 110 protestors crowded into the University of Kansas chancellor’s
waiting room, holding a sit-in protesting discrimination in the Greek system and other
university-sanctioned off-campus housing, as well as the advertisement of segregated
housing in the school paper, and discrimination in the placement of student teachers. So
many students filled the room that the chancellor later testified, “I had to pick my way
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through, arms, legs and bodies…I told my secretaries to lock their desks and leave. They
were unnerved.” When they refused to leave the office at closing time, police arrested
110 of the protestors for disturbing the peace. Chester Lewis defended them in court later
that spring, arguing that the sit-in was a tasteful expression of views – using his crossexamination to prove that they “threatened no one, were not noisy, and generally behaved
peaceably.”164
Lewis had not forgotten nor given up on changing things for K-12 students in the
City of Wichita, either. That November, he wrote a letter to the editor, printed in the
Wichita Evening Eagle, pointing out that there was no call for any school in the Wichita
Public School system to be segregated, since African Americans made up just 8% of the
population. At that point, the district had eight segregated schools, seven elementary and
one intermediate, that were 90% or more African American.165
From the Dockum Drugstore sit-in, carried out against the direct orders of the
NAACP, to his push for equal treatment in the school system, Lewis’ actions were
becoming increasingly separated from the conventional priorities of the NAACP civil
rights leadership. In 1962, historian Gretchen Eick reports, he and other younger
members of the NAACP became friendly at the organization’s national convention in
Atlanta and bonded over their frustrations with the direction of NAACP president Roy
Wilkins and his supporters. These critics became known as the Young Turks, and, over
the next few years, moved beyond spoken criticism to outright attempts to replace the
NAACP’s governing board with new leadership and, finally, in 1968 with a split from the
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NAACP. Lewis resigned both his presidency of the Wichita chapter and his membership
in the NAACP entirely.166
It was under these conditions that the argument over segregated schools came to a
head in the Wichita Public School district.
EDWANA DENNING COLLINS
Edwana Denning Collins was a member of the Wichita Public School Board of
Education from 1955 until 1971, from the year of the Brown II decision ordering
desegregation “with all deliberate speed” to the year the district officially fully
desegregated.167 She was an unlikely, unexpected proponent of racial parity and
desegregation in the district. Without her work, HEW might never have ordered a
desegregation plan that ended with Wichita operating a mandatory busing program for
four decades.
Collins was born Edwana Denning in New Orleans in 1921 to a European
American family. They moved to Wichita between her sixth and seventh grade years.
She dropped out of Wichita’s East High School at the age of 16 to elope with Edwin
Collins. She became an active parent in the school system when her first child began
school in an old one-room school building she described as having no running water or
way to communicate with the main school building across the street. She began to work
with the League of Women Voters, lobbying for school bonds, serving on citizens’
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committees to promote various candidates for the school board. When her youngest child
started school in 1955, she took the next step and ran for the board herself.168
In March of 1955, Edwana Collins was the fourth top vote getter in the primary
for the Wichita School Board behind Herbert P. Lindsley, Harrie S Mueller and Mrs.
Edra Weathers, all three of whom were incumbents, in an election with 34% voter
turnout. The top six candidates moved on to the general election.169 Collins ran on a
platform of ability, integrity and experience, pointing to her years of advocacy work for
the school system as an active parent.170 Once elected, she told the Wichita Evening
Eagle that she was “pleased by the results of the voting and sobered by the thought of the
responsibility. I hope the school board, working with the community [sic] can provide
the kind of educational facilities Wichita needs,” she said.171
While Collins named no particular project that she wanted to become involved in
after her election, she quickly became the board’s primary, and often only, advocate for
desegregation. Her frustration with the situation began to show up in her own records by
1960. A handwritten summary that year notes what she termed a lack of progress toward
desegregation over the previous three years after a board review of the issue with the
superintendent. She noted that the school population shift at Little from 50/50 African
American/ European American to 90% African American was apparently due mostly to
Edwana Collins, “Untitled,” box 4, folder 7, and Edwana Collins, speech to Rea
Woodman Elementary School, 1966, box 1, folder 2, Edwana Denning Collins Collection.
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white flight – children leaving the public school system mostly for private schools, not
moving out of the area. In 1961 and 1962, as board president, she served on a threeperson committee studying ethnic problems in the district along with board members A.
Price Woodard, Jr, who would later become the city’s first African American mayor, and
Robert Arnold. The committee returned an anti-discrimination policy which the board
passed on June 4, 1962, stating the district would treat all students alike regardless of
race, color, religion, or national origin when it came to enrollment, instruction, even
building maintenance, curriculum and activities.172 It was this same policy that the
district’s lawyers would point to in 1970 during the hearing with HEW, to prove that
Wichita Schools were not illegally segregated. But they did not count on Collins in that
defense.
In January of 1966, Collins was the primary defender of setting new school
boundaries with the opening of Coleman Intermediate School in such a way that they
would return the increasingly all-African American Mathewson Intermediate School to
being at least partially integrated. When the board overruled her, keeping 150 European
American students east of Hillside St in the Brooks Intermediate School, which was only
25% African American, multiple members of the community wrote letters commending
her for her defense. Alan M. Cress wrote, “We do appreciate your efforts to keep the
Board and Dr. Shepoiser honest and to keep before the Board the concern for the children
who are affected by the actions of the Board.” Ray Anderson, the chairman of the
Wichita Fair Housing Committee, wrote, “…we thank you for your stand on the
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Mathewson School issue. We thank you not because you agree with us, but because with
insight, you saw an opportunity to better our educational system for all children by true
integration.” It was the ending of this fight that would spark the beginning of the
district’s biggest fight yet for integration.
THE COMPLAINT
The issue that led to a formal complaint to HEW of deliberate segregation in the
Wichita Public Schools by the district began more than a year before Lewis mailed his
complaint to Washington, D.C. The district was building an additional intermediate
school, Coleman, and had to redraw attendance boundaries to account for the new
building. Almost immediately, the question of where to draw the new boundary between
Brooks Intermediate and Mathewson Intermediate on the northeast side of town became a
point of contention among parents. Mathewson had been 50% African American until
Brooks opened in 1958, at which point it became 99% African American, according to
Eick.173
With the looming opening of Coleman, the superintendent proposed moving the
boundary to enlarge the Mathewson attendance district, moving 150 European American
students from Brooks to Mathewson and creating a more racially diverse student body.
At that time, Mathewson was the only intermediate school with an enrollment of over
40% African American students in Wichita. Under this plan, students of both races
would be able to transfer out “using a computer to decide who is sent where.”
Superintendent Shepoiser also suggested that if 60% or more of parents requested a
transfer for their child(ren), the district would financially be forced to close Mathewson.
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Meanwhile, a vocal group of European American parents whose children would
be moved into Mathewson under this plan demanded that the district draw the boundary
between the two schools so their children, in homes to the east of Hillside Street, could
stay at Brooks, which had only a 25% African American student body.174
Cornelius P. Cotter, Chair of the Political Science Department at Wichita State
University and a former member of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, wrote
to Peter Libassi in D.C., deputy staff director of the Commission, to suggest that he use
the situation in Wichita as a test for the effectiveness of sending a federal investigator to
develop a “case study” of the process, “ostensibly to make the experience of one
community available to others similarly established with similar experiences,” but with
the ultimate goal of subtly influencing the situation through the investigator’s mere
presence. Later that month, the board of education was set to determine the new
boundary line and Cotter feared that the superintendent’s proposed boundary “will
intensify segregation in a de facto segregated school system, and in doing so predictably
will extend our Negro ghetto…” Cotter described district leaders as having a “high
degree of hypocrisy” in their handling of the situation and a “smug sense of security” that
the federal government would not apply Title VI to the district.175
The new Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed discrimination on the
grounds of race, color or national origin in any program or activity receiving federal
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funding, upon pain of losing that funding.176 But, there was some doubt that the
Commission on Civil Rights would enforce this provision against schools in the North
dealing with de facto segregation as opposed to the still-ongoing issue of de jure
segregation in the South. On January 24,1966, the district’s attorney J. Ashford Manka,
reviewed court decisions on segregation and the role of school leadership in pushing
integration. He told the board that, in his opinion, the district was not racially segregated
and “that the Board of Education had endeavored to go beyond the legal mandates
prescribed by the courts in order to foster integration in the schools.” He told the board
that legally the district was not responsible for correcting for segregation caused by
housing segregation or to change boundaries to account for population shifts. He also
opined that African American students had no right to attend or refrain from attending a
particular school because of its racial make-up, although the district could take racial
make-up into consideration when setting school attendance boundaries and such an act
would not be discriminatory toward European American students.
At the January 24th school board meeting in 1966, the boundary change was the
main topic under discussion, drawing hundreds of parents. Among the speakers that
night were Mrs. Mary Ellen Lewis, president of the Mathewson PTA; Rev. Ray
Anderson, chairman of the Fair Housing Committee; Chester I. Lewis, president of the
Wichita NAAC; Dr. Maurice Weinberger, associate professor of education at Wichita
State University, and district parents Mr. L.L. McNulty and Mrs. Edgar (Jo) Gardenhire.
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Mrs. Lewis asked the board to consider integration “as one of the basic facts in
quality education.” She also referenced the superintendent’s suggestion that if 60% or
more of the parents requested transfer, the district could just close Mathewson. She
spoke of the survey that the Mathewson PTA had circulated. It showed that 430, or 80%,
of Mathewson seventh- and eighth-grade parents wanted their children moved to other
schools. Lewis suggested that Mathewson be discontinued as a junior high and instead
operate as an intermediate school for grades four through six. She pointed out that
parents were not asking the district to provide transportation to these other schools. Thus,
it would carry no additional cost for the board. 177
However, at a board meeting earlier in the month, the superintendent had
dismissed the petition. When the Wichita Beacon first asked him about the petition for its
January 7th article, he said he had not seen it yet, but added, “I don’t put my stock in
petitions.”178 The next day he called the petition “irrelevant,” saying that there was not
enough room for all of the African American students at the other schools mentioned in
the petition.
“This is out, it just couldn’t be done,” Shepoiser told the Wichita Eagle. “When a
school gets beyond 30 per cent (Negro enrollment) people begin to move.” The schools
named in the Mathewson petition were adjacent to the junior high school in question. 179
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Cotter’s letter to a member of the Civil Rights Commission reports that the
superintendent’s response to the petition “confirms Negro suspicion that such an optional
plan would be subject to manipulation against them.”180
The Rev. Anderson, who was fighting housing segregation in the city, asked the
board to “assume responsibility for eliminating a segregated” school caused by unfair
housing problems. Dr. Maurice Weinberger agreed that the segregation issue was not
one necessarily of the district’s making but urged the board to “deal with the issue of
integration squarely” and include it in the new boundaries. And Mrs. Edgar Gardenhire
spoke about the experiences of her children, who had been lucky enough under the
limited transfer option to “escape the ghetto.” She asked the board to allow other
children the chance at the “experiences her children had been enjoying in an integrated
school.”
Well aware of the district’s financial concerns due to rapid growth, both of local
population with the Baby Boom generation now in school and through expansion of area
caused by the city’s land annexations of outlying areas in recent years, most of those who
supported the closing of Mathewson as a junior high for integration purposes repeatedly
pointed out to the board that parents, not the district, would bear the cost and
responsibility of transporting the students to the more distant schools. This followed the
pattern of those who had already managed to transfer out of Mathewson in recent years,
like Mrs. Gardenhire’s children. The minutes from that January 24th board meeting
record Chester Lewis as saying, “There wasn’t one group that made one demand either
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by letter or by voice or orally for any subsidized transportation, and any proposal
recommended to this Board by anyone that was couched in any kind of language that
contained a subsidized transportation plan would fall by its own weight.”181
Within the group recorded in the official meeting minutes as speaking at that
January 24th meeting, the only one to support keeping Mathewson open was Mr. L.L.
McNulty. He liked the suggestion of board member Evelyn Whitcomb of keeping
Mathewson as a junior high, but transferring all successful, or “A” and “B,” students to
other junior highs and turning Mathewson into a Junior High Development Center, a
remedial school of sorts for struggling students from across the district. The district
would provide special help and services as needed to ensure those students’ future
success.182
The board’s digest of the January 24th meeting states, “the agenda was short, but
discussion was long as the Board attacked related problems of junior high boundaries,
pupil transportation, integration, and the transfer policy.”183 In the end, the board voted
to set the boundary between Brooks and Mathewson at Hillside, keeping Mathewson a
segregated school. The vote came after midnight and was seven to five, with Edwana
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Collins, Dr James M. Donnell, Dorothy Goodpasture, John M Michener, and Dr Charles
M. White voting against it.184
While Wichita area civil rights leadership stewed over what to do next, the district
moved forward with trying to figure out what to do with Mathewson. The January 24th
meeting had left the junior high’s future in limbo. Would it even re-open the next school
year? Disregarding the fact that 80% of the parents at Mathewson had already requested
that their children be transferred to another junior high, above the 60% level the
superintendent had originally set as the point between keeping the school open and
closing it, Shepoiser decided to run his own poll. In a letter dated February 7, 1966,
Shepoiser asked Mathewson parents with children in sixth, seventh, and eighth grades to
go to their child’s school to fill out a new survey. This survey asked them to pick their
top five choices for a junior high for the following year while reminding them that there
would be “only limited space available” at Brooks, the next closest junior high, and that
transportation “is a parent responsibility and is not a satisfactory excuse for being absent
or tardy.” 185
All of this coming just a few years after the board ruled, prior to the construction
of Coleman, that “It is not feasible to change the boundaries of the junior high
schools…in order to effect any meaningful integration in the Mathewson School.”
Instead the board implemented an extremely limited transfer-out policy to compensate for
housing segregation, a policy that many African Americans in Wichita felt was little
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more than lip service to integration. This move was the final straw for the city’s NAACP
president, Chester Lewis.186
Just a few days later, Eick records, Lewis flew his personal plane to Washington,
D.C., to begin investigating a formal complaint against the district. On February 10th, he
officially mailed that complaint to HEW’s Office of Education. He charged that the
district was practicing racial discrimination in the public school system, as evidenced by
gerrymandering of attendance boundaries, discriminatory assignment of teachers based
on race, and inferior curriculum materials and buildings. The complaint asked the federal
government to withhold funds under Title VI of the Civil Right Act of 1964.187
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CHAPTER V

COMPLAINT AND COMMUNITY REACTION

When Chester Lewis filed a formal complaint of segregatory practices by the
Wichita Public Schools with the federal government, he had years of issues to present to
HEW, but the recent decision on attendance boundaries between Brooks and Mathewson
junior highs was the final straw. What he did not know then was what HEW would make
of his complaint or that prosecutors, in the end, would find on the Board of Education
itself a key ally in determining that the district was illegally segregated.
The complaint Lewis mailed to the Assistant Secretary of HEW, David Seely, was
76 pages long. It began:
The Wichita Board of Education has deliberately segregated the city’s public
school system. This conclusion was sustained from the examination of:
(1)
Intentional racial discriminatory gerrymandering of school attendance
boundaries as to discriminate against Negro pupils solely because of their race or
color.
(2)
The deliberate appointment and assignment of teachers and administrators
on a racial discriminatory basis.
(3)
The assignment of inferior curricula to the Negro schools.188
Lewis’ complaint was only the second filed against a northern school district, after
Ferndale, Michigan. The Office of Civil Rights’ Annual Report for 1969 says that it
“initiated its first formal Title VI enforcement against a northern school district in
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Ferndale, Michigan.” The following year’s report stated, “OCR initiated a second formal
administrative enforcement proceeding against a northern school system (Wichita,
Kansas).” The Wichita case would, by default, be breaking new ground in the fight to
integrate public schools across the country.189
With knowledge the Lewis had filed this complaint, the superintendent moved
forward with presenting the results of his attendance preference survey of February 7th.
The very language he used confirmed to African Americans that Shepoiser was looking
for ways to circumvent integrating the junior highs as much as possible. Shepoiser did
not inform the board of how many parents listed a junior high other than Mathewson as a
first choice. Instead, he informed the board that “326 Negro pupils or 32 per cent of
those Negro pupils living in the optional attendance area” did NOT (emphasis added) list
Mathewson as ONE of their five choices while 68% or 689 pupils DID list Mathewson as
ONE of their five preferences. The preference cards showed that 589 pupils, just eleven
shy of the 60% point for closure, listed another junior high as their first choice. Just 418
listed Mathewson as their first choice.190
The following week, February 28th, Shepoiser officially recommended the district
keep Mathewson open over the protests of African American parents and students.
Along with the recommendation he warned the board that closing the school would leave
it with, “I believe… a moral responsibility on the part of the Broad to provide free
transportation for all the pupils who have chosen to remain at Mathewson.” This, after
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leaving board members, in an age when they were fighting for every nickel and dime to
accommodate expanding enrollment needs, with the impression that 68% of students
wished to remain at Mathewson. The board failed to take any action that week after three
tied votes on continuing to operate Mathewson as is, closing it, and even holding a closed
session of the board to further discuss the issue.191 The board again tabled the issue of
Mathewson’s future at its next two meetings, finally voting on March 21st to keep
Mathewson open as a neighborhood junior high while implementing “an experimental
pilot program of compensatory education.192
Local civil rights groups derided the board both publicly and in letters to the
board for its actions. The Reverend Everett Reynolds, president of the Wichita
Ministerial League, wrote, “…we must protest your continued lack of integrity as a
Board” for leaving the parents of Mathewson students hanging for so long, not knowing
their children’s educational future and then for supporting the “Preference Card” survey.
Reynolds added, “The matter is race and then some, to this extent YOU KNOW THE
SCHOOLS ARE BELOW CITY STANDARDS [sic]…” His letter included information
pulled from the district’s own records showing that students at the five elementary
schools with 97% African American enrollment tested among the lowest tenth of the
district’s schools and that the majority of the students were a year below grade on the
sixth-grade test. In 1964, according to the district’s own board presentations, African
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American youth were 12.4% of elementary enrollment, 10.8% of Junior High enrollment,
but only 5.2% of High School enrollment. In fact, the dropout rate of African American
youth figured highly in Lewis’ complaint to HEW. Reynolds called on the district to
restudy its position, saying, “…you have failed to properly educate the Negro community
child.”193
The fight over the future of Mathewson combined with the results of an NAACP
study of the educational standards of the town, comparing the educational status of
African American students with European American students, led the organization to
begin mulling over a school boycott to show its displeasure. The NAACP study showed
that at least a quarter of African American students were “two grades below comparable
students in other schools,” found out-of-date textbooks at the African American schools,
broken down equipment, lower quality teaching, and fewer subjects offered to students.
It also determined that 75% of the high school dropouts in 1963-64 and of the senior
dropouts in 1964-65 were African American. Lewis told the Associated Press,
“Something is wrong with the school system which permits this to happen…What you
really need are the best teachers in the worst schools.”194
During this same period, the board had been arguing over how to accommodate
expanding enrollment at some of the district’s African American majority elementary
schools as well. At the center of the issue was what to do with Isely Elementary. It

193

Rev. Everett Reynolds, Letter to the Board of Education, March 18, 1966, box 1,
folder 2, Edwana Denning Collins Collection.
“NAACP Studying Possibility of Wichita School Boycott,” Hays Daily News,
February 28, 1966; “Wichita School Still a Question on Integration,” Manhattan Mercury, March
1, 1966.
194

93

needed more classroom space. Should the district move boundary lines to send some of
the students to other, majority European American schools? Or, should it put up more
portable classrooms at an African American school when more than two-thirds of the
portables already in use in the central city area of Wichita were already at African
American schools? After several weeks of discussing the issue and hearing from African
American parents asking for the boundary shift, the board voted six to five to put 10 more
portable classrooms at Isely.195 Vashti Lewis chaired the NAACP Education Committee
in Wichita. In that position, she gathered data on this decision which Lewis sent on to
HEW to add to the NAACP’s formal complaint.196
By mid-March it was public HEW was considering an official investigation into
the Wichita Public Schools. Lewis had received a response to his formal complaint in the
form of a letter from Herbert C. Kane, area director for the Office of Education, which
Lewis had shared with the media. According to newspaper reports, that letter told Lewis,
“You may be assured that the complaint will be carefully evaluated together with other
material on this school system. As soon as our staff and priorities permit, we hope to
start a full-scale investigation of the Wichita school system.”197
Finding the staff to complete the investigation was indeed a concern. It was not
until April 27, 1966, that the school board got official notice of the investigation. That
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was when the superintendent received a letter from David S. Seeley, the Assistant
Commissioner of the Equal Educational Opportunities Program, announcing that his
office had received Lewis’ original complaint from February. The letter said, in part,
“The allegations of non-compliance (with Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act) are
serious ones, and apparently have not been made without considerable thought and
analysis.” It then cites as staffing shortage in explaining why the office was not sending
investigators to Wichita, but instead asking the district to cooperate with the investigation
by sending any requested materials to their D.C. offices. In this first contact, Seeley
asked the district to provide: a narrative description of all boundary changes affecting
Mathewson and the impact on its racial make-up; a description of any parent opinion
sampling and who took it; total enrollment at each school by year, broken down by race;
planned capacity of each school; hiring practices; an ethnic breakdown of provisional,
probationary and substitute teachers by race, and the curriculum offered at each school,
including the number of classes given in each subject.198
Two months later, on June 22, 1966, the district officially responded to this
request, shipping off two packages of paperwork to Kane. Shepoiser writes, “I believe
that the answers to the questions asked and the exhibits offered as evidence give support
to our contention that the Wichita Public School System during the years in question did
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not, nor does not,” violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as accused in Lewis’
complaint.199
At stake were millions of dollars in federal funding. In the wake of the Sputnik
launch and America’s fear of falling behind the Soviets in the Great Space Race, more
federal money had become available to public school systems. The district, struggling to
accommodate a rapidly enlarging enrollment due to both population growth and
urbanization, had taken part in many of the federally funded programs as they became
available, everything from Project Head Start pre-school programs to vocational training.
In the last year, the biggest chunk of dollars yet had become available through the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965. Even the board’s
conservative members who worried about the included federal controls generally
approved taking advantage of the money, rather than letting it go to another district. That
money would now be held over their heads to force compliance with HEW and its
segregation investigation.200
HEW and the African American community were not alone in paying attention to
how the district handled racial matters. The Wichita City Teachers Association (WCTA)
began drafting an integration resolution. It sent a preliminary draft to its members in
May of 1966, asking them to read, discuss and provide input on the final resolution.
WCTA President F. Robert Hollowell wrote in the introductory letter, “We as educators
are long over due [sic] in making our thoughts known to the community and providing
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the leadership in the integration of our schools…We must not give token support any
longer.” The resolution demanded immediate integration of all teachers, saying that
present numbers would allow a ratio of “Negro teachers to white in the same proportion
as the total population,” and a change in attendance boundaries so as to fully integrate all
school buildings in the district. It promised to lobby for fair housing laws in the city and
against the use of portable classrooms as a means of retaining segregated schools.201
However, in the face of resistance from membership, the original resolution ended
up tabled, essentially killing it. The WCTA tried again later in the year with a modified
version of the resolution, using the argument that it would help the district in its case with
HEW, and members reluctantly approved it. It was not until the spring of 1969 when,
during another contract dispute with the district, a national union leader visited Wichita to
help. Samuel Ethridge defended HEW’s position on the district’s segregation status, and
that defense helped push teacher sentiment firmly against segregation and into active
promotion of integration policies.202
Lobbying efforts by groups like the Wichita Urban League and the NAACP to
swing public opinion on the issue of integrating schools moved into high gear. From
speaking at community meetings discussing other civil rights topics, such as fair housing
laws, to letters to the editor, it was mostly a grassroots effort and often led by local
ministers. One of the arguments used to urge integration as a good idea for European
American families was that it would provide their children with an advantage in the

201

F Robert Hollowell, in letter to membership of the Wichita City Teachers Association,
May 16, 1966, box1, folder 2, Edwana Denning Collins Collection.
202

Eick, Dissent in Wichita, 171-72.

97

economic world as adults. Hugh Jackson, president of the Wichita Urban League, wrote
in an Op-EGd piece in the Catholic Advance that parents cannot avoid a multiracial
future and that, “Integration provides an opportunity for white [sic] citizens to help
prepare their children in a natural, diversified setting for the world they are going to live
in.” In other words, it would provide European American children with an economic
advantage as adults.203
As early as 1966, activists also started pushing for some form of busing as a relief
from segregated neighborhoods creating de facto segregated schools, even as the school
district was entrenching itself in fighting the accusation that it was segregated at all.
Jackson argued that the benefits to both African American and European American
children of integrated education made a compelling argument for busing. “Busing can
cut across existing residential segregated housing patterns and help to end de facto
segregation.”204
By August of 1966, several African American students who had requested and
received transfer to Coleman and/or Robinson Junior Highs, found that they could not
afford the transportation. F. Doyle Fair warned the board at its August 1st meeting that
there might be a rush of students requesting transfer back to Mathewson due to
transportation problems that fall. By the end of August those requests were coming in,
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and the board was denying them. That is when an interdenominational, interracial
foundation formed to raise the money to buy those students bus passes for the school
year. Forty-five dollars would pay to transport one student for the year. One of the
trustees of the organization was school board member and integration advocate Edwana
Collins.205 The new organization cited the district’s failure to follow its own policy No.
2250 in dealing with the transportation needs of students who transferred out of the
Mathewson “optional attendance area.” That policy stated:
The Board of Education wishes to cooperate with other community
agencies in helping eliminate the conditions that bring about de facto
segregation. This community cooperation is believed to be essential in
that residential patterns as well as cultural and social attitudes of the
people have an impact on segregation. In respect to desegregation, the
Board of Education sees the public school system as an agency to give
leadership in developing attitudes and understandings which are
compatible to race integration for a democratic form of society.
The Board of Trustees of the Operation Transport Foundation blamed the school for not
paying for buses to transport the students transferring out of Mathewson. The district had
told all families that the cost was theirs to bear and, while students and their families
were willing to deal with the time lost every day to traveling farther to get to and from
school, most found that they could not sustain the cost for long.206 In a handwritten note
dated August 25, Collins wrote that Operation Transport was designed to fight the view
in the African American community that the entire “optional attendance area” policy for
Mathewson was little more than lip service to integration. That it was, in fact, a sneaky
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way to limit integration without saying that that was what they were doing. She hoped
that if the fundraising efforts were successful, Operation Transport would not only help
integrate Coleman Junior High but also make the compensatory program at Mathewson
more successful and “aid other efforts being made to stabilize the entire northeast area of
the city.”207
In January of 1967, the Board of Education had created a new committee to study
the issues of socioeconomics and race in the city and their impact on the district. The
Low Economics Area Problems (LEAP) committee was made up of some thirty
Wichitans including educators and laypeople. Among the members were several African
Americans, including Hugh Jackson; Clyde Phillips, the principal of Ingalls Elementary;
Rev. Kelsey Jones, pastor of St. Matthew Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, and
Frank Carpenter of the board’s intergroup relations staff. Three members of the Board of
Education, including Edwana Collins, and Superintendent Lawrence Shepoiser were also
on the committee. Carl Bell, a former school board member, city commissioner and
mayor, chaired the committee. Eick says the district chose him for his proven consensusbuilding abilities throughout the community, a needed first step in building support for
desegregation in the district. Bell had rallied the community behind several major civic
projects, including building a civic center and a library. He also had experience working
with African American leaders due to his participation in the fair housing fight. This new
committee Bell headed would spend the next two years and $20,000 studying how
socioeconomics, race, housing segregation and schooling intertwine with and correlate to
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each other in the City of Wichita, concentrating on the historically segregated
northeastern sector of the city, before making recommendations to the school board on
actions that body should take toward desegregation.208
The superintendent kicked off the study with a memo to committee members
explaining the situation from his perspective, telling them that a superintendent’s time in
the late 1960s was taken up with an “endless effort” of dealing with “social, economic,
and political forces beyond the limits of the public school domain” and warning that the
“flood waters of social unrest, group conflict, racial strife, personal prejudices, and
political ferment threaten the very foundation … of public education.” He descried these
issues as forcing him to spend his time “listening to unruly forces in the community”
rather than concentrating on staff improvement and curriculum innovations. In his view,
the most pressing issues facing the district that the committee needed to find solutions for
included how to secure a quality education for all pupils, regardless of race or
socioeconomic status, how to deal with a concentration of disadvantaged students in any
one location, how to find the money to provide adequate compensatory education for
those areas, how to secure integrated education free from prejudices and artificial
controls, and how to determine the district’s role in race integration “without making the
school the sole political instrument for change.”
Bell charged one subcommittee with studying the characteristics of teachers on
staffs at low-socioeconomic and at minority dominated schools. Discrimination in hiring
and assigning teachers was one of the main charges of Lewis’ complaint to HEW. The
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study broke schools down into groups, Low Socio-Economic, Negro; Low SocioEconomic, Integrated and Low Socio-Economic, Caucasian. The committee both studied
the district’s own records for those schools and had teachers at each school fill out a
questionnaire. Committee members looked at number of credit hours, degrees obtained,
age, gender, and total professional experience of all the teachers at the schools in
question. A year and a half later, in April of 1968, the sub-committee presented its
findings.
At the elementary level the committee determined that African American schools
had the most teachers with the highest levels of education at all levels - undergraduate,
graduate, and post-Masters. Lower socio-economic integrated schools did better on
teacher education than European American -only schools and lower socio-economic
schools in general did better than middle and upper socio-economic schools. This
aligned with the district’s efforts to provide compensatory education at low-performing
schools. However, when it came to retention, the opposite was true. The European
American -only schools did much better at both hiring teachers with experience and at
keeping them on the staff. And the ratio of African American to European American
instructors was directly related to the student population’s racial make-up with the
highest proportion of African American teachers at African American schools, 95% at
each school, and the lowest proportion at the European American schools, 3% at the
lower socio-economic schools and 0.5% at the upper socio-economic schools.
At the junior high level, though, things changed. The preponderance of
professional training moved over to join the level of professional experience, benefiting
European American children much more than African American children. And, while
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there had been some mixing of races amongst teachers at the elementary level, that dove
toward zero at the junior high level, the more European American and affluent the school
got. The one advantage African American students retained was in class size, still
averaging about 16 students per teacher, the lowest in the district. This contrasted with
the 26-student average at the richest European American -only schools.
The sub-committee concluded that there was no “consistently clear pattern” of
differences among teachers between different types of segregated and integrated schools,
suggesting that “perhaps there will be less of a tendency to generalize or make categorical
statements about staffing patterns or conditions in different types of schools.”209
By May of 1968, the idea of busing students in and out of the “optional
attendance area” was commonplace. The LEAP committee queried the superintendent on
a series of issues, from “What is the value of a racial mix?” to “How does USD No. 259
finance a totally integrated program within present budget limitations?” The
superintendent’s first response to the financing question immediately referenced the cost
of busing students to and/or from Mathewson. The answer, at a time when the district
was already cash-strapped, ranged from $40,000 for just busing out of the Mathewson
zone all the way to $8,764,420 for busing elementary students from the seven segregated
elementary schools, including the additional costs of moving portable classrooms,
purchasing additional portables, expanding cafeterias, and providing special,
compensatory educational services at their new schools. Shepoiser also listed out issues
that would likely increase that number, such as probable increase in enrollment of
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students requiring transportation and where to find the money to pay for the idea.
Though the idea was present already, the district itself appeared resistant to the concept
of busing students for purposes of integration. The superintendent was certainly not
convinced that integrating solely for the purpose of integration was a good idea. Telling
the committee that “there is no evidence” that integrating would help improve student
performance differences which came about because of differences of ability, socioeconomic levels, and neighborhood influences. He pointed to an analysis of the Coleman
Study showing that integration impacted only what he called “conditions of learning” not
the goals of learning.210
Despite these reservations on the part of the superintendent, the superintendent
and administrative staff recommended to a new committee, the Civil Rights Compliance
Committee, cross-busing of students between majority African American and majority
European American schools to achieve a racial balance of students in all schools
equivalent to the overall city racial mix. While the LEAP Committee was still digging
through reams of data to determine its recommendations, the Board president on July 15,
1968, after meeting with HEW representatives and getting a January 1, 1969, deadline for
a desegregation plan, had formed the new Civil Rights Compliance Committee, headed
by board members Dorothy Goodpasture and Dr Gary N Pottorf. The committee’s
purpose was to “coordinate information necessary for Board decisions on issues in the
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area of civil rights” as it worked to respond to HEW’s investigation and demands for
change.211
On December 2nd, the committee made its recommendations to the Board.
Admitting that the superintendent, et al, had recommended cross-busing, the committee
chose instead to advise the board to draw new attendance boundaries within the African
American community for junior and senior high school assignments. “The nucleus of the
black community would be sub-divided into geographical divisions for the purpose of
assigning pupils to various schools (other than Mathewson Intermediate School).” At the
same time, the committee rejected even redistricting for the city’s seven all-African
American elementary schools, calling it “unrealistic and impractical” because it would
require busing 320 African American children out of the segregated neighborhoods and
642 European American children into those neighborhoods. Instead, the district would
operate a “freedom of choice” plan for the elementary schools, students who chose could
volunteer to be bused out of the area to other schools. This same plan had increased the
percentage of African American students enrolled at Mathewson Junior High over the
previous two years.212
African Americans in the community were incensed. Chester Lewis called the
plan a violation of the law and accused the Board of putting the wants of European
American parents over the needs of African American schoolchildren. He wanted crossbusing, arguing that the district already bused 5,000 students, so why not a couple of
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thousand more? Other African American parents, speaking out at school board meetings,
were upset because the plan put the burden of movement only on their children. They
wanted cross-busing, too. However, not even the African American community was
unified in its desires regarding integration. A group of African American teachers in the
district was in favor of greater compensatory spending and an increase in other resources
for the African American schools over desegregation efforts. While a small group of
European American parents favored complete desegregation, the majority fought against
busing for their students and one group of South High parents demanded that the district
reject federal funding and keep things the way they had been, wanting the district to
refuse to bus African American students to their high school, which had just 18 African
American students, about 0.7% of the enrollment, in the 1967-68 school year. It was the
second most- European American high school in the district, behind West High, at that
time.213
As this was going on, Wichita Public Schools, and the city in its entirety, began to
deal with outbreaks of race-related brawls and riots. By 1967, the newspapers routinely
referred to East High School, with a 29.7% African American enrollment the most
integrated high school in the district, as racially troubled. Van Meter records that trouble
had been brewing at East High for several years. Despite its high percentage of African
American students, none were in leadership positions.214 In May of 1967, the district
asked Wichita Police to provide extra officers both inside and outside the school after a
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brawl at a drive-in across the street broke out, injuring three people including a KTVH
(KWCH) TV photographer. Police said it started when a European American man “put
his hand on the shoulder of a Negro girl.” Investigators told the paper that they believed
it started as a “typical loud-mouth brawl” over controversy involving the cheerleaders at
East High. None of the African American students who had tried out for the squad had
made it to the final round. No African Americans were cheerleaders at the school. The
African American community protested that the decision was racially motivated, not
about abilities. The superintendent announced that the cut-off was “lowered to permit a
Negro candidate for the cheerleaders final election Friday.” Police believed that a group
of drunk European Americans, non-students, sparked the fight that eventually involved
some 200-250 people.215
In August of 1967, the city slapped a curfew first on the African American
community, then on the entire city, after a shooting incident sparked off days of violence.
Don Kendall of the Associated Press reported that the violence started when someone in a
car fired at the Sedgwick County Sheriff, Vern Miller, and three African Americans he
was speaking with, hitting them with shotgun pellets. Officers eventually arrested four
European American men and prosecutors charged them with the original attack, but not
before the shooting sparked off several days of confrontations, rock throwing and other
disturbances across the city. After the mayor ordered the curfew in just the African
American neighborhood, “large groups of Negroes” faced off with police. “Youths
hurled bottles, rocks, bricks and other debris,” Kendall wrote, injuring at least 13 people.
The violence continued even after the citywide curfew went into effect. A sniper, firing
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what the paper described as 20-caliber rifle, injured a European American man who lived
in the African American neighborhood and six police officers, as well as damaging two
squad cars. Firebombs destroyed a dry goods store and damaged a church.216
The following summer, more violence broke out in the city. As race riots rocked
cities across the nation in the summer of 1968, unrest returned to Wichita. In August,
several days of rioting led to the mayor’s ordering another curfew and even calling in the
Kansas National Guard to restore order. The Associated Press reported that “a Negro boy
was shot and seriously wounded” on the second night of confrontations. Investigators
believed that the shooter was speeding by in a car with Oklahoma plates when he shot the
19-year-old Lawrence Hytche. Police and fire crews both reported someone shooting at
them as they drove through the city responding to calls. Someone firebombed a
restaurant, service station and paint store. Others looted an all-night grocery store.
Dozens of guns were stolen. Overwhelmed by the incidents, the city asked the governor
to activate the National Guard, which he did on August 22. Some 458 guardsmen
deployed throughout the northeastern sector of the city in three- to four-man groups, each
group working with a two-man police unit. It still took the troops another couple of days
to end the disturbances.217
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This was the atmosphere in which the Wichita Public school board was working
as they answered HEW’s questions about their role in the impact de facto segregation
was having on school assignments in the city. While riots ended in the city after the
summer of 1968, fights, brawls, and other racial confrontations would continue for the
next few years in the school buildings and at the school board meetings, especially once
the public realized that there would be only one way to keep their public schools open
while still relying on federal funds, and that was to accept some form of busing.
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CHAPTER VI

HEW INVESTIGATION AND A FORMAL HEARING

The increasing discussion on busing African American students only and crossbusing both African American and European American students to achieve integration
came as the district was quarreling with HEW over the investigation into its segregatory
status. Since receiving that first request for information in April of 1966, various HEW
investigators came to Wichita in April, June, and July of 1967 to verify the information
the district had forwarded and to seek out additional details on the situation. In February
of 1968, carrying the investigative team’s recommendation that the district was in
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a team of attorneys, social workers, and
consultants from HEW, led by Frederick Cioffi, met with the superintendent on February
6th, then visited department heads and schools before meeting with the school board
president and Shepoiser in a closed meeting on February 9th. In a report to the full board
after these meetings, Shepoiser was confident that HEW would clear the district of the
charges against it if the board simply passed a public policy statement on desegregation
and a time table for Mathewson Junior High and all the segregated elementary schools or
for teachers and staff.218
“Superintendent’s Meeting with Civil Right Commission Team, Title VI,” February
13, 1968, box 1, folder 4; Lloyd R. Henderson, Education Branch Chief, Office for Civil Rights,
218
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However, in March of 1968, Lloyd Henderson, Education Branch Chief of the
Office of Civil Rights, informed the superintendent that the district was in violation of
federal law on all three of Lewis’ main charges: segregation of African American
students by school building, segregation of African American teachers, and
gerrymandering of attendance boundaries to maintain segregated status at Mathewson.
Despite the opinions of the district’s lawyer in 1966, Henderson informed the district that
the “school system has the affirmative duty under law to take prompt and effective action
to eliminate segregation or other discrimination based on race, color, or national origin,
and to correct the effects of past discrimination.” Henderson told the superintendent that
the investigation showed that Wichita Public schools had failed to eliminate ongoing
discrimination or to correct for the results of past discrimination within the district. He
suggested that in order to come into compliance with federal law. the district should close
Mathewson as a junior high and redistribute its students to other buildings, accelerate the
district’s desegregation program for teachers, suspend construction plans for a new Isely
Elementary School, and develop a plan to terminate segregation at the district’s seven
African American elementaries.219 Of these suggestions, OCR expected only the closure
of Mathewson and the acceleration of the faculty desegregation program to be
implemented by that September.220

letter to Lawrence Shepoiser, April 16, 1968, box 1, folder 4, Edwana Denning Collins
Collection.
219

Lloyd Henderson, Education Branch Chief, Office for Civil Rights, letter to Lawrence
Shepoiser, April 16, 1968, box 1, folder 4, Edwana Denning Collins Collection.
220

Lloyd Henderson, Education Branch Chief, Office for Civil Rights, letter to William
Busch, Wichita School Board President, box 1, folder 4, Edwana Denning Collins Collection.

111

The district responded in May, telling OCR that the school board was evaluating
its suggestions while at the same time working on an alternate solution through the LEAP
committee. The board president requested time to complete the evaluation and to get
study results back from the committee. He also informed OCR of a court decision in
March invalidating the district’s most recent bond issue, suspending all projected major
construction in the district. Board President William Busch also wanted to know if the
district would be responsible for the cost of transportation in any busing or cross-busing
plan and if reassignments should be made “without regard to the preference of the
teachers and students necessarily affected.”221
In response to these requests, Henderson said, yes, the district would be expected
to bear the cost of transporting students “required to attend schools at substantial
distances from their residences.” However, his answer about whether student and teacher
assignment should be mandatory or voluntary or somewhere in between was more vague.
He wrote, “…we can only repeat that your school system has an affirmative duty, under
law, to take prompt and effective action to eliminate segregation and other
discrimination…and to correct the effects of past discrimination.”
There were some conflicts between the HEW position on desegregation and both
Kansas and federal law, according to the district’s new attorney, Donald Newkirk. He
believed some of HEW’s guidelines went beyond the constitutional requirements and
would open the district up to lawsuits by both the African American and the European
American communities. He worried about the result of inadvertent reverse
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discrimination resulting from any decisions the board made to desegregate, questioned
HEW’s right to demand the district provide transportation for reassigned pupils, and said
that the Kansas Civil Rights Act did not give the board the right to “compel a teacher to
transfer for purposes of integration.” He told the board that HEW was judging the district
not on intent, but on effects and that the department was experimenting on the district.
There had been 100 cases of HEW’s cutting off funds to segregated schools, all south of
the Mason-Dixon line. “We are number one,” he told the board, the first northern school
facing these actions.222
But HEW remained adamant about the changes that needed to be made. After a
face-to-face meeting in July 1968, Cioffi and Henderson approved a year’s delay in
closing Mathewson due to the district’s overcrowding problems at junior highs, the
construction program already in place, and the delays caused by the court’s reversal of
the bond issue. For that reason, the issue of building a new Isely Elementary, HEW
considered moot. The district simply dropped the school from its future construction
plans. HEW also accepted as reasonable the district’s plan to reduce the concentration of
African American teachers in any one building to 50% in the 1968-69 school year, 35%
in 1969-70, and 25% in 1970-71.223 However, in September of 1968, HEW informed the
district that it still needed to resolve the issue of segregation at the seven predominantly
African American elementary schools. Federal funding, an increasing total every year
due to the district’s financial straits, remained in jeopardy. Failure to submit a detailed
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plan by January 1, 1969, and implement it by September 1, 1969, would lead the
government to take the next step in proceedings against the district. HEW would either
ask counsel to cut off funds or ask a judge to set up a desegregation plan for the
district.224
The board re-designated the formerly optional attendance area around Mathewson
as the Assigned Attendance Area (AAA) with its closure. Students and their families
would no longer be able to list their first, second, third, and so on choices for a junior
high. Instead, the district would decide which school they attended, by address, and bus
the students there. The AAA remains in use in the Wichita School District as of 2019,
despite the ending of court-ordered busing. African American students remain the only
students required to bus out of their neighborhood to attend school in the intermediate
grades, something both the African American community and HEW fought against in the
1960s and 1970s.225.
At the same time, the school board was checking with other school districts across
the nation dealing with desegregation cases with HEW, to see how they were handling
responses and what their lawyers thought of current law both in the U.S. legal code and
via court decisions. Among the responses was a 1968 letter from the Baltimore City
solicitor’s office to David Glenn in the Baltimore Community Relations Commission
outlining their reading of the impact on desegregation plans of the Green vs County
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School Board of New Kent County U.S. Supreme Court decision outlawing so-called
“freedom of choice” plans, such as the one Wichita had been operating with Mathewson.
The letter noted that prior to the Green ruling HEW had accepted “freedom of choice”
plans “so long as in operation such a plan effectively promoted integration.” However,
the Court ruled that “freedom of choice” plans were acceptable when implemented
immediately after Brown II to effectuate integration and when they were effective.
However, in cases such as Kent County, Virginia, where the district had waited several
years to implement the plan and in the three years under the plan not a single European
American child had chosen to attend the African American school, while 85% of African
American children remained at that school, such plans were unconstitutional. This
aligned very closely with the Wichita district with one exception. Wichita had never
been segregated by state law. However, it had waited several years after the Brown II
ruling to implement even a limited “freedom of choice” plan, for Mathewson alone,
ignoring the segregated elementary schools, and the plan had failed to desegregate even
Mathewson. The court ordered that where “freedom of choice” plans do not work, rezoning of attendance boundaries is an acceptable option. But that was in application to a
district segregated originally by state law as opposed to a district segregated by a
combination of housing segregation and the resistance of European American parents to
integration. The Green ruling provided little additional guidance, ending with an
admonition that there is no one plan that will work everywhere and that, “It is incumbent
upon the school board to establish that its proposed plan promises meaningful and
immediate progress….” Meanwhile, the White House was signaling a sea change in
attitude toward desegregation policies. During his presidential campaign in 1968,
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Richard Nixon had come out in opposition to busing plans, saying it was
counterproductive to send “slum” children to rich schools. Instead he favored the
“freedom of choice” plans ruled out by Green.226 All of which left the Wichita Public
Schools back where they started, trying to figure out what no one else really had at that
point, how to desegregate a school system built primarily around neighborhood schools
to please a federal agency that could be changing its enforcement policies soon.227
That was the question tackled by district representatives and a six-man team from
HEW at a meeting in Washington, D.C., on March 27, 1969. Despite this meeting, HEW
insisted that the board submit a supplement to its overall compliance plan, laying out how
the board planned to desegregate the seven remaining African American elementary
schools in Wichita. The board voted on the 31st to deny that request. In open defiance of
HEW, the board said instead that it would stick with its original plan, though allowing
that it would also report to HEW “by June 1, 1969, and from time to time thereafter, the
extent to which black elementary students are assigned and transferred out of the seven
elementary schools as a result of the present plan.”228 In a letter to Leon Panetta, then
head of the Office for Civil Rights, announcing its decision, Board President Patrick
Thiessen wrote that the board would not “make a present commitment to abandon the
neighborhood school concept and completely ‘desegregate’ the seven elementary schools
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by the fall of 1970.” Only Edwana Collins and Dr. James Donnell dissented from this
stand.229
Over the summer, discussions would continue with HEW via letters, phone calls
and visits. These discussions covered topics such as the next year’s ratio of European
American to African American students at various schools, when each of the seven
segregated elementary schools achieved segregated status, and how the district put
portable classrooms into use. In an August visit, the federal team refused to socialize
with the board.230 In September, the board again invited HEW representatives to again
visit Wichita, see the schools, and speak with board members and administrators about
the district’s unique issues and concerns.231
As the district continued to play what critics saw as a delaying action with the
federal government, waiting to see if enforcement rules would change, the LEAP
Committee finally came back with its long-delayed recommendations. General reaction
to the committee’s recommendations was shock. “Way, way out there,” board member
Evelyn Whitcomb responded when she heard them. Fellow board member Ruby Tate
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called them “a sociologist’s dream.” New superintendent Alvin Morris, however, liked at
least the general concept of the recommendations.232
The 40-member committee had considered both a cross-busing plan and the
possible creation of “education parks” in the district. Education parks would toss out the
district’s preferred neighborhood schools in favor of collecting all students from a sector
of the city onto one campus. Model Cities, a federal program designed to alleviate the
problems associated with large, poverty-stricken urban populations, had already endorsed
the idea of education parks and indicated a delay in funding for Wichita because of its
failure to deal with the seven segregated elementary schools.233 But the school board was
adamantly opposed to education parks, preferring the long-standing neighborhood school
system. The board did not release the committee’s report until July, after board members
had had a chance to read the book-length report of 247 pages. It included more than 35
recommendations “with several alternatives under each proposal.” It also included an 18page “minority” report from committee members who disagreed with the majority’s final
recommendations in one form or another. 234
Among the recommendations, the LEAP committee said that the district should
work to “achieve total socio-economic integration of students.” By default, this would
include total racial integration, as well. It recommended no more than 20% minority
students at any one school building, the immediate establishment of a teacher training
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program, a feasibility study of education parks, a pilot compensatory education program
for disadvantaged students, provision of textbooks for free, and establishment of a
district-wide transportation system.235
It was not until August that the public finally got a look at what community
leaders thought was the best course for the district moving forward. In September, the
Wichita Eagle published a six-part series looking at the LEAP recommendations and
making its own suggestions for what the district should do. The purpose was to give “all
interested citizens…a chance to look over the recommendations…along with some of the
reasoning that led to the recommendations.” It quoted liberally from the actual
committee report, outlining both the report’s recommendations and the reasoning behind
the recommendations. For example, the report recommended complete socio-economic
integration of schools because “inadequate skills of the poor, insular environments of the
affluent and the ineffectiveness of compensatory programs” failed to provide the equality
of educational opportunity that was the district’s goal, to poor European American
students as much as to African American students.236 Toward that end, better teacher
training and complete racial integration would be big first steps.
The minority report, the Eagle said, mostly criticized the overall committee for
the report’s “lack of demonstrated financial feasibility, lack of objectivity, and lack of
credible bases to support the majority’s study and recommendations.” Bell, the
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committee’s chairman, had answered some of those criticisms while meeting with the
media to discuss the report’s recommendations in late August. He said it was not the
committee’s job to “investigate cost of the LEAP proposals” and added that the
committee had pointed out in its report that the district would need to find additional
funds to do what was needed to provide a better education for all. The committee knew
that implementation of the plan it presented would depend on the actions of the Wichita
Board of Education.237
Dorothy Wood, who wrote most of the Eagle’s series on the LEAP report, ended
the series by saying, “Something has to be done. The question Wichita and the Board of
Education must answer is whether the LEAP recommendations can and should be put
into effect. If not, some other answers must be found, quickly.”238 On September 29th,
the board told Superintendent Alvin Morris to begin studying what portions of the LEAP
recommendations could be implemented in time for the 1970-1971 school year.
There was an immediate rush to take positions on the report’s recommendations.
While some school board members had called the report unfeasible and pie-in-the-sky
idealization, Collins pushed the board to follow up on an education park feasibility study.
The Wichita Urban League came out on October 6th with a statement urging the district to
“take steps to immediately implement the recommendations of the LEAP REPORT [sic]
beginning with the immediate desegregation of the seven black elementary schools by
means of cross bussing [sic]….” League chairman Daniel Sawyer made the presentation
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to the board, with supporting statements from Hugh Jackson. The League’s position
statement pointed to the Catholic Diocese as precedent for the benefits of cross-busing.
“For the second year in a row white children are being bused to Holy Saviour [sic]
School… from the parish that includes Church of the Magdalene…The very latest word
on this experience is that it continues to be a wholesome and profitable educational
experience for all involved.” Holy Saviour was a predominantly African American
school and Church of the Magdalene was in a predominantly European American
community.239 Parents of thirty of the European American children participating in that
voluntary program signed a letter of support to the district calling the Diocese voluntary
program “beneficial” not only to both sets of children, but to their parents as well.240
Later that month, the Board of Education got word that members of the HEW
team would be returning to Wichita, as invited, on November 4th. In addition to their
normal visits with administration and tours of schools, the team wanted “a private
audience” with the Board of Education the night of the team’s arrival in town. The board
rented the Walnut Room at the Radisson Hotel for the meeting and rounded up key staff
and the Civil Rights attorney. 241
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Just days before the HEW team was to arrive for this meeting, bad news for the
district came in the form of another U.S. Supreme Court ruling. This ruling ordering the
immediate desegregation of all Mississippi schools struck down the “all deliberate speed”
doctrine of Brown II. The justices wrote “the obligation of every school district is to
terminate dual school systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary
schools.” The government had argued that the Mississippi schools needed time to
overcome “logistical” problems related to desegregation, much as the Wichita School
Board had been arguing in the case of its seven segregated elementary schools. The
Supreme Court justices unanimously disagreed, saying that 15 years since Brown II was
plenty of time to deal with the logistics of desegregating.
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This decision in the Alexander v Holmes Board of Education case put the Wichita
school board’s delaying tactics on the wrong side of federal law just as board members
were about to sit down with federal investigators to argue their case for not immediately
desegregating. Local African American leaders were quick to point this out. Rev.
Wallace Hartsfield, pastor of Tabernacle Baptist Church and the new president of the
Wichita NAACP, told the Wichita Beacon the Alexander ruling had stripped the board of
its “last hiding place.” Chester Lewis was less sanguine about the ruling. He told the
paper that it would not change the attitude of the Wichita school board at all. “I have no
hope this school board - this city [sic] will do anything meaningful. It has never once
kept its word on anything having to do with the elevation of the black community.” The
district’s attorney, Newkirk, declined to comment on the ruling, saying he had not read it
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yet, while pointing out the differences between the Mississippi and Wichita school
systems. “They have a clear dual system that we don’t have here.”243
Several board members hoped that the limited busing plan proposed would be
enough to hold off HEW legal action against the district. Even that plan had already
raised a protest among district parents. Two separate groups had met in recent weeks, in
the northeast and southwest corners of the city, to protest the plan. Parents of
elementary-aged children feared that kids living across the street from one school might
be bused to another school. Board president Robert Davis tried to placate them, telling
the Beacon, “I don’t know of any proposal now before the board that would do that.”
Edwana Collins, however, continued to push the board toward more radical changes that
would eliminate segregation in the city’s schools. She put a proposal for a feasibility
study of educational parks, or mega-campuses, on the board agenda for discussion the
same week that the HEW investigative team was to return to town. It was an idea that
HEW supported, but that the board had at least twice rejected in votes to continue
supporting the neighborhood school concept that had dominated in Wichita for
decades.244
Edwana Collins kept nearly transcription-level notes, all handwritten, of the
meeting between district administrative staffers, including the superintendent and the
board’s attorney, and four HEW representatives, Frederick Cioffi, the Region V Director,
Marlina Kiner, attorney, Christopher Hagen, attorney, and Harold Blackburn, Kansas
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City Region VI Director. In the meeting, the district’s attorney, Newkirk, repeatedly
made the case for more time and a slow, step-by-step plan pointing to both financial and
political difficulties surrounding immediate and total desegregation. Board members
denied district responsibility for the segregation, saying it was de facto, a result of
residential patterns outside of their control. But, Cioffi warned the district, HEW
considered the segregation in Wichita to be de jure because the board had never taken
any steps to remove the vestiges of its legally segregated system when it changed the
rules in 1952. Collins records him as saying that “when school opened [that fall, the]
same three schools opened black.” By the time of this meeting, investigators were clear
that they considered Wichita guilty, that they were just trying to figure out how much
guilt the board shouldered for perpetuating an unequal school system.
When Cioffi spoke about the board’s reaction, or lack thereof, to the LEAP report,
one can almost read his exasperation through Collins’ notes, perhaps augmented by her
own frustration. He told those gathered that he “couldn’t quite believe it,” and that he
“didn’t see how that board can read that document and maintain (the) position contained
in (its) last correspondence” with HEW, refusing to commit to further desegregation
plans for the seven elementary schools in question. He told the board that any one of four
suggestions from the LEAP report for complete desegregation would be acceptable and
would end the investigation. Throughout the meeting, he asked several times for a
commitment from the board to come up with a plan to completely desegregate. The
board refused.
Cioffi ended the meeting with a warning, send a plan for complete desegregation
to HEW, received no later than December 31, 1969, to be completed by the beginning of
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the 1970-1971 school year, or the case would go to court. He admitted that HEW was
pushing the timeline because of the Alexander ruling, saying that it changed how much
time could be allowed. Then he added that HEW teams had been in and out of Wichita
for the last three years, and it was obvious that they had reached an impasse. Cioffi
admonished that lack of a plan by the end of the year would send Lews’ request for a cutoff of federal funds to Wichita Public Schools “up the administrative route.”245
At the board’s December 1st meeting, the superintendent reviewed the issues
discussed at the meeting with HEW and proposed that the Board of Education consider
several actions, including requesting aid from HEW in promulgating a new desegregation
plan, that the Board forwarding to HEW for review the current plan that administrators
were working on, issuing of a “carefully worded” statement to the public, holding a series
of public meetings to explain what was going on to parents, contacting the Kansas
congressional delegation, and changing its present position on integrating the district.
Morris added, “The conclusion might be drawn that the Wichita Public Schools may be a
target system to be used by federal officials to demonstrate how integration can be
achieved in a large metropolitan area. During the meeting, he and Newkirk both had
asked about whether districts like Denver, Omaha, and Oklahoma City were facing the
same deadlines. Cioffi said they were not, as the cases against them were neither as old
nor as developed as the case against Wichita.246
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Yet, on December 23rd, Morris received a telegram from Leon Panetta warning
that the deadline for submitting a new plan for complete desegregation was fast
approaching, and the district had not yet submitted anything. “I have carefully reviewed
the file in this case and…have concluded that although progress has been made in the
secondary schools and systemwide teacher segregation, adequate steps have not been
taken to desegregate the 8 [sic] Negro elementary schools.”247
Six days later, on December 29, the district submitted a compliance plan that
“reassert(ed) its intent to continue full implementation of the Compliance Plan adopted
January 6, 1969, with the addition of closing two of the segregated elementary schools,
L’Ouverture and Dunbar, starting in the 1970-1971 school year and, as with Mathewson,
busing the students to other, European American-dominated school buildings. The
district also promised to have a plan in place by September of 1970 to upgrade the
facilities and programs offered at the remaining segregated elementaries, Fairmount,
Ingalls, Isely, Little, and Mueller, and to bus students in grades four through six from
those schools to European American-dominated schools. They also promised to intensify
compensatory educational efforts at those schools while coming up with a plan to prevent
surrounding elementary schools from transitioning to all-African American segregated
facilities through changing housing patterns.248
Within weeks Lloyd Henderson from HEW had written back with the
department’s determination that the plan, as presented, was insufficient. It failed to
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desegregate all the currently segregated elementary schools in Wichita, the seven
historically segregated schools and Mathewson, which now operated as an African
American majority fifth- and sixth-grade center. Then Henderson took time to comment
on the method the district was using to desegregate even at a piece meal rate, the closing
of African American schools and busing of those children to other, nearby European
American schools. “It appears that these schools are not being desegregated as
elementary and junior high units because of anticipated opposition from the European
American community to sending their children to buildings located in Negro
neighborhoods. It is our opinion that the practice of transporting only Negro children to
Caucasian schools under these circumstances is discriminatory and in violation of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”249
Wichita’s African American community agreed with Henderson’s assessment.
The Black United Front called a school boycott for January 15th, in conjunction with Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr’s birthday. The district did not record attendance based on race,
but reported that out of 5,000 students at the eight predominantly African American
elementary schools, including the converted Mathewson, only 249 showed up for classes
that day, an absentee rate of 92.7%. Mathewson and L’Ouverture had the fewest pupils
show up for classes with just 12 each. Absenteeism was also high at integrated schools,
the percentage of no-shows corresponding roughly to the African American enrollment at
each school. In the high schools, even several European American students observed the
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boycott, with about 50% of the enrolled teens at East High not showing up. The Wichita
Eagle reported that some parents kept their children home for fear of trouble that day, not
out of support of the boycott. There were instances of vandalism to school buildings and
buses. The district also reported that a majority of the African American teachers did not
show up that day, with zero reporting to work at Ingalls, Little, and L’Ouverture
elementaries. The boycott even extended to the buses, operated by a private contractor.
According to the Wichita Beacon, the African American community set up liberation
schools for the day, though there were no attendance records available, and the media
was not allowed in. The Eagle reported that those schools expected about 2000 students
but were “sparsely attended.” The Black United Front planned a second school boycott
for February 2nd or 3rd “unless the school board develop(ed) a plan to cross-bus school
youngsters” the following year.250
One African American woman shared her own experiences with one-way busing
to explain why the African American community opposed the idea. When Doris Jean
Larkin was a child in the 1940s, the district had bused her from her mostly European
American neighborhood, with a neighborhood school just three blocks from her home, to
the all-African American L’Ouverture Elementary on the other side of town. She
recounted to an Eagle reporter what happened if she or her sister missed the bus. “If we
missed the bus, we had to catch a city bus at 13th and Mosley, go clear downtown, make
two or three transfers, and of course we were late for school.” Besides the time and effort
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involved, she explained the emotional toll it took on them, entering schools in strange
neighborhoods. “I think this busing will make kids resentful…I was resentful; when we
got off the bus, they were lined up to meet us with, ‘Here they come, boy!’ They made us
feel different because we were different…And now they’re doing it again to a whole
bunch of kids.”251
At the same time, many European American families across Wichita were
incensed at the idea of sharing the busing burden. They started a massive letter-writing
campaign against the idea of busing their children. Edwana Collins kept some 330
postcards and letters expressing opposition to the various plans the district was
considering. Many of them bore the signatures of multiple sets of parents. Out of that
total, 107 letters opposed cross-busing but supported voluntary busing, another 82
opposed all busing, and 132 argued that the district should defy HEW and let the case go
to court or just forego federal funding. Only eight postcards and letters supported the
idea of moving children to desegregate schools and one opposed the one-way busing of
African American children only.
Many of the writers opposing cross-busing specifically argued that it was a
violation of their “freedom of choice” and constitutional rights. Mrs. Thomas Sawyer
wrote, “To be forced to participate in a program such as this is a violation of our
constitutional rights as stated in the 1964 Civil Rights Act.” Mr. and Mrs. Glen James
argued that it would be better to eschew federal funding than to bus the children, writing,
“We do not think it will benefit any child regardless of color to be bused across town to
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attend another school. We worked and saved for several years to buy the house where we
now live, so that our children could attend the schools in this neighborhood.” Tom Clegg
was more outspoken in his opposition, writing, “So called [sic] leaders of the N. E.
community are in my opinion using the present situation to advance their own images to
a few in that area … Are we trying to raise these people out of the so called [sic] ghetto
or trying to force everyone down to their level.”252
Board president Robert Davis said he knew that many Wichitans were skipping
the Board of Education and writing directly to HEW. “People have called and wanted
addresses. I’ve had petitions delivered in here, and mail from every possible point of
view,” he told the Wichita Eagle and Beacon. “If it at all reaches the parties that are
concerned (in Washington) with the Wichita situation, they must know there is
considerable concern here, and turmoil.”253
NEA-Wichita, the teacher’s union, said that the superintendent had ordered
teachers and administrators to follow the board’s plan, but that, regardless of HEW’s
decision, the board might “have to change its mind ‘because of the deep-seated
resistance.’” A few days after the boycott, the Wichita Federation of Teachers wrote to
the board, urging it to revise its plan to include cross-busing. “We agree with those
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community leaders who contend that a one-way busing plan is inequitable in its
disproportionate effect on Black families.”254
There were also European Americans, like Edwana Collins, who worked with the
African American community toward desegregation, both of schools and of Wichita’s
housing and job markets. The morning of the school boycott, they met to form what the
Wichita Eagle called an Urban Coalition to “bring the Wichita black and white
communities together….” Dr. John Valusek, a psychologist and former school board
consultant, chaired the meeting. He told the Eagle that discussion “varied from areas of
agreement to areas of confusion,” but that a “sizeable minority” urged the school board to
keep Dunbar and L’Ouverture open as elementary schools, not turning them into special
education centers as was currently called for in the district’s integration plan. The
National Conference of Christians and Jews also issued a statement supporting crossbusing, as well as keeping Dunbar and L’Ouverture as elementary schools.255 A small
group of seven or eight European American families announced a plan for voluntary
busing to Dunbar and L’Ouverture. Tom Chick, an aircraft worker, told the Eagle that
the plan “was not intended to be a substitute or a long-range solution, but a demonstration
to aid the school board in changing its policy.” The group felt that they could show the
rest of the city’s European American families the advantages of integrated schools.
Members pointed out that the LEAP report had shown that “white children of blue-collar
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workers…did better in integrated classrooms than in segregated, and that children of
white-collar workers do just as well.”256
January 19, 1970, news broke that HEW had rejected the district’s latest
integration plan, calling it “unacceptable.” The letter from Lloyd Henderson informing
the Wichita Board of Education of this decision said that he had “no other option but to
recommend enforcement proceedings be initiated.” In other words, the district’s sudden
commitment to complete integration through a measured, step-by-step plan was too little,
too late. They were headed to court. At stake, by then, was some $5 million in federal
funding for the district.257
Board members were not surprised by the ruling, but Davis told the Eagle that he
was surprised at the forcefulness of the wording in Henderson’s letter. He “suggested
HEW had listened only to ‘first reactions of militant elements of the black community,
whose purpose may not be peaceful integration.”258 In the board’s official response on
January 26th, to HEW’s announcement, Davis wrote they were “of course, disappointed
to discover that the school district’s rather considerable efforts to further integration”
were “legally unacceptable” to the Office for Civil Rights.259
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Sentiment among leading Wichita citizens opposing cross-busing began to harden
and several action committees formed, including the School Community Relations
Council, the Committee to Save Our Neighborhood Schools, and the Committee for the
Preservation of Neighborhood Schools. These groups passed around petitions protesting
cross-busing, wrote letters to the school board members, packed board meetings, and held
protest marches outside elementary school buildings. On January 30th, the various groups
opposing cross-busing combined for a thousand-person march from Century II to the
Wichita Public Schools administration building. Made up mostly of area mothers and
school children, the marchers carried signs saying, “I don’t want to be bused!’ Integration
yes – cross-bussing no,” “Keep our kids at home,” and “Land of the Free and the Home
of the HEW Way.”260
On the other side, Citizens for Cross-Busing, the Black United Front, the Urban
League and other groups worked to get their position in front of the public’s eyes and
ears. With fewer numbers, they had less success at gaining visibility. They, too, held
community meetings, organized rallies, and spoke to the press. But, as had been proven
the case in other civil rights fights, their true power lay in their economic impact on the
city. Organized by the Black United Front, the community called for another school
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boycott and, on the same day, an economic boycott of all “white merchants” in
downtown Wichita, residential shopping areas, and within the African American
community. This boycott included not showing up for work as well as not spending any
money with European American -owned businesses. The boycott included picketing
outside European American-owned businesses in the African American neighborhood.
The NEA-Wichita suggested that teachers observe the economic boycott. The papers
declared the second, broader boycott effective. The district said that only about 250 of
the 5,000 students at the predominantly African American elementary schools attended
classes. The principal of East High reported that about 95% of his African American
students did not show up for classes. While European American business owners
declined to say how much the boycott hurt them, a local African American supermarket
said the boycott was about 95% effective, that their business was “up 500 per cent.”261
Despite the uproar in Wichita over cross-busing, one-way busing, integration and
federal funding, it never reached the levels seen in nearby major cities such as Oklahoma
City and Denver. In early February, Wichitans read about explosions and a following fire
at the Denver school bus yard that wrecked 38 school buses. Investigators said someone
placed highly explosive charges in several buses parked in rows at an unlighted storage
lot. Police and fire investigators quickly said it was a possibility the explosions were the
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work of someone trying to discredit opponents of court mandated busing for
integration.262
In early February, city leaders active in the anti-busing movement reached out to
Kansas Governor Robert Docking, asking him to ask Vice President Spiro Agnew and
Robert Finch, secretary of HEW, for help in solving Wichita’s dilemma. Docking
refused. His press secretary said, “this is an argument that has to be settled between
HEW and the City of Wichita,” and added that the governor “hopes a satisfactory
solution will be reached to benefit the children.” Two weeks later, Docking relented
asking for a meeting with Finch in Washington. Docking said, “The controversy has
reached a critical state.”263 In March, six Kansas state senators from Sedgwick County
wrote to President Nixon asking him to intervene in the controversy by telling HEW to
“back off” on mandatory busing, opposing a proposal in the U.S. Senate to force crossbusing of students, and to propose legislation outlawing cross-busing. They told the
president just the possibility of cross-busing in Wichita was “polarizing the races.”264
The school district had to decide whether to move forward with the one-way
busing plan it had sent HEW, to amend it, or to scratch it and start over with a full
integration, cross-busing plan, or education park plan. At its February 9th meeting, filled
with booing and shouting from some 450 Wichitans gathered to listen, the board went
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round and round on four new proposed plans, three of which switched out mandatory
cross-busing for some form of voluntary “freedom of choice” busing or one-way busing,
which HEW had already told the board violated federal law. While the city waited to see
which plan the board would pick, newspaper editorial boards and many African
Americans said Edwana Collins’ plan to turn the buildings in the AAA zone into 6th
grade centers that would serve all students in the city and to bus out first through fifth
grade African American students to other elementary schools was the fairest. Though
even it still put the majority of the busing on the backs of African American children.
The Black United Front unanimously rejected all four plans. Harry Esters, a Front
spokesman, told the media, “The Board of Education continues to demonstrate open
hostility to the law,” which he said clearly made “freedom of choice” plans and one-way
busing illegal and discriminatory.265
As they inched closer to a court confrontation, relations between HEW
investigators and the Board of Education also deteriorated. In mid-February, a two-man
investigative team returned to Wichita unannounced. When the board discovered their
presence, the board’s president vociferously objected to what he called the investigators’
“cloak and dagger tactics.” The HEW investigators were both Civil Rights specialists
and called their visit “an information gathering” trip. Davis speculated that maybe they
were in town to collect evidence against the district for possible proceedings against the
district. The Wichita Beacon reported that the men had met “almost entirely” with
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members of the African American community.266 On February 25th, HEW officially filed
paperwork requesting a hearing with an administrative judge against Wichita Public
Schools.267
In its response to the formal filing, the Wichita school district argued that while,
yes, it had been segregated, legally, prior to 1952, all decisions made since then had been
made in the best “good faith educational judgement” of the Board of Education and its
administrative staff. The district denied operating a dual school system and accused
HEW of violating its own rules by disapproving a plan it had suggested and then using
the threat of denying other funding to the city, under the Model Cities program, to coerce
the district to comply. The district argued that it had already done everything in its power
to prevent the segregation of school buildings and to provide compensatory educational
opportunities and resources to buildings that were de facto segregated.268
Despite the harsh language used in public and in court documents, the district’s
board and administrative staff once again held face-to-face meetings with members of the
HEW team over the next year to try to hammer out a compromise deal that would avoid
formal proceedings. At the end of April 1970, the board approved a new integration plan.
It would reassign African American students in the AAA zone to other, predominantly
European American, schools as space was available. The African American students
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could request to continue attending a school in the AAA zone, though there was no
guarantee that they would be assigned to their current school. The district would
“encourage” European American students to transfer to schools in the AAA zone. Board
member Dr. Gary Pottorf, acting as chairman at the meeting, said he doubted that HEW
would approve the plan.269 The new plan certainly did not prove popular with parents.
The Board conducted a card survey and found that less than 1% of parents wanted their
elementary school students to transfer to a new school under the voluntary busing plan.
About half of the parents, most of them African American, did not even return the
cards.270 Pottorf’s concerns that HEW would not accept the plan proved prescient.
Within days a court hearing was set to begin June 8, 1970, in Kansas City.271
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CHAPTER VII

THE RULING AND ITS IMPACT

Going into the administrative hearing at the old Federal Building in Kansas City,
911 Walnut St, the Wichita Public Schools’ attorneys were confident that they had a good
case to argue, that the district was de facto segregated purely due to residential patterns
for which the district had no responsibility and that the Board of Education had done its
best to integrate the school buildings, mostly succeeding.272 They didn’t count on
Edwana Collins’ not only stepping up to testify against her fellow board members and the
district, but handing over years-worth of meticulously detailed notes and records from her
years on the board. Collins was HEW’s surprise weapon in the case and, arguably, a
large part of the reason Administrative Judge Irvin Hackerman ruled against the district.
After the Wichita school board, over her objections, had doubled down on a
voluntary busing plan in April, Edwana Collins determined it was time to take her fight to
the next level. In 1966, she had told a staff gathered at Woodman Elementary that her
actions were dictated by her faith as a Protestant and could be found in the root of that
word, Protestant. As a Christian she felt called to protest wrong-doing where she saw it
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and, based upon her own notes, she had seen plenty while on the school board.273 So she
reached out to Cioffi, offering all her records and notes to the prosecution. She also
offered to testify against her fellow board members at the hearing. Her testimony was
damning.
Under direct examination by HEW attorney Albert Hamlin, Collins described
how transfer policies were applied differently to African American and European
American families, enabling European American students to “escape” from integrated
schools in the northeastern section of the city, creating or accelerating their
transformation to essentially all-African American segregated school buildings.
Beginning in the early 1950s, the district allowed parents an exemption to transfer
schools using a babysitter’s address instead of their home address, due to the needs of
working mothers. Given the racial attitudes at the time, Collins testified, this was
available only to European American families, and a report from the Fairmount
Elementary principal, Gerald Cron, showed that those families were using the policy to
transfer out of African American-dominant schools into European American-dominant
schools at will. There was no restriction on which school the student could transfer into
as there was in the restricted housing transfers allowed to Mathewson Junior High
students starting in 1962, extended to elementaries in 1963. Those students, African
Americans, would only be granted transfer if there was room in the school they asked to
attend. Over Newkirk’s objections, Collins reported that she believed the other board
members had voted for these transfer policies precisely because of what would happen.
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“When you see a policy or a device which is repeated with regularity, with the same
result each time, and then is proposed again, then I think one has to assume that if you
know what the effect is going to be in advance and you do it, that there is an intent to
achieve that effect.”
She described how the board had rejected a proposed resolution presented by the
Committee to Study Ethnic Problems which would have pushed the board to take an
active role in desegregating schools. Instead, the board voted to “simply pledge that it
would not discriminate.” This was a key difference in determining the board’s
responsibility for the continued segregation of a handful of school buildings and gave
credence to Chester Lewis’ accusations that the board just paid lip service to integration
with no intentions of following through.
She also testified that when the state legislature began providing up to 70% of the
cost of transporting students who lived farther than 2.5 miles from their school, the
district took advantage of that money for all students except those living in the “optional
attendance area” that then existed around Mathewson. To get to an integrated school or
return to Mathewson, those students, all African American, had to continue to rely on the
non-profit Operation Transport that Collins had helped organize.
Collins was very methodical in her testimony, relying on the reams of records and
notes she had kept over the years rather than on her own memory. She was able to quote
specific names and dates of various actions, even finding information neither HEW nor
the district’s attorney had been able to find prior to the hearing. She refused to answer
questions that were badly phrased, saying at one point that she could not say whether the
superintendent’s actions on the transfer policy decision surrounding Mathewson at the
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time of the attendance boundary change was effectively a denial of transfer requests from
80% of the student body because the board had not yet set a transfer policy. Despite
Newkirk’s repeated attempts to make her look confused and unable to remember
information accurately, Collins’ reliance upon documented information for details kept
her testimony clear and reliable. It is doubtful that HEW would have been able to prove
its case without her. While the investigators had certainly uncovered a pattern of de facto
segregation based on segregated housing in Wichita, Edwana Collins’ records and
personal testimony provided the context that showed deliberative intent on the part of the
school district to maintain the dual system, at the behest of European American
parents.274
Though Collins was HEW’s star witness, she was by no means the department’s
only witness. Cioffi was the first to take the stand. He testified that the district could
have kept L’Ouverture as an integrated school by not allowing optional transfers out,
used by European Americans to escape a growing African American enrollment as the
neighborhood around the school transitioned. Cioffi argued that the failure to
gerrymander attendance boundaries in favor of integration and the optional transfer
policies in place until 1959 just helped stabilize transitioning neighborhoods, and thus
their schools, into all- or almost all-African American, creating the segregated
buildings.275 He added that if the district had just followed the recommendations of the
LEAP committee, actively worked to desegregate all schools immediately, with no
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school having more than 20% African American enrollment, there would have been no
case against the district. “We would have accepted any plan that achieved that goal,”
Cioffi said.276
Dr. Dan Dodson, a professor of educational sociology at New York University,
reported that the neighborhood school concept which Wichita was so tied to was being
used nationwide as “a racist way of maintaining the segregation pattern in education,”
adding that it became the preferred mode only after the original Brown ruling in 1954.
He described three major faults in the neighborhood school system, all of which applied
to Wichita both in 1970 and in 2019. Neighborhood schools cannot deal with a shifting,
mobile population, they cannot control racial imbalance problems due to housing
patterns, and an inevitable “silk-stocking” school will develop in wealthier
neighborhoods.
Also on the witness list were Chester Lewis, Mrs. Mary Ellen Lewis, and seven
principals of the elementary schools in question, four European American, three African
American. When presented with evidence from HEW investigators that African
American parents were never notified of the optional attendance policy between the allAfrican American Dunbar and all- European American Ingalls elementaries, allegedly
designed to encourage integration, only the European American parents received
notifications, the principals of Ingalls and Dunbar elementaries testified they could not
remember if the district had sent out such notifications. 277
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Dorothy Goodpasture and Dr. James Donnell were two more members of the
Board of Education to take the witness stand. Both had often, though not always, voted
with Collins on desegregation issues. But in their testimony, they did not take the same
attitude toward the board’s actions. Goodpasture highlighted the board’s efforts at
integration, such as the closure of Mathewson as a junior high school. She did admit,
though, that in “hindsight” the boundary decision surrounding Mathewson and Brooks
junior highs was a case of gerrymandering. Donnell said “he knew of no board action
designed to discriminate.”278
The hearing lasted a week. The district expected a decision within 30 days. At
stake were some $5 million in federal funds from HEW, the National Science
Foundation, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). The loss of these funds would impact every school in the district,
not just the seven segregated elementary schools, eight, including the new Mathewson
fifth- and sixth-grade center. It was not until March of 1971, however, that a ruling came
down. Hackerman concluded that the district was operating in violation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and that operation of a segregated system “at the elementary level
denies the Negro student equality of educational opportunity which he carries throughout
his elementary and secondary education.” Hackerman’s ruling echoed some of the
language in the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling on the Alexander case the year before. To
keep its federal funding, the district would have to come up with an integration plan that
HEW would approve before the next school year. Hackerman did determine that the
city’s segregatory practices did not impact all its programs and exempted the Community
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Action Program (Head Start and Follow Through), the Child Nutrition Act program,
Manpower Development and Training Act program, and the Vocational Education
program for non-traditional students to be exempt from the ruling, lowering the total
amount of federal funding at stake to $4.4 million.279
While the district waited for the HEW ruling to come down, the 1970-1971 school
year got underway, filled with tensions over the controversial voluntary cross-busing plan
the district had committed to in May. There were regular eruptions of violence at various
schools starting almost as soon as classes began, almost always fights between groups of
European American and African American students, at both junior highs and high
schools. In multiple cases, the fights left students seriously injured. On September 18,
several students and teachers were injured in a fight at a junior high. A boy suffered an
eye injury after someone raked him across the face with an Afro comb, leading to a ban
of the combs across the district, two girls got stabbed and three teachers hurt. After a
football game that night, the Associated Press reported that a “crowd of youths in the
Negro district” pelted police squad cars with stones and bottles. In another instance at
least three sheriff’s officers suffered injuries while breaking up a fight involving some
300 students at Heights High School. TV news crews reported seeing the officers using
mace and night sticks to “subdue” the teens. The Board of Education threatened
expulsion for any student involved in the violent encounters and brought in teams of
police to patrol the school halls to enforce the peace.280
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In the wake of the district’s crackdown on students, to prevent further violence,
African American parents and students had begun another boycott of the schools. A
week later they packed the next school board meeting, on September 28th, to demand that
the district do something to alleviate the racial tensions. The Black United Front charged
that the district had created an “atmosphere of racial anxiety and hatred” with its
reactions. The informal, not approved by the district, Black Student Union demanded
that the district give African American students a say in the hiring of teacher and staff,
the creation of a separate Black Studies program, equal treatment of African American
students by all teachers and staff, that the district provide more buses, and that there be
more African Americans on student councils. While the board made no decision on the
demands, parents decided to end the school boycott, instead planning to patrol the halls of
the schools themselves until they felt their children were safe at school.281
In November of 1970, the district briefed the school board on its plans for
responding to the upheaval. The district had begun planning to offer Swahili language
classes at a high school yet to be named. The district’s continuing education department
was already offering afternoon and evening Swahili classes to the public. In addition,
schools would begin establishing “multi-ethnic councils…to discuss problems and
propose solutions.” The district, however, denied the formation of a formal Black
Student Union because membership would be restricted to African Americans. In
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making their request, African American students had pointed out that many school clubs
were “all-white.” This calmed things for a while, but there were more eruptions of
violence during the spring term and in the following couple of school years.282
The Wichita Public Schools almost immediately upon receipt of HEW’s ruling
announced that it would be appealing. However, according to the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights, the board soon realized it could not continue to operate without the funds in
question until an appeal was resolved. The Board of Education came back to the
negotiating table and began meeting with HEW to come up with an acceptable
desegregation plan that would bring USD 259 into compliance with the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. It had to be done in the next few months to get all the pieces in place for the fall
of the 1971-1972 school year or lose those federal funds for that year.283
The school district sent a team to Washington, D.C., for a two-day conference
with HEW officials on April 5 and 6. They discussed several ways to accomplish a more
equitable burden for desegregation changes and developed a Memorandum of Agreement
with the federal agency on what must be done. This agreement included integrating
L’Ouverture, all African American, but busing European American students into the area
and African American students out of the area. The district would reverse that busing
pattern with Mueller, which was all European American. It would close Fairmount
Elementary, and stop using Dunbar, Little, and Isely as “elementary attendance centers,”
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transitioning them to “other educational purposes.” The district would also remove all
portable units from the three segregated elementary schools being desegregated and
operate at no more than the building’s capacity. In addition, the school board agreed to
actively work to prevent “peripheral schools” from becoming segregated. The goal was
no more than an 80/20 mix of races in any one building, preferably closer to 50/50 in
L’Ouverture and Mueller. What the district called the “majority-to-minority transfer
policy” would remain in effect and, in the coming years, more families would take
advantage of that policy to get their children into desirable programs, to ensure that
siblings in the same family could all attended the same school, or simply because they
supported desegregation efforts. On April 27th, the superintendent held a public news
conference to announce the details of the agreement. The Board of Education officially
approved the plan on May 17, 1971, and began filing the paperwork to ask the
government to dismiss the order withholding federal funds. 284
After years of using delaying tactics with HEW over a desegregation plan, the
district took only three months to begin the process of coming back into compliance once
the federal government withdrew funding. Even then things did not go smoothly. Due to
the hurry to meet the deadline, the district left out some details that the government
wanted to know before releasing funds, such as how pupils would be chosen for the
transfers. In addition, since HEW and the district had negotiated the Memorandum of
Agreement, a new U.S. Supreme Court ruling had come down with direct implications on
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the case. In Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Court ruled that
busing was an acceptable start for integration, but the government could not set hard
guidelines for how it should work. In addition, HEW had to judge an integration plan by
how well it worked, and using mathematical ratios was a legitimate “starting point.” In
addition, courts could accept non-contiguous attendance zones as a remedial measure for
segregation. This element would have a direct effect on the transfer plan the Wichita
Public Schools developed.285
By June the district had worked out further details for the desegregation plan to go
into effect by September 1st. While it was more equitable than the one-way busing plan
the board had sent HEW before the hearing, African American parents still argued that it
put too much of the onus of desegregating the district on their children. The busing
transfer plan would involve students from “all grade levels within elementary school,”
and reassignments would be for at least one year, but the Board of Education could
extend that period. In the basic principles for implementing the compliance plan
administrators had developed and given to the Board of Education, they said, “It is highly
desirable that the reassigned pupils complete their entire elementary school experience in
the school to which they were reassigned under this plan.”
The district would first ask for volunteers for reassignment, add a series of special
programs in schools to draw European American students to formerly African American
schools, as had successfully worked with the Fairmount Elementary Gifted Program until
the school’s closure, and, as a last resort, turn to a form of random selection to find
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enough students to fully integrate the elementary school system. While this initial plan
would impact only “Caucasians and Negroes,” the district allowed that if any other racial
group became a majority at any school, that group would also be subject to the
integration busing system. The district would also pair schools, as suggested by the
Swann ruling, attaching each school outside the AAA zone to one inside it to “preserve
the feeder school concept” for junior high schools and on into the high schools. An
independent group from outside the district would be hired to make the random
assignment and monitor the overall system.
African American community leaders remained skeptical about the plan. Chester
Lewis said he was sure the plan had catches in it somewhere, as he did not trust the
school board to “act in good faith.” “They haven’t in the past and there’s no reason to
think they are now.” Willis Hocket, by then the president of the Wichita NAACP, said
he would accept the plan if African American parents did although he had reservations
about the unequal busing, saying it “just intensifies what’s been going on all along.”286
With only three elementary school buildings left in the AAA zone and with
African American attendance limited to no more than 50% of the enrollment, most
African American students would find themselves riding busses to schools outside their
neighborhoods. While the impact of busing was more evenly spread with this plan than it
had been in the one-way busing plan the district had turned in prior to the HEW hearing,
it was still too lopsided in the view of many African Americans. The first year, the
district selected a total of 2,925 African American pupils and 1,318 European American
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students for mandatory busing to other schools outside their neighborhoods. In total,
cross-busing affected only 12% of students in the district. But since the ratio of bused
students was more than two African American students for every European American
student, more than 57% of all African American elementary students were cross-bused
that first year, compared with just over 4% of European American elementary students.
By the fall of 1974, those numbers had moved so that roughly 92% of African American
students found themselves bused across town compared to less than 6% of European
American students. In addition, most of the European American students would only
have to be bused out of their neighborhoods for a year or two, while many of the African
American children would endure busing for their entire elementary school career.287
When the plan went into effect that fall, Mark McCormick, future Wichita Eagle
reporter, was a kindergartner and one of the first African American students bused. His
family was friends with Chester Lewis’ family, and his father worked with Lewis to,
among other things, help integrate machine shops across the Wichita area. When
Coleman Junior High opened in 1966, his family had been able to transfer McCormick’s
older sister to that school from Mathewson Junior High. McCormick remembers his
father telling the story years later of how much trepidation he had had about her attending
the European American school to integrate it. His earliest memory, though, came as
busing for integration began. His earliest memories were of riding the bus from North
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Volutsia near Wichita State University some six miles to OK Elementary on North West
Street, near Interstate 235. On average, students bused those first few years spent about
37 minutes on the bus one way, about an hour and a quarter round trip, every day.
McCormick remembers his parents worrying about the distance, talking about, “That’s a
long way to put Mark on the bus,” and he remembers feeling not quite wanted. He does
not remember any overt actions against him and the other African American students
bused to the school but says, “It did seem clear that we weren’t exactly embraced there.”
He remembers only one European American student willing to befriend him that first
year, Dana Farmer. She sat with him at lunch and even invited him over for dinner.
“Everybody in my family was talking about it,” McCormick recounted. In later years, he
spoke with Farmer’s mother about the invitation and learned that the family had faced
great criticism for it, especially when their son invited an African American boy for a
sleepover. “Do you really want a black boy spending the night? You have a daughter!”
He says that if African American children in his class at OK Elementary got a hug at all it
did not come from the teachers, it came from Dana Farmer.288
There was more unrest at the high schools, however. At East High School, Roz
Hutchinson was starting her senior year. She had spent the previous two years attending
the Catholic girls’ high school in town, Mount Carmel, with, among others, Chester
Lewis’ daughter. She remembers a point that fall when she was walking down the hall
with the journalism teacher for whom she was a student aid. They got caught in the
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stairwell as a rush of kids clashed on the stairs. She recounts seeing the “fists flying, and
yelling and screaming.” Stories about fights at the high schools made the news
throughout the region that fall and into the spring term. In at least one case, the news
reported police using mace to disperse rioting students and, later, patrolling the schools in
uniform, again. Yet, this time around, the stories mostly involved fist fights as opposed
to some of the more violent conflicts of the year before. The fights continued
sporadically for the next few years but, while there were still arrests, there were fewer of
them.289
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights called reaction to enforced school
integration in Wichita “noisy but ineffective.” A 1977 report credited the support of the
business community, much as in Charlotte, N.C., for the success of the plan. Despite
petitions and talks of boycotts, only 45 children stayed home from school in the fall of
1971 to protest integration. The Commission says that there was no violence “in or out
of school,” quoting a parent who said reports of violence in the media came from
“reporters inaccurately reporting such episodes.”290
Hutchinson credits efforts on the part of the district for this. She said that at East
High they had special girl and boy student unions that East High’s staff formed, made up
of the kids who had been in the fights and kids who “they thought were folks who got
along well with other people.” She was one of the members of that council as part of the
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group of “get along folk.” Hutchinson says that while the council meetings began with a
lot of finger pointing and accusations, eventually they were able to begin talking to each
other and, as they talked, the overt racial tensions began to fade away.291 The district had
also gotten a $332,745 Emergency School Assistance Grant in 1971 to provide training
for staff, parents, students and business leaders on human relations to help smooth the
way for integration. About 3,000 people across the city went through the four training
sessions of about five hours each.292
In 1973, the League of Women Voters got a $35,000 grant from HEW to hire an
ombudsman to act as an intermediary between families, students, and the district. The
hope was that having an uninvolved third person negotiating difficult issues, especially
racially sensitive ones, would relieve some of the tensions surrounding busing in the
school district. Also referred to as a grievance officer by the Wichita Independent, the
first person to fill the position was himself a teacher, Robert Wright, who returned to
teaching at North High in the fall of 1974. Rex Krieg, a new graduate of Wichita State
University, followed him as ombudsman for the 1974-1975 school year. That August
and September Krieg reported getting an average of 2.1 new cases a day, ranging from
“inquiries about special education to four charges of alleged unfair arrests of students.”
He reported that most new cases were complaints, with most complaints coming from
“white parents.” He only got one suggestion in his first two months on the job.293
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While many were struggling to find ways to make the new integration plan work
for students, at least three groups had not given up on fighting the mandatory busing plan
in the public forum and in court. There had been African American parents who opposed
cross-busing as early as January 1970, due to the loss of neighborhood schools in the
AAA zone and the unequal burden of busing, among other reasons. They formed a group
called Concerned Citizens, who joined with the European American group Citizens for
Neighborhood Schools to act against the plan. They held joint meetings, circulated
petitions for parents to sign opposing the busing movement, and staged marches in front
of the district administration building. Citizens for Neighborhood Schools joined with
another European American group, Parents and Taxpayers, to sponsor newspaper ads
encouraging the public to “apply pressure, or harassment, or whatever you want to call it,
to influence them.” In August of 1971, each group individually filed suit against the
district, asking a judge to block implementation of the integration plan.294
Parents Billy Joe Linker, Ellis Brown, and Nancy L. Farha, filed separate suits
against Wichita USD 259 on behalf of their children and all others affected by the
integration plan. They wanted the court to permanently stop the implementation of the
district’s new cross-busing scheme in the fall of 1971. The court combined the three
cases into a single suit and assigned it to Judge Wesley Brown, who added HEW
Secretary Elliott Richardson as a co-defendant. The lawsuit alleged that neither the
school district nor HEW had the legal right to undertake certain portions of the
integration plan, that the busing constituted a form of penal servitude enforced by the
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defendants in violation of Article 6 of the Kansas Constitution and the 13th Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution, that Richardson violated HEW regulations in his handling of the
case and dealings with the school district. In addition, Linker contended that the
selection of his children’s names for mandatory busing was “accomplished in an arbitrary
and capricious manner” and violated the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause. The
next summer Brown ruled that the case had no standing, that the Farhas, “as parents of
local school children,” lacked the legal right to challenge the plan and that the integration
plan did not violate the U.S. Constitution. In 1974, the Court of Appeals upheld the
ruling, and the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the case. Thus, the final legal effort
to prevent desegregation through mandatory cross-busing of students ended with a
whimper rather than a bang.295
Yet, the court was not the only means Nancy Farha and her husband Alfred turned
to. They testified before a Kansas State Senate Select Committee Wichita School
Disturbances, studying the outbreaks of violence at Wichita schools over the last couple
of years. The committee held four meetings in the Wichita area in the spring of 1972. At
the first meeting, Alfred Farha testified that school administrators were not using the
disciplinary powers they already had to control violent youth. The Associated Press (AP)
reported that Farha blamed “forced busing to achieve racial balance” for most of the
disturbances and said that closing the four African American elementary schools was a
bad idea. “We closed their schools, but have we supplied them the means to move out of
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their area? Is this proper?” the AP quoted him as asking the committee. He argued that
this led to African American children entering European American schools with “chips
on their shoulders, feeling they are mistreated.”296
The teachers’ union disagreed. At the committee’s second meeting the following
week, Kevin Hughes, executive director of the National Education Association, said
things were neither as rosy as the school district would have the committee believe nor as
drastically awful as the bigots painted. He argued that teachers had identified several
concerns that contributed to the current atmosphere, including time limits, class size,
pupil ability range, lack of parental knowledge of school conditions, and a lack of support
from the central administration.297
In the end, the committee sponsored a bill that authorized school districts to set up
an alternative school for students “determined…to be unable to benefit normally from
other schools of the school district.”298
Despite the fights, legal and extralegal, and the growing pains of two populations
learning to live and study together, by November of 1974, the Wichita Independent
announced “Busing: Seems It’s Here to Stay.” In the article, Don Nicoson points to the
cause for mandatory busing, segregated housing patterns, as the reason why parents can
expect busing to likely continue for decades. The LEAP report had predicted that
housing would not be fully integrated until 1990 at the earliest.
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In the first couple of years of busing, at least two studies of its impact had already
been undertaken. Dr. C. Lindal Silvertooth, who had been the principal at Mueller
Elementary from 1969 to 1973, compared the “achievement, self-confidence, and
environment” of bused and non-bused European American fifth- and sixth-graders in
Wichita. He found no difference in performance between the two groups, other than in
reading during the first year of busing, which rebounded in the second year. Nor did he
find “significant differences” in “self-concept or perceived school environment.” By the
third year of busing, he determined that “the white fifth-graders had significantly higher
attendance.” He also discovered that in the first three years of cross busing for
integration, the number of children who had to be picked by lottery based on randomly
drawn birthdates, dropped. He concluded this was because students were volunteering to
remain at their new school. In the first year, the district bused children with 21
birthdates, but by the third year, the district had to draw only seven birthdates to fill the
enrollment lists. Charles Rankin, former assistant principal at Ingalls Elementary, studied
the impact of busing for integration on African American students. He found only a
small, statistically significant change in performance came in reading among African
American students, but also determined that long-term busing imposed no harmful effects
on students. Silvertooth disagreed with some of Rankin’s findings, saying that other
studies had found busing for integration improved African American students’ classroom
performance.299
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A federal report in 1977 agreed with Silvertooth’s analysis. That August the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights released a report detailing the history of the segregation
problems and solutions in the Wichita school district and its impact on students. It, too,
reported no slippage of test scores since integration began. In 1964, third-graders in the
city had ranked in the 54th percentile on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills, right in the middle
of all third-graders nationwide. In 1974, after two years of cross-busing for integration,
they ranked in the 56th percentile. By 1975, Wichita elementary school students were
consistently scoring at least a year above grade level. Remember, one of the complaints
leading to the HEW order was that African American students were testing below grade
level, lower than their European American peers. In its view, integration in Wichita was
off to a running start.300
Chester Lewis was less sanguine about the success of integration in Wichita. He
viewed it almost as a failure. Not only were African American students bearing most of
the busing burden, but he did not see the levels of academic improvement that he had
dreamed of.301
Based on the 1975 Board of Education elections, cross-busing was no longer a
driving issue in the community. The campaigns centered around more traditional
education-related topics such as student responsibility, teacher and administrator training,
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and how to spend the district’s money most wisely. None of the candidates mentioned
busing or integration as a concern.302
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CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION: INTEGRATED OR TEMPORARILY DESEGREGATED?

Despite early rosy predictions, cross-busing in Wichita did not effectively and
permanently integrate the public schools. From the beginning, the district saw busing as
a temporary remedy until fair housing and employment anti-discrimination laws at the
local, state, and federal level could equalize the playing field elsewhere. Leaders fully
expected that segregated housing patterns would disappear over the next generation,
allowing the district to return to a full neighborhood school concept. While laws
changed, individual attitudes did not and enforcement was uneven at best. The same
attitudes that allowed the KKK to flourish in Wichita at the turn of the 20th century lived
on in the city at the turn of the 21st century. Neighborhoods remained largely segregated,
with distinct swaths of African American, Hispanic/Latino, Asian American, and
European American populations. In 1977, deputy superintendent Dr. Dean Stucky
presciently said, “We have desegregated, but we have not completed an integration
program.” Wichita Public Schools still have not completed the integration program the
district set out on in 1971. Since the end of mandatory busing in 2008, the district’s
schools have moved back into a segregated system, reducing the chances of achieving
full integration within the next twenty years and expanding by at least three generations
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the number of school children who have had to pay the price of either mandatory busing
or a segregated education.303
As the 1970s became the 1980s and the 1990s, the huge, city-wide uproar over
busing faded into a minor ruckus raised only at the time of the birthday lottery each year,
confined mainly to a handful of individuals upset their children had “lost” the lottery.
The ruckus would generally last a week or two, spawning scant news coverage, and then
fade away until the next year. Yet, as was evidenced just a couple of years into the
busing program, more European American families chose to volunteer their children over
the decades, either because they liked the specialized programs at the new schools or
wanted siblings to attend the same elementary school. So, perforce, the lottery became
smaller and smaller. Busing for desegregation purposes had become a mostly noncontroversial part of the Wichita educational process. Much like the court mandated
integration program in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, HEW’s experiment in Wichita, only the
second system in the nation to come under such scrutiny for civil rights violations,
appeared to be a success. By late 1976, Wichita was the largest city in the region
operating a busing for desegregation program and, much as had happened with CharlotteMecklenburg, other cities in the region, from Topeka to Omaha, began to call and ask for
advice. Richard Upton, executive director of the Wichita Area Chamber of Commerce
praised the district, saying, “Wichita does bus and it does so successfully.”304
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The hopes for a fully integrated school district in the future did not rest on crossbusing, however. For most folks in the area, they rested on the belief that new fair
housing laws at the federal and state level would create substantive changes in residential
patterns. Throughout the fight with HEW and the subsequent institution of cross-busing,
numerous leaders had pointed out that this was meant to be a temporary solution to a
problem much larger than the school district itself. A series of Wichita Beacon Op-Ed
pieces in 1970 stated outright, “Cross-busing can be only a temporary solution” because
“it fails to solve the deeper issues – better job opportunities to enable blacks to improve
their economic position so they can buy houses in every neighborhood in the area.”
George Romney, then U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, called crossbusing a “superficial compromise” in a speech at a Kansas Day dinner in Topeka. He
pointed to the growing suburbanization of America as a big part of the problem,
exporting the funds needed for good schools away from poor and minority neighborhoods
along with the more affluent European Americans who were moving to the suburbs, and
“balkanizing” populations so that they did not interact in meaningful ways and could not
learn to understand and trust each other. The League of Women Voters said that it
supported cross-busing, not because it was the best option, but because it was “the only
feasible method” at that time. When Doris Larkins, who had been bused for segregation
spoke out against busing for desegregation purposes, she pointed to the need for
European American support of stricter open housing laws, and a stronger, more cohesive
African American community ready to support all members. As was evident in Irvin
Hackerman’s ruling against the school district, it only ran afoul of HEW because the
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Board of Education’s actions had exacerbated the already existing housing segregation in
the city.305
In the years following the institution of mandatory busing, the city and state made
uneven strides toward equalizing the job and housing markets. The U.S. and the Kansas
Commissions on Civil Rights (KCCR) powers did continue to increase when it came to
enforcing job and lodging anti-discrimination laws and more laws were passed. In 1970,
two years after the Federal Fair Housing Act passed, the Kansas legislature passed a
statewide Fair Housing Act. That same year, the KCCR opened an office in Wichita to
handle formal complaints, primarily of job discrimination. Eick reports the number of
cases referred to the KCCR had increased from 41 in 1962 to 497 in 1971. Funding for
enforcement, despite the KCCR’s broadened investigative powers, remained insufficient
for many years to come. The fight for a Wichita Fair Housing law continued, however,
despite A. Price Woodard’s presence as the first African American city councilperson
and Jo Brown’s presence as the first African American school board member. It wasn’t
until 1973 that Wichita established its own Civil Rights Commission. A few years later
the city folded that commission and the Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Board into
a single Civil Rights Equal Opportunity Commission (CREOC) tasked with investigating
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complaints of discrimination involving employment, housing, financial institutions, and
public accommodations in the state’s largest city with more than 276,600 residents.306
Wichita had the state’s largest African American population by that time.
According to KCCR records state and local governments were among the most common
offenders. Often, government bodies would hold meetings in private facilities that could
still legally discriminate based on race, de facto barring minorities from participating in
the governmental process. Troy Scroggins, director of the KCCR, told the Garden City
Human Relations Commission in 1971 that the state government was “the worst
discriminator in the state” with a work force that was 94.6% segregated. He said the
state’s new fair housing law was a start, but it needed serious revision. Since the act had
passed, the KCCR had received just 15 housing complaints, mostly about rental housing
and half filed by “white persons living in Wichita.” Meanwhile, of the 1,000 cases he
said the KCCR had handled, 900 were employment complaints. Most of those, Scroggins
said, “were made by whites who believe they were being denied jobs and promotions
because of pressure on employers to hire minority applicants. He added that employment
discrimination was no longer “blatant,” it had become disguised and subtle and, thus,
much harder to prosecute.307 The next month, Scroggins was begging lawmakers for
additional funds, pointing to a backlog of some 288 complaints from the previous year
with some 40 more coming in every month. He also warned lawmakers most of the
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complaints were cases involving hiring or firing someone. “Once on the job, most
members of minority groups won’t complain for fear of losing their jobs,” he told them.
“The individual complaints just aren’t coming in from the people we feel are being
victimized by failure of promotion or job discrimination.”308
McCormick remembers throughout his childhood how his father actively worked
to desegregate unions and machine shops throughout Wichita. “He’d go into a job and
see that there were no African Americans, talk to them about integrating. When they
would hem and haw, he’d say, ‘Ok, I’ll just call Chet (Chester Lewis).’ And Chet would
come in and force them to (integrate).”309 At one point the KCCR began an investigation
into the Wichita Eagle Beacon for allegedly refusing to hire African Americans and
applicants with Hispanic/Latino surnames for clerical, semi-skilled and white-collar jobs.
The newspaper filed what was an early version of a reverse discrimination suit, saying
the investigation violated its right to hire regardless of race.310 In the 1984 presidential
election, the Democratic and Republican Party platform planks on fair housing still made
the news in Wichita voter guides.311 In 1998, Mary Dean became the first Wichitan to
join a class action lawsuit against Boeing, Co, alleging a practice of racial discrimination
in hiring, promotion and transfers of employees that disproportionately hurt African
Americans and benefited European Americans. The case dragged through the courts for
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the next decade, with the courts coming down on the plaintiffs’ side in 2008. By then,
Dean had already retired from Boeing after more than 17 years of service. During the
years of the lawsuit, Dean reports hearing co-workers question why she would join a
lawsuit against her employer, that even if they got a judgement in their favor, they would
never get any money from Boeing. She remains closely tied into the Boeing employee
community and says discriminatory practices continue in hiring and pay, but that
minority employees are too afraid of retaliation to complain. This report came some four
decades after Scroggins made the same observation.312
While attempts to integrate and succeed in the greater Wichita market were
failing, attempts to revitalize the once thriving African American business district on the
northeast side of Wichita appeared to be making gains in the late 1960s. In a 1968 article
on his departure as president of the Wichita NAACP, the Wichita Eagle commended
Chester Lewis’ push to get African Americans to use their political and economic power
to advance the community. He told the Eagle, “This is the only way the black
community can improve its standard of living and make it stick.” He pointed to a
program in the city that had led to a recent increase of African American-owned
businesses. Two supermarkets, a hamburger stand and a service station had all recently
opened. “Similar projects ought to be started on a grander scale.”313 Yet, by 1971, the
state began building Interstate 135 right through the traditionally African American
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sector of town. Within six years, the new highway had taken out hundreds of homes and
businesses along the route that bisected the neighborhood, much as happened in poor and
minority communities around the country as interstates went in.314
At the same time, more freedom in the housing market promoted by the state’s
new fair housing laws, allowed those with the money, like Chester and Vashti Lewis, to
move out of the traditionally depressed area to which they had previously been confined
by segregation practices into more mixed neighborhoods. If they could qualify for the
loans, that is. When they could qualify, they often paid more through higher interest
rates. In 2018, an investigation by Reveal: the Center for Investigative Reporting,
showed that across the country financial institutions have routinely denied African
Americans and Hispanic/Latinos conventional mortgage loans at a much higher rate than
their European American counterparts. In Wichita, specifically, Reveal found that
Hispanic/Latino applicants were 2.2 times as likely to be denied a home loan and that
there simply weren’t enough African American applicants to draw a conclusion. For
example, in the center of what had been the segregated African American portion of
Wichita, only two people applied for home loans in 2016, only one of which declared
their race as African American. Banks denied both of loan applications. In other, more
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mixed, neighborhoods, financial institutions denied about half of African American home
loan applications.315
The loss of neighborhood schools in addition to the nearly simultaneous loss of
most of the middle class leadership further led to the decline of community in the African
American neighborhoods of northeastern Wichita. Loss of community led to loss of
economic and political power in the city. In 2019, Mark McCormick wrote that for an
entire generation, the district did not build any new schools in the Assigned Attendance
Zone because of the busing agreement with HEW As a result, home values dropped due
to the lack of neighborhood schools, while their tax dollars went toward building new
schools in European American neighborhoods, helping stabilize their home values. All
this while banks continued to use the redlining policies for deciding who got home loans
and who did not, policies that favored European American buyers in European American
neighborhoods. When African Americans could get the loans, they paid much higher
interest rates on them. The redlining around the northeast Wichita neighborhoods further
depressed home values.316
Better jobs they were afraid to lose and higher mortgages on new homes to pay,
helped to quiet many of the voices that had combined to keep the civil rights movement
strong in Wichita, much as it had throughout the rest of the country. Calls continued late
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into the 1970s for the district to begin planning educational parks, the idea originally
suggested to the Board of Education as an alternative to long-term cross-busing, but as
progress failed to appear, the necessary community activism to force the issue did not
show up. Education parks would have bused all children to schools set up on one large
campus, or one of several regional campuses, and each building within the park would be
apportioned for racial and socio-economic proportionality to the overall city. This would
have been like the setup in the Maize Public School district in 2019, where all the
district’s schools are located in one of roughly two areas, rather than scattered throughout
the district’s neighborhoods. Such a plan would have allowed the district a more stable
integration program that could have withstood the ongoing lack of change in the job and
housing markets, but, in the face of declining enrollment and other budget constrictions
in the recession of the late 1970s, the idea was likely financially unfeasible. With little
protest from parents in the community, the board chose not act, sticking with the crossbusing plan.317
Overall, the African American community came out of the busing era in Wichita
weaker, politically as well as economically, not stronger. By the end of busing in 2008,
African Americans were no longer the largest minority in town. In 1971
Hispanics/Latinos, combined with Native Americans and Asian Americans, had made up
just 3% of the student enrollment; in 2013 they made up 31% of the district’s enrollment.
Despite this growth, and their housing concentration in north Wichita neighborhoods, the
district never included Latinos in its desegregation busing plan. In that same time span,
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African Americans had grown from 15% to 18% of the enrollment and European
Americans had fallen from 82% of the enrollment to just 36%.318
Due to white flight, many of the European Americans with children still living in
the metro were those who could not afford to move to the suburbs, with nicer housing
and better schools. European American families with money who stayed in the city
sought out educational alternatives. The Wichita Diocese warned city residents not to
look to its extensive Catholic school network as an escape from busing or integration.
But other schools opened during the years of debate over racial integration. While none
of them state an escape from racially mixed schools as their raison d’être, the timing of
their founding, and even the predominance of European Americans on their websites in
2019, speaks volumes. The Wichita Independent School opened around 1959 as the first
non-parochial private school in Kansas. Robert Love, a conservative who would later
oppose busing, was the chairman of the original operating board. The school said from
the beginning that “it gets no aid, wants no aid, will accept no aid” from the federal or
state government. Collegiate School opened in 1963. A series of Christian academies
began opening throughout the city in the late 1970s and early 1980s, most of which no
longer exist, with the exceptions of The Independent School (1980), Central Christian
Academy (1982) and Sunrise Christian Academy (1983). As of 2019, all accept minority
students, however there remains a high price for admittance that most minority families
cannot afford.319
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In all, busing for desegregation lasted for 37 years in Wichita, officially ending in
2008. In that time, the district’s formal agreement with the federal government went
through at least one change: in 1989 the district revised the agreement accommodate a
district-wide redesign, moving ninth graders into the high schools and sixth graders from
elementary schools into what were now termed middle schools instead of junior highs.
But, despite a surge in the Hispanic/Latino American population in Wichita in the 1980s
and 1990s, the district never changed its busing plan to include this growing minority that
quickly outstripped the size of the African American community and found itself
relegated to neighborhoods due to a combination of language, financial and
discrimination barriers. Even as the district bused African Americans to avoid schools
becoming segregated by neighborhood, it did nothing to prevent segregation of
neighborhood schools based on socioeconomic status or any race other than African
American. The board apparently was fine with Hispanic/Latino American-dominated
schools. 320
This may have been in part due to changes in enforcement and the rules
surrounding desegregation as court rulings began to take the teeth out of efforts to force
de facto segregated districts to actively work against local residential patterns. From the
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1954 Brown v. Board decision through the 1973 Keyes v. Denver School District ruling,
which clearly applied to the Wichita case as well, the U.S. Supreme Court, and its
incumbent lower federal courts, had stayed the course on desegregation, constantly
removing barriers and overriding school district delaying tactics. In Keyes, the Court
ruled that districts were guilty of aiding and abetting segregation when their policies,
such as building neighborhood schools in segregated neighborhoods and gerrymandering
attendance boundaries, resulted in a racially segregated school system. However,
beginning with the 1974 Milliken v. Bradley ruling, the Court began to pull the teeth from
the federal government’s desegregation enforcement. First, in Milliken, the Court
blocked school district efforts to compensate for white flight by forcibly merging urban
and suburban schools. The follow-up case, Milliken II, three years later, had a direct
impact on the future of Wichita schools. There, the Court decided that compensatory
programs or extra money from the state or district to repair the harm caused by
segregation, were an acceptable alternative to actual desegregation. So, too, did the
federal court ruling in Riddick v. Norfolk, 1986, the first that permitted a district declared
unitary to return to local control, no longer subject to federal oversight, as well as
Oklahoma v. Dowell, 1991, where the Supreme Court determined a unitary district could
legally return to a neighborhood school system even if that meant a return to segregated
buildings. The Freeman v. Pitts ruling, 1992, meant that districts no longer even had to
be fully desegregated to win partial release from court supervision, and Missouri v.
Jenkins, 1995, said school districts no longer needed to fix any of the educational harms
caused by operating a racially segregated system and that compensatory moneys, per
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Milliken II, should only be for a limited time. All these rulings slowly loosened the
financial bonds restricting Wichita’s options when it came to desegregation.321
Wichita had already tried the compensatory education route to make up for
segregated schools, and continued to use extra funds as an option to provide attractive
programs at the formerly African American dominated buildings to attract volunteer
European American students, lessening the need to draft students for busing purposes.
As the years passed, the concept came to be called magnet schools and took off
nationwide. One could argue that the gifted program operated at Fairmount Elementary
was the district’s first magnet school. School history labels Emerson Open Alternative
School, opened in 1975, as the first official magnet. By the end of mandatory busing in
2008, the district had 29 magnet schools in operation, including three of the formerly
segregated elementary schools at the center of the lawsuit. The next year, 2009, a fourth
was added. Dunbar and Little no longer served as elementary schools. Dunbar was used
for “other educational purposes” while Little had transitioned to an early childhood
education center, a pre-school. 322
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It was the success of its magnet program that the district cited to show its
continued commitment to desegregation when asking the Department of Education, the
offspring of the former HEW, to formally release the district from its “voluntary” busing
for desegregation agreement in 2012. While the agreement was nominally voluntary,
since it was reached through a negotiation between HEW and the district as opposed to
court-ordered, it did not come until the district had officially lost federal funding due to
its segregatory status. For all intents and purposes it was a federally mandated solution to
segregation in Wichita schools. The board voted to end busing in 2008, after the 2007
Supreme Court ruling that it is illegal to assign students to schools based on race. In
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, the Court
decided in a 5 to 4 vote that “preventing racial imbalance did not meet the standards for
constitutionally legitimate use of race” in school assignments at the K-12 level. This
ruling, on top of the series of rulings in the 1980s and 1990s, left the district with one
clear route - ask to end its agreement with the federal government. Then Superintendent
John Allison said, “We’re confirming with OCR our commitment to families to offer
high-quality education regardless of zip code or ethnicity, and whether it’s a magnet or
neighborhood” school.323
Yet, in the five years between the vote to end actual busing and the request to
officially be released from the district’s agreement with the federal government, 20 of the
district’s school buildings had quickly returned to being officially a single-race school,
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with 60% or more of the enrollment coming from just one race. Three schools were
predominantly African American: Mueller, one of the original seven segregated
elementary schools; Spaght, which had replaced Ingalls Elementary, another of the
original seven, and Gordon Parks Academy, opened in 2008 in the middle of the
traditional African American neighborhood in northeast Wichita. This was despite all
three being neighborhood magnets, with 50% of the enrollment coming from the
neighborhood and 50% from volunteers. Gordon Parks frequently was the lowest-scoring
school in the district. In addition to the three predominantly African American schools,
there were by then also six predominantly European American schools and 11 others that
were either Hispanic/Latino American majority or minority majority schools. Perhaps
part of the problem was the district’s magnet assignment method, by lottery. By 2016,
four years after formal release from the busing agreement, nine years after busing had
stopped, nearly 25% of the district’s schools were officially single race facilities.
L’Ouverture, another of the original seven elementary schools, had by now also returned
to segregated status. Yet, Hispanic/Latino American-dominated schools, which the
district had never bothered to add to the busing agreement, were now the most segregated
buildings, some of them with up to 95% of students being Hispanic/Latino American.324
A factor the architects of the busing plan in Wichita, and in other cities, did not
yet understand in 1971 was the nature of how children learn about race and racism in
American culture. At that time social scientists mainly saw children as empty vessels to
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be filled up with the sociological training of adults. With that understanding, enforcing
interaction among the races with guidance by well-meaning adults made sense as a sole
means of battling racism. And it did work to some extent. But perhaps not in the way
either researchers or the public might have hoped.
In the early 1980s, social science researchers began to look at how children
develop within their own spheres and the role they play in interpreting what is going on
around them and developing new attitudes and behaviors based on what they have
observed and experienced. Multiple studies have found that by the age of three most
children are aware of racial differences in appearance, the racial hierarchy within society
and where they place within that racial hierarchy, even altering behavior based on
interactions with people at different levels of that racial hierarchy. All of this happening
long before the chidlren enter a public school classroom, potentially with students of as
yet un-encountered races. This explains the persistence of racial divisions in American
society, from racial residential groupings outside of socioeconomic causes, to churches
and social interactions. In a city like Wichita, with a history of a strong KKK presence
and enforced segregation at many levels, it is no surprise, then, that racial animus
continued despite desegregation in schools. With the mixing of races at school, children
learned not to say or do certain things in public, or even, sometimes, to admit certain
attitudes to themselves (implicit bias), but the attitudes continued, carried over from
generation to generation.325
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In many ways those attitudes bubbled back to the surface with the election of first
President Barack Obama and then President Donald Trump. The author, a high school
teacher at the time of Obama’s election, witnessed this firsthand. While students in the
predominantly conservative Republican school district, USD 265 Renwick, were
predictably upset and always couched their objections to Obama in either political terms he was a communist in disguise - or religious terms - he was a secret Muslim - it was
always accompanied by using racial epithets to describe the new president. A few days
after the election, a 16-year-old male student threatened to shoot that “nigger upstart” in
the head if he ever got close enough to do so. According to the FBI, race-based hate
crimes, with race being the only cause, climbed from a low of 3,081 in 2014, before the
beginning of the presidential campaign in 2015, to a high of 4,832 in 2017, the most
recent year numbers are available. That is a 56.8% increase and does not count hate
crimes where race played a role but was not the sole cause. While consistent statistics are
not available for Wichita specifically, the State of Kansas saw similar increases, from 64
hate crimes committed in 2013to 75 in 2017. That is a 17.2% increase. 2014 numbers
were not available. The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) records a similar growth
in hate groups, a 30% increase, in those same three years across the country. At least
seven, five of which are anti-African American groups, operate out of Kansas and,
specifically, Wichita. The anti-African American groups are Identity Evropa, Crew 38,
White Boy Society, Traditionalist Worker Party, and The Crusaders. Although, by late
2019, the SPLC was only listing four hate groups in Kansas, two of them the anti-African
American groups Identity Evropa and Midland Hammerskins. The arrests and
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convictions of three members of the Crusaders in Garden City for plotting to bomb a
Somali refugee community there may have had something to do with that.326
So, was the effort worth it? That depends on who one asks. European American
activists who lived through the mandatory busing era in Wichita say yes, in the sense of
taking two steps forward and just one step back. Many African American leaders who
grew up withstanding the worst of the busing era in Wichita say their community came
out of what Alvin Morris called the “experiment” on Wichita schools facing a whole new
set of problems exacerbated by the solution to segregation.
In 2019, Mark McCormick’s attitudes toward the busing era echo those of Chester
Lewis when the agreement was first announced. While Constance Menninger released
the 1977 report from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,” School Desegregation in
Wichita,” she said, “Wichita has reason to be proud. Yet it cannot afford to be
complacent. It must remain vigilant to new forms of discrimination.” But as the 1970s
marched into the 1980s and 1990s, the educated African American middle class lost its
direction when it came to the civil rights fight. Many members of the civil rights
leadership in town left the fight to the next generation, instead choosing to protect new,
more lucrative jobs and the ability to pay their home mortgages, often in nicer
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neighborhoods with better schools. This left the lower socioeconomic levels of the
African American community alone to deal with the consequences of the changes crossbusing wrought on their neighborhoods. In an August 2019 article in the Kansas
Leadership Center Journal, McCormick wrote that “integration efforts remain a partial
failure despite noble though grudging efforts.” He argues that not only did the district put
the burden of desegregating on the victims of segregation, but it did nothing to help
children deal with the trauma of crossing picket lines to do so. In addition, the district’s
refusal to build new schools in the AAA zone decimated property values in the area even
as African Americans’ tax dollars were used to build schools in European American
neighborhoods, shoring up their property values, enriching those already financially
better off while simultaneously impoverishing the poorest in the city. McCormick says
“there’s [sic] a lot of people feel like integration disintegrated black communities.”
“My own little personal thesis is that you think you’ve come (a long way), but
then the next generation becomes almost oblivious to it to the point that they let the gains
slip away,” said Roz Hutchinson, looking back on the changes over the years. A senior
the year the HEW-ordered cross-busing went into effect, she remembers how things
changed for the better in school and across the city with the desegregation efforts.
Though, like McCormick, she mourns the loss of what could have been and the gains
lost, she holds on to her hopes for a brighter, more multi-racial and equitable future in
Wichita’s schools and elsewhere. She rests those hopes on the next generation. “I’ve got
to tell you, the people who made a difference, it wasn’t the parents and the adults, it was
the people my age….We’ve watched a generation let gains for people of color, for
women, you know…we’ve watched all of that slide away,” she said, recounting a recent
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conversation with her college-aged intern. “And it’s going to be the people your age who
are going to bring it back.”327
In the beginning, civil rights activists hoped desegregating schools would help the
next generation learn to live together instead of living in parallel worlds, one set above
the other. Yet, while their efforts left the seat of that three-legged stool tilted, and
uncomfortable for racists, they did not manage to destroy it entirely. The underlying
attitudes, attitudes that European American culture had spent more than four centuries
developing and reinforcing, remained in place. Schools like those in Wichita could
never, on their own, do the job. Even in the beginning, with the full force of the federal
government behind the effort, supporters knew that busing for desegregation was a
temporary solution to a long-term problem, a solution that required changes in personal
attitudes and overall culture, not just in laws. In the end, what they got were unevenly
enforced laws that, in the case of schools at least, became less effective, one might even
call them toothless, as more conservative judges found seats on the federal bench and on
the U.S. Supreme Court. At the same time, activists latched on to small gains in school
desegregation as well as in the job and housing markets and then became afraid to rock
the boat, afraid of losing what had been gained by pushing for more. Busing was a token
effort made at desegregation to pacify agitators and the federal government without
making the hard, and expensive, decisions that could have completely integrated schools
using education parks concomitant with increased compensatory educational spending
and long-term sociocultural programs designed to help develop new attitudes toward
other races throughout the community. Busing was too little, too late to integrate public

327

Roz Hutchinson, interview by Pilar Pedraza-Bailey, Wichita, KS, January 31, 2019.

181

schools and their surrounding communities. Wichita Public Schools may have
desegregated for a time, but they never truly integrated. Whether or not that can ever
happen will be up to coming generations.

182

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Interviews
Dean, Mary. Interviews by Pilar Pedraza-Bailey. Wichita, KS. June, July, August 2019.
Hutchinson, Roz. Interview by Pilar Pedraza-Bailey. Wichita, KS. January 31, 2019.
Mike Iuen. Interview by Pilar Pedraza-Bailey. Wichita, KS. October 18, 2019.
McCormick, Mark. Interview by Pilar Pedraza-Baily. Wichita, KS. August 28, 2019.
Manuscript Collection
Chester I. Lewis Papers, Kansas Collection, RH MS 558, Kenneth Spencer Research
Library, University of Kansas Libraries, Lawrence, KS.
These are the personal papers collected by former NAACP of Wichita President
and civil rights leader Chester I. Lewis. From newspaper clippings to personal
correspondence, this collection spans his persona life, professional legal career and Civil
Rights advocacy throughout his lifetime.
Edwana Denning Collins Papers. Ablah Library Special Collections, Wichita State
University, Wichita, KS.
These are the papers collected by former USD 259 school board member Edwana
Collins and donated to the Ablah Library Special Collections. They include letters from
Wichitans on both sides of the busing issue, communications with and reports from the
federal government and investigators looking into segregation in Wichita, and her
personal notes on conversations and school board meeting debates. This collection
played a major role in the judgement against the district.
Eugene Anderson Collection, Kansas Collection, RH MS 654, Kenneth Spencer Research
Library, University of Kansas Libraries, Lawrence, KS.
These are the legislative and personal papers collected by former Kansas State
Senator and State Representative Eugene Anderson, a founding member of the Kansas
African American Legislative Caucus, of Wichita. They cover the years 1971 through
1986.
Government Documents
City of Wichita. “2020-2021 Adopted Budget: City Profile.” Center for Economic
Development and Business Research, Wichita State University. Adopted August
13, 2019. Accessed November 29, 2019.

183

https://www.wichita.gov/Finance/Operating%20Budget/City%20Profile%20V1.p
df.
This profile looks at the demographic make-up of the City of Wichita in 2019,
historic changes since 1950 in population, and projected growth rates throughout the
expanded MSA.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. “2017 Hate Crime Statistics.” Uniform Crime
Reporting Program. Last modified 2018. Accessed November 1, 2019.
https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2017/topic-pages/incidents-and-offenses.
This is the FBI’s annual collection of statistics for the calendar year 2017
involving crimes motivated by hatred of race, religion, or other protected status.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. “2014 Hate Crime Statistics.” Uniform Crime
Reporting Program. 2015. Accessed November 1, 2019. https://ucr.fbi.gov/hatecrime/2014.
This is the FBI’s annual collection of statistics for the calendar year 2014
involving crimes motivated by hatred of race, religion, or other protected status.
“Population of Civil Divisions Less Than Counties.” 1870 U.S. Census. Accessed
February 13, 2019.
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1870/population/1870a16.pdf?#.
This report breaks down demographics by race and gender in cities across the
United States as of the 1870 Census, the year Wichita was incorporated as a city.
U.S. Census Bureau. Population Division. “Historical Census Statistics on Population
Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and By Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, For Large
Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States,” by Campbell Gibson and
Kay Jung. Working Paper No. 76, 2005.
This report breaks down demographics by race and gender in cities across the
United States from the 1790 to the 1990 U.S. Census.
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. School Desegregation in Wichita, Kansas, August
1977.
This report from the Commission on Civil Rights covers both the historical
presence of racism, both structural and cultural, in the city of Wichita and how that
impacted segregation in the school district. It goes on to look at how mandatory busing
over the previous years had ameliorated those problems.

184

U.S. Congress. Senate. Special Committee on the Termination of the National
Emergency. National Emergency: hearings. 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Part 1 –
Constitutional Questions Concerning Emergency Powers, April 1973.
This is a record of the congressional hearings in 1973 into the usage of emergency
powers by the President of the United States. Used here to confirm the identity of
Cornelius P. Cotter.
U.S. Department of Education. “Education and Title VI.” Last modified September 25,
2018. Accessed October 1, 2019.
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/hq43e4html.
A formal description of Title VI and its impact on the implementation of
desegregation on U.S. public schools at the K-12 level.
U.S. Department of Labor. Office for Civil Rights. “HEW Annual Reports.”
The 1969 annual report listed Wichita as the second northern city to be under
HEW investigation.
U.S. Department of the Interior. National Park Service. “African American Resources in
Wichita, Sedgwick County, Kansas.” National Register of Historic Places
Multiple Property Documentation Form. Last modified June 28, 2011. Accessed
March 7, 2019.
https://www.kshs.org/resource/national_register/MPS/AfricanAmericanResources
inWichitaKS.pdf.
This source reviews some of the development of real estate, home and business,
resources in the African American community in Wichita throughout the city’s history.
News
Austin American-Statesman. Austin, TX.
Austin Daily Herald. Austin, MN.
Catholic Advance. Wichita, KS.
The Community Voice. Wichita, KS.
Council Grove Republican. Council Grove, KS.
Daily Oklahoman. Oklahoma City, OK.
The Democrat. Wichita, KS.

185

El Paso Herald-Post. El Paso, TX.
Emporia Gazette. Emporia, KS.
Garden City Telegram. Garden City, KS.
Great Bend Tribune. Great Bend, KS.
Hays Daily News. Fort Hays, KS.
Hutchinson News. Hutchinson, KS.
Iola Register. Iola, KS.
Kansas City Times. Kansas City, MO.
Kansas Sentinel. Topeka, KS.
KTEN-TV. Ada, OK.
Manhattan Mercury. Manhattan, KS.
Ottawa Herald. Ottawa, KS.
Salina Journal. Salina, KS.
Springfield Leader and Press. Springfield, MO.
Topeka Journal. Topeka, KS.
Wichita Daily Eagle. Wichita, KS.
Wichita Eagle. Wichita, KS.
Wichita Eagle and Beacon. Wichita, KS.
Wichita Morning Eagle. Wichita, KS.
Wichita Weekly Eagle. Wichita, KS.
Wichita Independent. Wichita, KS.
Parsons Sun. Parsons, KS.
Articles

186

Chung, James. “Wichita Segregation: Past & Present.” The Chung Report. Last
modified December 18, 2018. Accessed February 13, 2019.
https://thechungreport.com/wichita-segregation-past-and-present/.
Chung provides a brief history of segregation in Wichita, complete with
interviews of those who lived in the city under de jure segregation, and discusses its
impact on 21st century de facto segregation in the city.
Eckels, Carla. “A Reflection of History: Brown v. Board Mural Unveiled at Kansas
Capitol.” KMUW. Last modified May 17, 2018. Accessed February 26, 2019.
https://www.kmuw.org/post/reflection-history-brown-v-board-mural-unveiledkansas-capitol.
Fowles, Brian. “Avoiding the Bloody Confrontation: The Kansas National Guard’s
Experience with Civil Disturbances.” Heritage of the Great Plains 19, no. 4
(1986): 29-38.
Fowles looks at how the Kansas National Guard’s experience quelling riots in
Wichita Kansas in 1968, along with other incidents in Kansas that year, helped them
learn to better respond to internal outbreaks of violence.
Guasco, Michael. “The Misguided Focus on 1619 as the Beginning of Slavery in the
U.S. Damages Our Understanding of American History.” The Smithsonian
Magazine. Last modified September 13, 2017. Accessed February 8, 2019.
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/misguided-focus-1619-beginningslavery-us-damages-our-understanding-american-history-180964873/.
Guasco points out African American slaves existed in and around the colonies
long before the often-quoted landing of “20. And odd Negroes” in Jamestown, Virginia,
in 1619. He argues using the 1619 date as the start point for African American existence
denies the true transnational nature of the slave trade in North America and the impact of
African Americans on the development and culture of the nation.
Miner, H. Craig, and William Unrau. “Historical Background of Old Cowtown Living
History Museum.” Old Cowtown Museum. Accessed February 19, 2019.
http://www.oldcowtown.org/Documents/Historical%20Background.pdf.
This article looks at the development of the living history museum in Wichita,
Kansas, known as Old Cowtown. It includes a short history of several of the buildings
and why they were included in the museum’s make-up. In this thesis it provides a
glimpse of how the city made money of the sin trades popular with the cowboy culture.
Schiff, Mitchell. “The Process of Integrating Public Schools in Wichita, Kansas 18901971.” Kansas History and Life. Last modified Spring 2014. Accessed February
17, 2019. https://othercollections.omeka.net/items/show/30.

187

Mitchell Schiff provides a brief overview of the economic, political, and racial
situation in Wichita leading up to the HEW order to desegregate or lose federal funding,
the resultant political battles in the city and the outcome of that fight.
Sloan, Charles William, Jr. “Kansas Battles the Invisible Empire: The Legal Ouster of
the KKK from Kansas, 1922-1927.” Kansas History: A Journal of the Central
Plains 40, no. 3 (Autumn 1974): 393-409.
Sloan looks at how the State of Kansas took on the KKK and legally banned it
from the state even as it was growing in strength in other parts of the country.
Wolters, Rachel M. “Vice and Race: Segregation in Kansas Cattle Towns.” 2013.
Accessed February 13, 2019. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/gs_rp/331.
Wolters looks at how segregation worked in the practical considerations of
frontier cow towns in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in particular towns like
Abilene and Wichita, Kansas, and the role it played in the development of those towns.
Books
Anderson, Carol. White Rage: The Unspoken Truth of Our Racial Divide. New York:
Bloomsbury Press, 2016.
In this book Carol Anderson looks at how the legacy of structural racism has led
to European American anger and resentment in the post-Civil Rights Era. She looks
specifically at how the Great Migration and Brown v. Board played into this growing
race-based rage.
Aretha, David. With All Deliberate Speed: Court-Ordered Busing and American
Schools. Greensboro, NC: Morgan Reynolds Publishing, 2011.
David Aretha provides an abbreviated overview of the history of court-ordered
busing in the United States for the purposes of desegregating federally funded schools. It
concentrates on the Boston case and the sometimes-violent negative reaction among the
public. It looks at factors behind both the court’s decision and the public’s reaction.
Baptist, Edward E. The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American
Capitalism. New York: Basic Books, 2016.
In this book, historian Edward Baptist looks at how race-based chattel slavery was
the underpinning of the modern American economy and how that developed into the
structural racism that still plagues the nation today. Those structures are why, without the
artificial mediation of school plans such as mandatory busing, resegregation is the trend
of the day.
Boyer, Paul. By the Bomb’s Early Light. New York: Pantheon Books, 1985.
188

Darling-Hammond, Linda. The Flat World and Education: How America’s Commitment
to Equity Will Determine Our Future. New York: Teachers College Press, 2010.
In her look at the impact of the current American educational system on the
country’s, and various racial groups’, economic success, Linda Darling Hammond
identifies what she calls an opportunity gap between groups that’s leaving low income
students, minority students, and English Language Learners behind. She works to
identify what needs to be done to fix this opportunity gap. Historically across the nation
and in Wichita desegregation has done precisely that.
Dean, Mary. The Black Legends of Kansas. Wichita: B. Global Entertainment, 2017.
Duncan, Greg J., and Richard J. Murnane. Restoring Opportunity: The Crisis of
Inequality and the Challenge for American Education. Cambridge: Harvard
Education Press, 2014.
In the era of improving schools for low-income students by improving support
systems rather than integrating them into a mixed socio-economic, and thus mixed race,
school system, Greg Duncan and Richard Murnane look at what supports are working
and which ones aren’t. Their conclusions, however, would support the idea of
desegregation, racial as well as socio-economic, as a solution to the increasing economic
inequalities in the current American educational system.
Eaton, Susan E. The Other Boston Busing Story: What’s Won and Lost Across the
Boundary Line. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015.
Susan Eaton presents the personal stories of 65 graduates who participated in a
voluntary, cross district busing problem between African American neighborhoods in
Boston and European American suburban schools. The pertinent portion of this study is
each participant’s evaluation of whether the attendant difficulties were worth it. Nearly
all said it was.
Eick, Gretchen Cassel. Dissent in Wichita: The Civil Rights Movement in the Midwest,
1954-1972. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001.
Feagin, Joe R. The White Racial Frame: Centuries of Racial Framing and CounterFraming. New York: Routledge, 2013.
Feagin looks at how European American America has repeatedly changed its
understanding of race through the centuries as it developed structures and ideas to contain
certain groups and limit options for advancement.
Jackson, Kenneth T. Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.

189

Kenneth Jackson describes how the process of European Americans fleeing the
big cities is buried deep in American history, pre-dating the Great Migration that swelled
the ranks of African Americans in northern cities or the battle to desegregate schools
across the nation. He also looks at how governmental policies enabled European
Americans to make the move to the suburbs while trapping African Americans and other
minorities in older, crumbling neighborhoods with failing infrastructures.
Lemann, Nicholas. The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How It
Changed America. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991.
Relying on the personal histories of those who lived it, Nicholas Lemann traces
the migration of some 5 million African Americans from the rural South to the urban
North between 1940 and 1970. In the process, he also sheds light on how some
government programs designed to help African Americans actually did work.
May, Elaine Tyler. Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era. New
York: Basic Books, 2008.
Elaine May looks at how the advent of the nuclear bomb coming on the heels of
the Great Depression and World War II influenced American concepts of topics as
distinct as family formation, gender roles, city design, home architecture, and attitudes
toward change. These changing ideals played into the push for desegregation and the
pushback against it.
Mead, James R. Hunting and Trading on the Great Plains, 1859-1875. Edited by
Schuyler Jones. Wichita: Rowfant Press, 2008.
This personal diary of one of the founders of Wichita sheds some light on the
early racial composition of the city and on racial attitudes of the original inhabitants.
Mickelson, Roslyn Arlin, Stephen Samuel Smith, and Amy Hawn Nelson, eds.
Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: School Desegregation and Resegregation in
Charlotte. Cambridge: Harvard Education Press, 2015.
The authors look at how the Charlotte-Mecklenburg district has unusual
characteristics for a larger, metropolitan school district that allowed it to become, for a
brief period, the poster child of desegregation and how, after demographic changes,
newcomers upended the hard-fought status quo and successfully got a court order ending
busing. Within a couple years the district was right back where it had started with
segregated schools and segregated academic outcomes. Finally, the authors look at what
factors might help the district once more climb out of that hole.
Miner, H. Craig. Wichita: The Early Years, 1865-80. Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1982.

190

This book looks at the development of Wichita in its earliest years. Used here in
provides insight into the influences African Americans had on and the roles they played
in the city’s development.
Mondale, Sarah, and Sarah B. Patton, eds. School: The Story of American Public
Education. Boston: Beacon Press, 2001.
Sarah Mondale and Sarah Patton look at the history of the American school
system, from the family tutor to the one room school house, from Americanizing
immigrant groups to desegregating classrooms, from vocational education to college and
career readiness. These changes more often than not reflected concurrent changes in the
greater social atmosphere of the country and rarely, if ever, truly considered what was
best for the child.
Ogletree, Charles J., Jr. All Deliberate Speed: Reflections on the First Half Century of
Brown v. Board of Education. New York: WW Norton, 2005.
Charles Ogletree, Jr, uses his own life memories to tell the story of the Brown v.
Board ruling and its impact on minority students over the next 50 years. As used here, it
provides background into how districts across the country worked to avoid implementing
full integration plans.
Orfield, Gary, and Susan E. Eaton. Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of
Brown v. Board of Education. New York: WW Norton, 1996.
This series of essays looks at the different aspects of resegregation in the country,
the court rulings that encouraged it, the swing in educational philosophy that marched
along in step with those rulings, and the parents who demanded it. They use case studies
of ten different school districts across the country to illustrate the widespread backsliding
in racial equality.
Rivoli, Pietra. The Travels of a T-Shirt in the Global Economy: An Economist Examines
the Markets, Power and Politics of World Trade. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons,
2015.
Pietra takes a look at the development of the garment industry in the United States
and, as its progenitor, the cotton trade and its reliance on slavery and other forms of cheap,
easily controlled labor in an effort to gain and maintain dominance on a global scale.
Taylor, Quintard. In Search of the Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American
West 1528-1990. New York: WW Norton, 1998.
Taylor traces the role African Americans played in the development of the
Western United States and in how those states, in particular Kansas, worked to limit
African American participation as the territory became more “civilized.”

191

Urban, Wayne J., and Jennings L. Wagoner, Jr. American Education: A History. 4th ed.
New York: Routledge, 2009.
Urban and Wagoner trace the development of the modern public school system and
the changing attitudes in the nation toward the form and function of a government
sponsored education. Their history includes a look at the role race relations played in those
attitudes and changes throughout the nation’s history.
Van Ausdale, Debra, and Joe R. Feagin. The First R: How Children Learn Race and
Racism. New York: Rowan and Littlefield, 2001.
Van Ausdale and Feagin trace studies since the mid-1980s that change the modern
understanding of how children learn about race and develop their own attitudes toward
race relations, then present their own study of 58 children, ages three to six, to show how
even in the pre-school years children develop an understanding of racial markers, from
hair type to skin tone, and use those markers to increase their own standing within a
social hierarchy. This held true even in a schools with what the authors describe as an
anti-bias, pro-tolerance curriculum.
Van Meter, Sondra. Our Common School Heritage: A History of the Wichita Public
Schools. Shawnee-Mission, KS: Inter-Collegiate Press, 1977.
Van Meter traces the development of the Wichita Public School system, from
buildings to taxes and curriculum, from the district’s inception through the early 1970s.
She includes a chapter almost exclusively devoted to the fight over busing and
desegregation in the Wichita schools.
Wilkerson, Isabel. The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America’s Great
Migration. New York: Vintage Books, 2011.
Wilkerson traces the Great Migration of some 6 million African Americans from
the South to the industrial North from the days of World War I through the end of the
Civil Rights Era. She depicts the massive changes the country underwent and its impact
on housing patterns and segregation issues in the North through the lives of three main
historical persons in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s.
Other
LeBegue, Erin. “Peace Breaker: Edwana Collins and Desegregation in Wichita Public
Schools.” Fairmount Folio 18. Wichita: Wichita State University, 2018.
Erin LeBegue profiles the contributions of one active member of the Wichita
USD 259 Public Schools Board of Education during the fight over whether to institute a
busing program in the district.

192

Peavler, David J. “The Color Line and Confronting Jim Crow: Civil Rights in Middle
America: 1850-1900.” PhD diss. University of Kansas, 2008.
In his doctoral dissertation, David Peavler traces how communities in the
midwestern states of Kansas, Nebraska and Iowa, developed color lines and enforced
them. His research spans a century and a half from 1850 to 1900, the time period of most
rapid growth and development in the Midwest.
Southern Poverty Law Center. “In 2018, We Tracked 1,020 Hate Groups Across the
U.S.” Accessed November 4, 2019. https://www.splcenter.org/hatemap?state=KS.
The Southern Poverty Law Center is the only entity in the United States that
tracks the growth and spread of hate groups across the country. That information is
collated here into an interactive map, allowing the user to see which groups are operating
in each state and what their particular hate is aimed at as well as race, religion, and
gender norms.

193

